Reassessing North-South Relations: An Examination of North-South Preferential Trade Agreements for Developing and Emerging Economies by Sahakyan, Davit
		
 
Reassessing North-South Relations: An Examination of North-South 
Preferential Trade Agreements for Developing and Emerging Economies 
 
 
PhD Candidate: Davit Sahakyan  
 
PhD Program in International Studies 
Doctoral School of International Studies 
University of Trento 
 
Thesis Supervisor: Professor Vincent Della Sala 
 
 
Thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor 
of Philosophy in International Studies 
 
 
 
Trento, Italy 
 
December 2015 
 
 
  
	 2 
 
Abstract 
The rapid proliferation of North-South preferential trade agreements (PTAs) during the last 
quarter century has had broad implications for developing and emerging economies. As a result 
of North-South power asymmetries and the aggressive trade policy that has been characterized as 
‘competitive liberalization,’ it has been argued that these agreements have produced asymmetric 
results in favor of Northern countries.  
This thesis advances a novel approach in the assessment of North-South preferential trade 
relations that goes beyond the simplistic interpretation of North-South trade politics as a 
phenomenon largely dominated by North-South power asymmetries. By acknowledging that not 
all North-South PTAs have the same characteristics, this thesis divides North-South PTAs into 
two sequential categories: first-order, i.e., Southern countries’ first North-South PTAs and 
second-order, i.e., Southern countries’ subsequent North-South PTAs.  
The thesis argues that, while first-order North-South PTA negotiations can produce 
asymmetric outcomes in favor of Northern countries because they have the ability to exert 
discriminative pressure on Southern countries, second-order North-South PTA negotiations 
follow a different logic. Having secured preferential access to Northern markets through first-
order PTAs, Southern countries become immune to competitive pressures and can themselves 
exert discriminative pressure on Northern countries during second-order negotiations.  
The thesis examines the North-South PTA negotiations of Mexico, Chile, Korea, Colombia, 
and Peru, five countries of the Global South that have been especially active in North-South 
preferential trade. Based on the author’s personal interviews with EU and US trade officials and 
primary and secondary sources, this thesis conducts process tracing to account for the process of 
the five Southern countries’ first-order and second-order North-South PTA negotiations and 
reveal the impact of first-order North-South PTAs on the bargaining powers of Southern 
countries in second-order negotiations and hence the outcomes of second-order agreements. The 
thesis concludes that, albeit to varying extents, first-order agreements improve the bargaining 
powers of Southern countries in second-order North-South trade negotiations.   
	 3 
Acknowledgements 
 
Although it is my name that features on the cover of this thesis, it would not have been possible 
without the continuous support of a great many persons. I owe my deepest gratitude to each and 
every one of them.  
First and foremost, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my thesis supervisor 
Professor Vincent Della Sala for the continuous support of my PhD study and related research, 
for his patience, motivation, and flexibility. His guidance and advice throughout the writing 
process was the single most important factor that made this thesis possible. Above his immense 
knowledge and experience, as well as right philosophy and attitude, I came to appreciate the fact 
that he cares about what he does. I am proud to have learned from him.  
I am grateful to all my professors and school staff, who made the PhD programme in 
International Studies a memorable part of my life. I express my appreciation to Professors 
Stefano Schiavo and Jens Woelk for their support and efficient coordination of the PhD 
programme. I would like to also thank Mark Beittel for his super-efficient courses in academic 
writing and Rosaria Astarita for her super-efficient administrative coordination of the 
programme.  
I express my gratitude to all my colleagues at the School of International Studies, especially 
Alice Gadler, who as a true Trentino, went out of her way to help a newcomer find his way in 
town, and Viktoria Akchurina, who has been a supportive friend. I particularly thank my good 
friend Lusine Mamyan, whose support throughout my time in Trento I cannot overemphasize.  
Last but not the least, I thank my family: my parents and my brother and his family, who 
have always been there for me throughout my life.   
	 4 
Table of Contents 
1.  Introduction …………………………………………………………........... 8 
2.  The Economics and Politics of PTAs and North-South Preferential Trade 
Relations …………………………………………………………………… 20 
 2.1 The Economic Rationale behind PTAs ……………………………………. 21 
 2.2 The Power and Politics behind Contagious PTAs ……………………….... 24 
 2.3 North-South Trade Relations against the Backdrop of the Proliferating 
PTAs .............................................................................................................. 30 
 2.4 A Novel Approach to North-South Power Relations: The ‘Order’ of a 
North-South PTA…………………………………………………………… 38 
 2.5 The Research Questions and Hypothesis ………………………………….. 45 
 2.6 The Research Design, Methodology, and Data Sources …………………... 48 
3.  From Developmental State to PTAs and the Shrinking Policy Space …….. 51 
 3.1 Industrial Development Policies and Economic Growth: The Role of the 
Developmental State and the Policy Space ………………………...…….... 52 
 3.2 North-South PTAs and the (Severely Constrained) Policy Space ……….... 61 
4.  An Assessment of US North-South PTAs: A Comparative Overview ……. 87 
 4.1 NAFTA ……………………………………………………………………. 89 
 4.2 The US-Chile PTA ……………….………………………………………… 108 
 4.3 The US-Korea PTA ……………………………………………………….. 122 
 4.4 The US-Columbia PTA  ………………………………………………….... 136 
 4.5 The US-Peru PTA …………………………………………………………. 148 
 4.6 Concluding Remarks ………………………………………………………. 160 
5.  An Assessment of EU North-South PTAs: A Comparative Overview ……. 166 
 5.1 The EU-Mexico PTA …………………………………………………….... 169 
 5.2 The EU-Chile PTA ……………………………………….………………… 177 
 5.3 The EU-Korea PTA ………………………………………………………… 183 
 5.4 The EU-Columbia and Peru PTA ………………………………………….. 194 
 5.5 Concluding Remarks ……………………………………………………….. 203 
6.  An Assessment of Japan’s North-South PTAs: A Comparative Overview ... 209 
 6.1 The Japan-Mexico PTA …………………………………………..……..…. 215 
 6.2 The Japan-Chile PTA ……………………………..……………………..…. 226 
 6.3 The Japan-Peru PTA …………………………………………..………..….. 233 
 6.4 Concluding Remarks ………………………..…………………………..….. 237 
7.  Conclusion ……………..……………………………..…............................. 242 
  Appendix I. List of Interviews …………………………..……………..…... 248 
  References ………..……………………………………………………..….. 249 
 
 
	 5 
Illustrations 
 
Figures   
  
2.3.1 Illustration of the ‘go-it-alone’ power …………………………………... 32 
2.4.1 Illustration of the logic of second-order North-South PTA negotiations .. 41 
3.2.1 The number of ICSID cases, 1972-2014 ………………………………... 74 
4.1.1 Mexico’s trade with the US, as per cent of its total trade, 1986-2013 ….. 91 
4.1.2 Mexico’s trade with the US, in thousand USD, 1986-2013 …………….. 92 
4.2.1 US trade with Chile, in thousand USD, 1981-2013 …………………….. 110 
4.3.1 US trade with Korea, in thousand USD, 1981-2013 ……………………. 123 
4.4.1 US trade with Colombia, in thousand USD, 1981-2013 ………………... 137 
4.5.1 US trade with Peru, in thousand USD, 1981-2013 ……………………... 150 
5.1.1 The EU-25 trade with Mexico, in thousand USD, 2000-2013 ………….. 169 
5.2.1 The EU-25 trade with Chile, in thousand USD, 2000-2013 ……………. 178 
5.3.1 The EU-25 trade with Korea, in thousand USD, 2000-2013 …………… 185 
5.4.1 The EU-25 trade with Columbia and Peru, in thousand USD, 2000-2013 196 
6.1.1 Japan’s trade with Mexico, in thousand USD, 1990-2013 ……………… 217 
6.2.1 Japan’s trade with Chile, in thousand USD, 1991-2013 ………………... 228 
6.3.1 Japan’s trade with Peru, in thousand USD, 1991-2013 ………………… 234 
 
Tables 
  
4.1.1 Government procurement thresholds of NAFTA ………………………. 100 
4.2.1 Government procurement thresholds of the US-Chile PTA ……………. 115 
4.3.1 Government procurement thresholds of the US-Korea PTA …………… 131 
4.4.1 Government procurement thresholds of the US-Colombia PTA ……….. 144 
4.5.1 Government procurement thresholds of the US-Peru PTA …………….. 154 
4.6.1 An overview of US North-South PTAs ………………………………… 161 
5.1.1 Government procurement thresholds of the EU-Mexico PTA …………. 173 
5.2.1 Government procurement thresholds of the EU-Chile PTA ……………. 181 
5.4.1 Government procurement thresholds of the EU-Columbia and Peru PTA 199 
5.5.1 An overview of the EU’s North-South PTAs …………………………... 204 
6.1.1 Government procurement thresholds of the Japan-Mexico PTA ………. 223 
6.2.1 Government procurement thresholds of the Japan-Chile PTA …………. 231 
6.3.1 Government procurement thresholds of the Japan-Peru PTA ………….. 236 
6.4.1 An overview of Japan’s North-South PTAs ……………………………. 238 
7.1 An overview of first-order and second-order North-South PTAs ……… 243 
 
 
  
	 6 
List of Abbreviations 
 
AIDS Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome 
ARV Antiretroviral Drug 
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
BIT Bilateral Investment Treaty  
CAFTA Central America Free Trade Agreement 
CAFTA-DR Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement 
CFE Comisión Federal de Electricidad  
CIPR Commission on Intellectual Property Rights 
CODELCO Corporación Nacional del Cobre de Chile  
CRS Congressional Research Service 
DSU Dispute Settlement Understanding  
EC European Community  
ECLAC Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 
EU European Union 
FDA Food and Drug Administration  
FDI Foreign Direct Investment  
FTA Free Trade Agreement 
GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
GATS General Agreement on Trade in Services 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
GI Geographical Indicator 
GNP Gross National Product  
GPA Agreement on Government Procurement  
GSP Generalized System of Preferences 
HIV Human Immunodeficiency Virus 
ICSID International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes 
IMF International Monetary Fund 
IP Intellectual Property  
IPRs Intellectual Property Rights 
JETRO Japanese External Trade Organization 
MAFF Japanese Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery  
METI Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry  
MFN Most-Favored Nation 
MITI Ministry of International Trade and Industry  
MOFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 
MSF Médecins Sans Frontières 
NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement  
NGO Non-Governmental Organization 
OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
PEMEX Petróleos Mexicanos  
PhRMA Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers Association  
PTA Preferential Trade Agreement 
	 7 
RIETI Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry 
RQ Research Question  
SDR Special Drawing Rights 
TPA Trade Promotion Authority  
TPP Trans-Pacific Partnership 
TRIMS Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures 
TRIPS Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
TTIP Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership  
UK United Kingdom  
UNCITRAL United Nations Commission on International Trade Law  
US United States 
USA Unites States of America  
USD United States Dollar 
USDA United States Department of Agriculture  
USITC United States International Trade Commission 
USTR United States Trade Representative  
WHO World Health Organization  
WIPO World Intellectual Property Organization  
WTO World Trade Organization 
	
	
	
	
 
 
  
	 8 
1. Introduction 
 
This thesis will contribute to the debate of what are the policy preferences of Northern and 
Southern countries in North-South trade relations and how these preferences are advanced or 
constrained during North-South preferential trade negotiations. The thesis draws on the argument 
that, given North-South power asymmetries, North-South trade relations have increasingly been 
influenced by a North-South power play that has brought about global, regional, and bilateral 
trade rules that favor the preferences of Northern countries. This thesis contributed to the debate 
of who gets what share of the increased pie as a result of North-South preferential trade 
liberalization by advancing a novel framework, whereby it is acknowledged that Southern 
countries’ first and subsequent North-South preferential trade negotiations share different 
characteristics that can have serious implications for the outcomes of these negotiations. The 
sequencing of North-South PTAs will provide additional insights on the bargaining power of the 
parties and provide a more accurate interpretation of North-South trade relations.  
The liberalization and institutionalization of international trade in the post-World War II era, 
which started with the creation of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1947, 
have rendered significant results in terms of the reduction of tariffs and non-tariff barriers to 
trade, as well as the establishment of a credible dispute settlement body. After the creation of the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995, however, progress in multilateral trade negotiations 
has been limited. The Doha Development Round, which started in 2001, has brought multilateral 
trade negotiations to a standstill.1 The North-South divide in the Doha Round over issues related 
																																								 																				
1 To be sure, at the Ninth Ministerial Conference, held in Bali, Indonesia, in December 2013, ministers adopted the 
‘Bali Package’ on trade facilitation, which, although an important step in the otherwise stagnant multilateral 
negotiations, is a rather small achievement (Koopmann and Witting, 2014; Petersmann, 2014). Meanwhile, the 
	 9 
to agricultural and non-agricultural market access, investment measures, trade in services, and 
intellectual property rights (IPRs) still persists, which makes a possible final deal under the Doha 
Round less likely in the near future (Wade, 2004; Rodrik, 2008b; Hufbauer et al, 2010; Bagwell 
and Staiger, 2011; IMF, 2011; Schwab, 2011; Hufbauer and Schott, 2012; Koopmann and 
Witting, 2014; Petersmann, 2014; Decreux and Fontagné, 2015). 
With the WTO in its current form still ‘ill-suited’ to address recent developments in 
international trade, these developments have been increasingly covered by a variety of 
preferential trade agreements (PTAs) between different WTO member-countries (Koopmann and 
Witting, 2014; Petersmann, 2014). It is not only the quantity of such agreements that has soared 
during the last quarter century that matters, however, but also the terms and scope of PTAs that 
have changed to encompass the constantly evolving trends in the world economy (Chauffour and 
Maur, 2011; Hoekman, 2011; WTO, 2011). Given the sharp decline of the average most-favored 
nation (MFN) tariff2—the non-discriminative rate of tariffs, which, if offered to one member, 
should be made available to the other members of the WTO—eschewing high MFN tariffs has 
become a less important objective for the signatories to PTAs.  
As distinct from the ‘old regionalism’ of the 1960s, which was characterized by South-South 
linkages aimed at providing higher scales for industries in developing countries’ quest for 
industrialization (Bhagwati, 1968; 1993; Balassa, 2012), the ‘new regionalism’ of the 1990s 
includes new features, such as North-South linkages, deeper pre-agreement reforms, and deeper 
and beyond-the-border integration (Ethier, 1998; 2001; Estevadeordal et al, 2000). The nature of 
regionalism has evolved even further from that of the 1990s. In the words of one prominent 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																																			
prospects of its ratification have become gloomy after India withdrew its support, worried that the deal might 
impede with its food security programs (Economist, 2014b).   
2 The average applied tariff was as low as 4 per cent in 2009, down from the recent peak of over 9 per cent in 1994 
and close to 40 per cent when GATT was established in 1947 (Heydon and Woolcock, 2009; WTO, 2011).  
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voice in the debate, today’s regionalism is different from its predecessors, for the current bargain 
is ‘foreign factories for domestic reforms’ rather than one over preferential tariffs (Baldwin, 
2011:28).  
As a result of the recent proliferation, the number of PTAs increased four-fold during the 
1990s and 2000s, reaching around 300 in 2010 (WTO, 2011). As of December 2015, the count of 
PTAs in force was put by the WTO at more than 400,3 which constitutes more than a five-fold 
increase during the last quarter century. Volume-wise, intra-PTA trade comprised over 50 per 
cent of world merchandise exports in 2008 (including trade in the EU), up from 28 per cent in 
1990 (WTO, 2011). Although the number of PTAs between developing countries has risen 
sharply, North-South PTAs—i.e., between developing and developed countries4—have attracted 
extensive political and academic scrutiny due to the power asymmetry between the parties and 
developmental implications they entail. 
There has been a mixture of factors behind the rapid proliferation of PTAs during the last 
quarter century. The economic rationale behind PTAs largely rests upon trade creation5 and 
welfare maximization. Trade theory has identified the optimal levels of external tariffs and other 
factors, such as the distance between, as well as the size and relative factor endowments of PTA 
partners, which affect welfare gains and make preferential trade economically viable. The ideal 
type of PTAs, which is seen to increase the members’ welfare and not erode the welfare of non-
participants, is both desirable and potentially possible. The ideal outcome does, however, depend 
																																								 																				
3 WTO: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm (accessed 3 December 2015). 
 
4 For the purposes of this thesis, the US, EU, and Japan are defined as developed economies. 
5 Trade creation implies the exploitation of economic efficiencies within a free-trade area and creation of more trade 
via tariff elimination between the members. Trade diversion, on the other hand, implies a shift from a more efficient 
producer outside of the free-trade area towards less efficient producers in the free-trade area, which is made possible 
by high external tariffs and tariff-free trade within the free-trade area.  
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upon governments’ optimal policies, which are often hard to achieve politically (Kemp and Wan, 
1976; Krugman, 1991a; Baier and Bergstrand, 2004).   
Despite falling short of (consistently) providing trade creating and welfare maximizing 
outcomes, PTAs have proliferated during the last quarter century. In fact, it has been argued that 
the political viability of PTAs can be strengthened if the agreements are trade diverting, i.e., 
contrary to the economic rationale, for the narrow interests of the industries gaining from a PTA 
will prevail over those who become worse off (Grossman and Helpman, 1995; Krishna, 1998; 
Manger, 2009). This happens because industries gaining from trade liberalization are politically 
more organized and can lobby for agreements, while the costs of the agreements are dispersed 
among taxpayers that have little incentive to mobilize for negligible gains. ‘To the extent that 
industry interests are better represented in the political process than are taxpayer’s interests, trade 
diversion will enhance political viability while contributing to an inefficient allocation of 
resources in the two partner countries’ (Grossman and Helpman, 1995:680). Likewise, 
‘preferential arrangements that divert trade away from the rest of the world are more likely to be 
supported politically’ (Krishna, 1998:244). In relation to North-South PTAs, in order to ensure 
the political feasibility of the agreements within developed countries, North-South PTAs should 
discriminate against third—usually developed—countries (Manger, 2009). ‘Trade blocs have 
economic effects,’ argues a World Bank (2000:123) report, ‘but that is not why they are 
established.’  
Thus, the inherent discriminative nature of PTAs appears to be the most plausible explanation 
for the proliferation of PTAs during the last quarter century. Because PTAs are inherently 
discriminative, they put pressure on countries that see their welfare diminished as a result of the 
trade-diverting effects of PTAs. As a result, countries are compelled to sign counter-agreements 
	 12 
to level the playing field with their competitors and counter the trade-diverting effects of PTAs. 
For obvious reasons, Baldwin (1993; 1995) termed this phenomenon a ‘domino effect.’ 
Moreover, with the recent wave of regionalism, PTAs have brought about an increase in trade 
and investment flows between members (Berger et al, 2013; Dür et al, 2014; Büthe and Milner, 
2014; Egger and Nigai, 2015). This has invigorated the discrimination towards non-participants 
even further that have sought counter-agreements to redress the negative consequences of third-
party PTAs (Baccini and Dür, 2012; Baldwin and Jaimovich, 2012).  
Against the backdrop of the discrimination-induced proliferation of PTAs, North-South 
relations have been presented as a phenomenon largely explained by North-South power 
asymmetries. Southern countries’ increasing interest in reciprocal trade relations with the North, 
beginning from the 1990s, emerged partially because of changes in multilateral trade rules. 
Unlike in the pre-1994 GATT system, where Southern countries were not required to reciprocate 
by opening up their own economies while enjoying access—albeit only limited—to industrial 
countries’ markets, the WTO required policy change within Southern countries in return for 
foreign direct investment (FDI) and preferential access to rich markets (Schott, 2004). The quid 
pro quo of policy change in return for better market access and more FDI was taken to a new 
level in preferential trade negotiations. In fact, through the trade policy termed ‘competitive 
liberalization’ by Robert Zoellick (2002), the then US Trade Representative (USTR),6 Northern 
countries have pushed for policy change and trade liberalization in Southern countries. 
‘Competitive liberalization’ has been characterized by pressure on developing and emerging 
economies to sign deals with industrialized countries under the threat of losing vital access to the 
markets of rich economies while their competitors enjoy preferential treatment. As a result, 
																																								 																				
6 The term was introduced by Bergsten (1996), but was popularized as a result of Zoellick’s trade policy during the 
2000s. 
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North-South PTAs have restricted the policy space in Southern countries, which is generally 
referred to as ‘the flexibility under trade rules that provides nation states with adequate room to 
maneuver to deploy effective policies to spur economic development’ (Gallagher, 2008:63; 
Shadlen, 2008). This view presents the North-South preferential trade relationship as essentially 
a zero-sum game of who gets what share of the increased pie as a result of freer and more 
efficient trade within a PTA.7 
Given the North-South power asymmetry and the unique settings provided by the 
discriminative nature of PTAs, Northern countries have managed to reap bigger benefits from 
North-South PTAs. Based on the capacity of generating discriminative pressure on non-
participants, the domino effect ‘can trigger membership requests from countries that were 
previously happy to be non-members’ (Baldwin, 1995:45). The US, for example, was successful 
in altering the status quo by negotiating an agreement with Canada, which put pressure on 
Mexico, forcing it to choose between joining the bandwagon on terms largely dictated by the US 
and being marginalized while Canadian exports (which were increasingly converging in structure 
with those of Mexico) enjoyed preferential access to the US market. As a result, Mexico chose 
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which may have not necessarily been in 
its best interests at the time (Gruber, 2000). In fact, similar rhetoric can be observed in the 
comments of James Baker, Ronald Reagan’s Treasury Secretary, regarding the US-Canada PTA 
in 1988. Baker (1988:39) argued that the US-Canada PTA would serve as ‘a lever to achieve 
more open trade’ as other countries should understand that the US will push for and support free 
trade with or without them, thus ‘[i]f they don’t open markets, they will not reap the benefits.’ 
The asymmetric power relations between the US and Mexico enabled the US to basically dictate 
																																								 																				
7 The idea that ‘power can be used to extract greater gains from trade from the other party,’ notwithstanding the non-
zero-sum nature of freer trade for the trading parties, has been initially advanced by Bhagwati (1991:52).  
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the terms of the agreement in almost all important areas, including agriculture, investment 
measures, and IPRs (Maxfield and Shapiro, 1998; Cameron and Tomlin, 2000; Dumberry, 2001; 
Interview 10). 
Likewise, in the wake of the collapse of the US-Andean talks over a regional agreement 
between the US, Colombia, Peru, and Ecuador, the US went bilateral with Colombia and Peru, in 
order to achieve the negotiating outcomes it failed to push for during the Andean talks. Neither 
Colombia nor Peru could afford to be left out of deeper integration while the other signed a PTA 
with the US. Hence, both countries had to agree on restrictive and hitherto unacceptable terms, 
including in sensitive areas like IPRs and agriculture, which were predicted to have negative 
consequences on the two Andean countries. Colombian negotiators felt that ‘in order to sign a 
FTA with the USA it is necessary to pass the “lineas rojas,”’ including in measures related to 
IPRs and agricultural liberalization (von Braun, 2012:136), but they had to agree on terms 
proposed by the US as the alternative was deemed as less desirable. As a result, both Colombia 
and Peru signed separate agreements with the US on terms largely dictated by American 
negotiators (von Braun, 2012; Interview 11). A similar mechanism was in place in the EU’s 
negotiations with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Following a stalemate 
in the negotiations with the bloc due to irreconcilable differences between the parties, the EU 
started separate negotiations with individual ASEAN countries. As a result, the negotiations with 
Singapore triggered response from Malaysia and Vietnam, while Thailand was predicted to be 
next in line. Although the negotiations are still under way,8 the EU is hopeful to push for the type 
of liberalization in individual PTAs that was proved impossible during the negotiations with 
ASEAN as a bloc (Interview 4; Interview 5; Interview 8). 	
																																								 																				
8 Except for the negotiations with Singapore that concluded in December 2012.  
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Thus, the conventional interpretation of North-South preferential trade relations as an affair 
largely dominated by power asymmetries implies heavy concessions for Southern countries, i.e., 
‘to sacrifice many important and traditional tools of development policy’ (Shadlen, 2008:10), 
including in IPRs, investment measures, trade in services, and government procurement, in 
return for preferential access to Northern markets.  These are the areas where developed 
countries have their vested interests. At the same time, restricted policy space in these areas 
impedes development and even circumscribes governments’ ability to cope with a national 
emergency (Wade, 2003; 2006; Rodrik, 2008b; Gallagher, 2008; Shadlen, 2008; 2009).  
However, the conventional view fails to distinguish between the individual features of North-
South PTAs that can play an importance role in mitigating the effects of the power asymmetry in 
North-South preferential trade relations. Instead, it takes a largely ‘universal’ approach to these 
relations strictly from the lens of North-South power asymmetries. In fact, not all North-South 
PTAs have the same characteristics. This thesis takes a novel approach towards (re)assessing 
North-South preferential trade relations by distinguishing sequentially between first-order, i.e., 
Southern countries’ first, North-South PTAs and second-order, i.e., Southern countries’ 
subsequent, North-South PTAs. This thesis argues that the ‘order’ of an agreement can have 
serious implications for the outcome of North-South trade negotiations. While Southern 
countries are vulnerable to marginalization during the negotiations of first-order North-South 
agreements, second-order North-South trade negotiations follow a different logic. Having 
secured preferential access to Northern markets through first-order agreements, Southern 
countries become immune to discriminative pressures during second-order North-South PTA 
negotiations. Moreover, first-order North-South PTAs can subsequently induce pressure on 
Northern countries that feel the urge to sign counter-agreements to level the playing field for 
	 16 
their multinationals vis-à-vis their competitors from other developed economies. Hence, while 
power asymmetries may have heavily influenced the outcomes of first-order North-South PTAs, 
this study hypothesizes that first-order agreements increase the bargaining powers of Southern 
countries in subsequent—i.e., second-order—North-South PTA negotiations by alleviating the 
fear of exclusion among Southern countries and discriminating against other Northern countries. 
The novel approach introduced in this thesis goes beyond the simplistic interpretation of North-
South trade politics as an affair largely dominated by power asymmetries between the parties and 
takes a longer-term view on North-South trade relations that seeks to provide a more accurate 
interpretation of these relations, with serious implications for both developed and developing 
countries.  
It appears that first-order North-South PTAs raise the bargaining powers of Southern counties 
during second-order North-South PTA negotiations by making them immune to discriminative 
pressures and by exerting pressure on other Northern countries. Indeed, North-South PTAs can 
discriminate against exporting industries in developed countries, which influence trade policies 
in their home countries via well-organized lobbying activities and push for counter-agreements 
to redress the negative consequences of discriminatory PTAs (Manger, 2005; 2009). In fact, as 
recounted by Dür (2007; 2010) and Baccini and Dür (2012), a number of EU, US, and Japanese 
(North-South) PTAs concluded during the 1990s and 2000s were signed as a result of lobbying 
by European, American, and Japanese industries that were discriminated in terms of access to 
emerging and developing economies. This thesis finds there is sufficient evidence to suggest that 
Southern countries, albeit to varying extents, did take advantage of the pressure on Northern 
governments from domestic industries and stable and preferential access to Northern markets as 
a result of first-order agreements, to secure more favorable deals in second-order North-South 
	 17 
PTAs. Southern countries may accept restrictive first-order North-South PTAs because the 
alternative is even less favorable. They, however, can use these agreements as a bargaining tool 
in subsequent negotiations and as ‘a solid cornerstone upon which to build other critical ties in 
the global economy’ (Preece and Milman, 1994:56).  
As per the hypothesis of this thesis, second-order North-South PTAs are more likely to be in 
line with developing and emerging countries’ interests and preferences than first-order North-
South agreements, because Southern countries experience enhanced bargaining powers during 
second-order agreements because of first-order PTAs. In order to account for the impact of first-
order North-South PTAs on the bargaining powers of Southern countries and hence the outcomes 
of second-order agreements, the thesis employs a process tracing methodology to examine the 
negotiations of the agreements. Based on the author’s personal interviews with EU trade officials 
and policy-makers at the Directorate-General for Trade in Brussels (conducted in December 
2012) and US trade officials and policy-makers at the Office of the USTR in Washington, DC 
(conducted in April 2012), as well as primary and secondary data, the thesis studies the 
negotiations of the first-order and second-order North-South PTAs of the US, EU, and Japan 
with Mexico, Chile, Korea, Colombia, and Peru, five countries of the Global South that have 
been active in North-South trade negotiations and have PTAs with at least two developed 
economies.9 By doing so, the thesis seeks to establish links between first-order and second-order 
agreements that transform the utility of a first-order agreement into enhanced bargaining powers 
of Southern countries during second-order negotiations. Furthermore, to illustrate the results of 
the enhanced bargaining powers in second-order agreements, the paper conducts a comparative 
analysis of the first-order and second-order North-South PTAs of Mexico, Chile, Korea, 
																																								 																				
9 For practical purposes, the assessment of the negotiations and outcomes of the North-South PTAs is carried out in 
Chapters that are organized around the Northern countries, while final conclusions are drawn from the Southern 
countries’ perspectives.  
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Colombia, and Peru. The analysis is carried out as per the actual texts of the agreements, as well 
as other primary and secondary sources, and is based on provisions related to policy areas that 
have been argued to diminish the policy space in developing and emerging economies, as 
discussed in Chapter 3.  
A few caveats before proceeding. Firstly, this thesis does not attempt to measure the impact of 
North-South PTAs on their members and non-members. This, in fact, would have been next to 
impossible, given that most PTAs were concluded relatively recently, and the actual effects can 
possibly be known in a longer time span. Instead, the aim of this thesis is to explore the power 
dynamics in North-South relations, which among other things, are reflected in the outcomes of 
North-South PTA negotiations. Hence, to evaluate these outcomes, the thesis assesses the 
provisions of each agreement on a range of key aspects of North-South trade, including tariffs 
and related measures, agricultural liberalization, government procurement, trade in services, 
investment measures, and IPRs, as discussed and justified in Chapter 3.  
Secondly, by no means does the thesis intend to make strong causal claims on the sequential 
order of PTAs and negotiation outcomes. Other factors may account for different outcomes in 
second-order PTAs. However, based on the assessment of the negotiations and outcomes of the 
first-order and second-order North-South PTAs of Mexico, Chile, Korea, Colombia, and Peru, 
the thesis seeks to test the proposition that the sequence of PTAs does affect bargaining positions 
and power dynamics, which could shape negotiation outcomes. Moreover, it is hereby 
acknowledged that, due to the time span between the negotiations (that may have changed the 
priorities of the countries), difference between Northern countries (some project power more 
efficiently than others), and other factors this thesis does not account for due to objective 
reasons, such as the scope of the project and scarcity of time, there may be variables other than 
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the order of an agreement that may have accounted for the difference in the outcomes of North-
South negotiations.  
The rest of the thesis is organized the following way. Chapter 2 discusses the economics and 
politics of North-South preferential trade relations and the factors behind the proliferation of 
(North-South) PTAs during the last quarter century. It then reviews the power dynamics in 
North-South trade relations and argues why the approach introduced in this thesis is better suited 
to explain these relations against the backdrop of the proliferating PTAs. This is followed by the 
formulation of the thesis research questions and hypothesis and the introduction of the research 
design, methodology, and data sources. Chapter 3 discusses and emphasizes the importance of 
policy autonomy (policy space) for developing and emerging economies, as well as points out 
the restriction of the policy space in key policy areas in developing and emerging economies as a 
result of North-South PTAs. The outline of the key policy areas is later used for the analysis and 
comparison of first-order and second-order North-South PTAs in subsequent chapters. Each of 
Chapters 4, 5, and 6 respectively assesses the negotiations and outcomes of the US, EU, and 
Japanese North-South PTAs with Mexico, Chile, Korea, Colombia and Peru, whereby 
comparative overviews of first-order and second-order North-South PTAs, based on the policy 
areas outlined in Chapter 3, are carried out. And, finally, Chapter 7 provides concluding remarks 
and discusses the findings of the thesis and their implications for Northern and Southern 
countries.  
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2. The Economics and Politics of PTAs and North-South Preferential Trade Relations 
 
Before delving into the debate of what are the drivers behind the recent proliferation of North-
South PTAs and how it has shaped the North-South preferential trade relations, this thesis 
introduces the concept of the ‘order’ of a PTA. The thesis distinguishes between first-order, i.e., 
Southern countries’ first, and second-order, i.e., Southern countries’ subsequent, North-South 
PTAs. It is hereby hypothesized that the order of a PTA can affect its negotiation outcome, as 
illustrated further in this chapter. Hence, the novel approach introduced in this thesis that takes a 
differentiated view towards North-South PTAs, the thesis argues, will provide a better 
explanation of North-South trade relations.  
PTAs have had two main rationales behind them: economic and political. The literature 
review in this chapter is carried out as follows. Chapter 2.1 examines the economic rationale 
behind PTAs. It acknowledges the conditions of economic viability of PTAs and points out the 
political obstacles for consistently achieving welfare-improving PTAs. Chapter 2.2 reviews the 
political drivers of the proliferation of North-South PTAs, with a particular emphasis on their 
inherent discriminative nature that has strong effects on third countries. Chapter 2.3 discusses 
North-South relations against the backdrop of the proliferating PTAs that rest largely upon 
North-South power asymmetries. Chapter 2.4 introduces a novel approach to reassess North-
South preferential trade relations that adopts a differentiated view towards North-South PTAs 
based on the sequential order of the agreements. Chapter 2.5 elaborates the research questions 
and hypothesis of the thesis, and finally, Chapter 2.6 lays out the research design, methodology, 
and data sources. 
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2.1. The Economic Rationale behind PTAs  
 
The institutionalization of international trade, which started with the creation of GATT in 1947, 
has been based on the principles of reciprocity and nondiscrimination. Reciprocity exists when 
‘policy adjustments bring about changes in the volume of each country’s imports that are of 
equal value to changes in the volume of its exports’ (Bagwell and Staiger, 2002:6). 
Nondiscrimination implies that import tariffs on a specific good cannot be more restrictive for 
the exports of one GATT member than for the exports of another (the MFN principle). Although 
these ‘complementary principles’ are there to help governments strike more efficient bilateral 
agreements and make sure these agreements do not alter the welfare of non-participants (Bagwell 
and Staiger, 2002:8), GATT Article XXIV does allow governments to create free trade areas and 
customs unions10 on a discriminatory basis that may have negative welfare implications for non-
participants.  
The exception to the MFN principle is stipulated by Paragraph 8 of GATT Article XXIV, 
which states that ‘duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce … are eliminated with 
respect to substantially all the trade between the constituent territories of the union.’11  Thus, the 
exception to the MFN principle is justified on the grounds that full integration with the abolition 
of all (or ‘substantially all’) trade barriers between the members of customs unions will create 
unions with ‘quasi-national’ status and single-nation characteristics that would presumably 
preclude trade diversion and its negative impact on welfare maximization (Bhagwati, 1991; 
																																								 																				
10 As distinct from a free trade area, where each member-country has its own policy towards non-members, a 
customs union is a type of a preferential trade arrangement that abolishes tariffs among its members and sets 
common external tariffs for non-members (Frankel et al, 1997). 
 
11 GATT text, available at http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/analytic_index_e/gatt1994_09_e.htm 
(accessed 3 December 2015). 
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1993). The practice shows, however, that the ‘unfortunate’ Article XXIV has actually fallen 
short of serving that purpose, producing preferential liberalization with trade-diverting 
characteristics (Bhagwati, 2008:9).  
GATT Article XXIV (Paragraph 4) explicitly states that ‘the purpose of a customs union or 
of a free-trade area should be to facilitate trade between the constituent territories and not to raise 
barriers to the trade of other contracting parties with such territories.’12 Thus, the economic 
rationale behind PTAs rests upon the idea, initially promoted by Jacob Viner (1950), that 
preferential tariff elimination is welfare improving if it is ‘trade creating,’ and not ‘trade 
diverting.’ Trade creation implies the exploitation of economic efficiencies within the customs 
union and creation of more trade via tariff elimination between the members. Trade diversion, on 
the other hand, implies a shift from a more efficient producer outside of the customs union 
towards less efficient producers in the union. Trade diversion is, therefore, made possible by the 
sufficiently high external tariffs of the customs union, while its members trade duty-free among 
themselves.  
Even if a PTA is trade diverting, it may be welfare increasing for its members, as the 
members’ terms of trade vis-à-vis the rest of the world improve. However, the pursuit of such 
agreements may backfire if other such agreements emerge and trigger ‘a beggar-all trade war that 
leaves everyone worse off’ (Krugman, 1991b:16). It is worth noting that ‘while a customs union 
with a given external tariff may be harmful to the members, a customs union that adjusts its tariff 
optimally is always beneficial’ (Krugman, 1991a:11, italics in the original). The idea that it is 
always possible for countries to form customs unions with common external tariffs, whereby 
members improve their own welfare while outsiders do not incur welfare deterioration, was 
																																								 																				
12 GATT text, available at http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/analytic_index_e/gatt1994_09_e.htm 
(accessed 3 December 2015). 
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originally advanced by Kemp and Wan (1976). They argue that, through the adjustment of the 
external tariff, the members of a customs union can ensure that there is no trade diversion and 
that countries always gain from forming a customs union. The utility of customs unions, hence, 
becomes conditional upon governments’ decisions to pursue optimal policies.  
While a customs union can always be potentially beneficial to the members and harmless to 
outsiders if external tariffs are right, specific factors can increase the welfare gains as a result of 
forming a customs union. More specifically, (1) the higher the initial rate of tariffs on imports 
into the partner countries, (2) the greater the share of world production, consumption, and trade 
covered by the union, (3) the higher the trade volume between partner countries, (4) the more 
competitive and complementary in structure the economies of partner countries, and (5) the 
lower the rate of tariffs for the outsiders, the greater the likelihood of welfare gains from the 
formation of a customs union (Meade, 1980). Other factors, such as the distance between and the 
size of PTA partners and their relative factor endowments, also affect welfare gains and make 
preferential trade economically viable (Baier and Bergstrand, 2004; Baier et al, 2015). In 
addition, a recent study by Kim (2015) suggests that the formation (as well as the depth) of PTAs 
may also be determined by the existence of production networks between potential PTA 
members. 
In theory, PTAs can always be beneficial, if external tariffs are adjusted accordingly. This 
adjustment is, however, often politically difficult, because very often inefficient local industries, 
such as agriculture in developed countries, are politically too strong and organized and will not 
tolerate welfare improving tariff adjustments that are harmful for their specific industries. 
Moreover, it will be in the interests of the members of customs unions to raise the external tariffs 
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in order to improve their terms of trade. Thus, ‘a customs union ordinarily will choose policies 
that do lead to trade diversion’ (Krugman, 1991a:12, italics in the original). 
Krugman further argues that the optimal number of trading blocs is one (i.e., free trade). 
However, complete free trade is politically difficult, if not impossible, to achieve, and ‘when the 
number of blocs is reduced from a very large number to a still fairly large number, it would not 
be surprising to find that world welfare falls’ (Krugman. 1991a:13), as it is in the interests of the 
member of customs unions to erect higher external tariffs in order to improve their terms of 
trade. Thus, PTAs are often concluded contrary to the economic rationale, whereby the welfare 
of non-participants diminishes as a result of trade-diverting effects of these agreements 
(Krugman, 1991a; Bhagwati, 2008). The economic rationale is based on an ideal model of the 
state of the world that does not fully explain the soaring number of regional and cross-regional 
PTAs the world has witnessed during the last quarter century. In order to get a more complete 
account of the recent proliferation of PTAs, the political rationale behind PTAs needs to be taken 
into consideration.  
 
2.2. The Power and Politics behind Contagious PTAs 
 
‘Trade blocs have economic effects, but that is not why they are established.’ 
-- World Bank (2000:123) 
 
While the economic rationale behind PTAs rests largely upon welfare maximization among both 
the PTA participants and third countries, the political approach has attempted to determine 
whether and how international politics explain patterns of global trade. The distribution of power 
(hegemony), for example, has been argued to affect the level of global trade (Mansfield, 1992). 
Although in later studies too hegemony was found to be positively associated with PTA 
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formation, its impact was estimated to be relatively modest (Mansfield and Milner, 2015). 
Meanwhile, with the decline of hegemony and signs of possible distress of the international 
trading system, countries have increasingly opted for PTAs to secure undisrupted trade with 
other nations and guarantee their competitiveness abroad (Mansfield, 1998). By signing PTAs, 
the argument goes, countries insure themselves against adverse developments in the multilateral 
trading regime. For example, as argued by USTR Mickey Kantor in 1993, the proposed Free 
Trade Agreement of the Americas was seen by the US as an alternative to the Uruguay Round, if 
the latter faltered. Another reason why countries have embraced PTAs has been to obtain 
leverage in multilateral negotiations via accumulated market power (Mansfield and Reinhardt, 
2003).  
It has also been argued that the emergence of regional institutions would reduce the number 
of actors in multilateral negotiations and hence play down the bargaining and collective action 
problems. In addition, PTAs can become an important tool to undertake and consolidate 
important (and sometime painful) economic reforms that would eventually promote multilateral 
liberalization serving as building blocks to multilateral liberalization (Mansfield and Milner, 
1999). Moreover, it has been argued that preferential trade arrangements are more likely to 
emerge among political and military allies, as in such cases, security externalities that arise from 
international trade are better contained (Gowa and Mansfield, 1993; Gowa, 1994). This provides 
a link between economic and security regionalism, whereby countries join regional blocs both 
for economic and security considerations, as they also form collective security mechanisms 
(Mansfield and Solingen, 2010). Other factors of domestic politics, such as the regime type and 
number of veto players, may influence the formation of PTAs. The more democratic the 
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countries and the fewer veto players they have, the higher the probability of PTA formation 
(Mansfield and Milner, 2015). 
The above explanations, notwithstanding their merits, do not fully explain the recent 
proliferation of PTAs. As seen above, trade was argued to be positively associated with 
hegemony, but the decline in hegemony has produced new incentives for countries to pursue 
PTAs to insure against possible malfunction of the international trading system (Mansfield, 
1998). Moreover, ‘whether variations in hegemony contributed to earlier episodes of regionalism 
are issues that remain unresolved’ (Mansfield and Milner, 1999:608), while in any case, the link 
between hegemony and PTA formation was found to be modest, as was the relationship between 
alliances and preferential trade arrangements  (Mansfield and Milner, 2015). Meanwhile, 
whether PTAs are building blocks or stumbling blocks to multilateral liberalization remains an 
open question, as the effects of regionalism on multilateral liberalization remain ambiguous  
(Mansfield and Milner, 1999). In the words of Frankel and Wei (1998:216), ‘regionalism can, 
depending on the circumstances, be associated with either more or less general liberalization.’ 
So, why have PTAs proliferated during the last quarter century, despite falling short of 
(consistently) providing trade creating and welfare maximizing outcomes? It has been argued 
that the political viability of PTAs can be strengthened if the agreements are trade diverting, i.e., 
contrary to the economic rationale (Grossman and Helpman, 1995; Krishna, 1998; Manger, 
2009; Mansfield and Milner, 2015). In order to make PTAs politically viable, policy-makers 
often need to win the support of politically powerful inefficient import-competing industries, 
while they can ignore the interests of taxpayers (the perceived losers from economically 
inefficient PTAs) because the potential costs of inefficient trade are dispersed among numerous 
taxpayers that lack the incentive to mobilize and lobby against trade-diverting PTAs. As a result, 
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‘trade diversion will enhance political viability [of a PTA] while contributing to an inefficient 
allocation of resources in the two partner countries’ (Grossman and Helpman, 1995:680). 
Import-competing industries are not politically powerful enough to prevent the proliferation of 
PTAs, but they are powerful and organized enough to push for greater flexibility in PTAs as a 
form of protection, which may compromise the economic efficiency of these agreements 
(Baccini et al, 2015).    
As discussed in Chapter 2.1, PTAs are often concluded contrary to the economic rationale, 
whereby the members improve their terms of trade, while non-participants see their welfare 
diminished as a result of trade-diversion (Krugman 1991a; Bhagwati 2008), for ‘preferential 
arrangements that divert trade away from the rest of the world are more likely to be supported 
politically’ (Krishna, 1998:244). In relation to North-South PTAs, in order to ensure the political 
feasibility of the agreements within developed countries, North-South PTAs should discriminate 
against third—usually developed—countries. As a result, ‘to make North-South liberalization 
politically feasible, governments therefore erect new barriers as they tear down others’ (Manger, 
2009:3).13  
An alternative explanation of the recent proliferation of PTAs is the contagious nature of such 
agreements. Because PTAs are inherently discriminative, they put pressure on third countries 
that experience diminished welfare as a result of trade-diverting PTAs. Thus, countries, lobbied 
by discriminated domestic industries, are tempted to sign counter-agreements to offset their 
losses (Baccini and Dür, 2012). For obvious reasons, Baldwin (1993; 1995) termed this 
phenomenon a ‘domino effect.’ The spark of the domino effect is an idiosyncratic shock that 
‘can trigger membership requests from countries that were previously happy to be non-members’ 
																																								 																				
13	 Tovar (2012), for example, shows that products with bigger reductions in preferential tariffs in CAFTA-DR 
experienced greater increases (or smaller decreases) in MFN tariffs. 
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(Baldwin, 1995:45). It is assumed that such shocks in the form of a trading bloc formation, such 
as the European Community or NAFTA, can and will emerge because countries seek to increase 
their welfare by signing PTAs. Thus, when countries seek welfare maximizing PTAs, they 
engage in a self-fulfilling cycle of PTA proliferation (Baldwin, 1995). 
An account of the discriminative nature of PTAs, which was responsible for the recent 
proliferation of these agreements, was provided by a number of studies (Baccini and Dür, 2012; 
Baldwin and Jaimovich, 2012). Based on an analysis of PTAs signed between 1990 and 2007 
that involved 167 countries, Baccini and Dür (2012) explain the recent proliferation of PTAs as a 
result of competition for market access. Discriminated by PTAs concluded by foreign countries, 
exporters push their governments to sign counter-agreements to level the playing field in markets 
where their exports are threatened. In addition, Manger (2009) argues that investment 
discrimination of outsiders as a result of PTAs is another major force behind pushing 
discriminated countries to seek redressing agreements. In line with this reasoning, based on data 
for 145 countries, Egger and Larch (2008) show that during 1955-2005, pre-existing PTAs 
increased the probability that a pair of countries would join an existing PTA or sign a new 
agreement, while Mansfield and Pevehouse (2013:602) argue that ‘PTAs that add a new member 
tend to do so again in the near future.’  
For example, the 2011 ratification by the US Congress of the PTA that was signed with South 
Korea in 2007 looked especially timely for putting additional pressure on Japan amid the ever-
increasing discussions about the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), an ambitious free trade 
agreement recently signed by 12 Pacific Rim countries, the US and Japan included. The 
ratification of the US-Korea PTA put pressure on large Japanese exporters, which would struggle 
to compete against South Korean rivals without preferential access to the US market. In this 
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context, the pressure on the Japanese government from Kiedanren, a large Japanese business 
lobby, to pursue countervailing agreements does not seem surprising (Economist, 2011). This 
argument seems complementary to the assertion that the US-Korea PTA was going to produce 
only modest gains for the US, and its main objective was to unleash a catalytic effect on trade 
liberalization in the region (Choi and Schott, 2004; Financial Times, 2007a). As a result, in 
November 2011, Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda announced ‘Japan’s intention to begin 
consultations with Trans-Pacific Partnership countries toward joining the TPP negotiations’ 
(USTR, 2011). Japan’s intentions to participate in the TPP negotiations were later confirmed by 
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, and Japan participated for the first time in the 18th round of 
negotiations in July 2013 (CRS, 2015). The agreement was signed on October 5, 2015, awaiting 
ratification in the member-states’ parliaments. In fact, the catalytic effect of the US-Korea PTA 
went beyond the region and, in the words of Peter Mandelson, then EU Trade Commissioner, 
‘strengthen[ed] the prospects for the planned EU-Korea free trade agreement’ (Financial Times, 
2007b).   
The TPP is, in fact, one initiative that was largely determined by the politics of 
discrimination. The TPP’s predecessor, the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership, 
initially comprised of Brunei, Chile, New Zealand, and Singapore. After the US joined the 
negotiations in 2008, the initiative gathered momentum as other countries felt they would lose 
out if they stayed out of the agreement. As a result, within only a few years, Australia, Peru, 
Vietnam, Malaysia, Japan, Mexico, and Canada joined the negotiations. ‘Ironically, because of 
the fear of being left out, the interest for the TPP has been rising despite its alleged lack of 
transparency, restrictive clauses on investment protection and intellectual property rights’ 
(Sahakyan, 2015).  
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Hence, notwithstanding the merits of alternative explanations, the intrinsic discriminative 
nature of PTAs that triggers a domino effect appears to be the most plausible factor behind the 
recent proliferation of PTAs. The discrimination-induced proliferation of PTAs has had serious 
implications for North-South preferential trade relations that have been largely explained by 
North-South power asymmetries. The next section looks at how power politics have defined 
these relations. 
 
2.3. North-South Trade Relations against the Backdrop of the Proliferating PTAs 
 
North-South trade relations, it has been argued, have been shaped by power politics determined 
by North-South asymmetries. The inclusion of a number of contentious measures in the WTO, 
such as those related to IPRs, has largely been attributed to the Northern countries’ ability to 
exercise power politics and force Southern countries to agree on terms that favor developed 
economies. The US, for example, in addition to multilateral pressures backed by other developed 
economies such as the European Community (EC) and Switzerland, put additional pressure on 
Southern countries through unilateral actions via its Section 301 of Trade Act of 1974 and the 
Special 301, to make them agree on the IPRs provisions envisioned by the North. As a result of 
such pressures, negotiators from Southern countries admitted that the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) that mostly reflected the priorities of 
Northern countries appeared a better option than resisting it under American unilateral sanctions 
(Shadlen, 2004; Pugatch, 2004).  
The power dimension of North-South trade relations has become more acute during North-
South preferential trade relations, as the discrimination-induced proliferation of PTAs has 
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provided ample opportunities for Northern countries to take advantage of North-South power 
asymmetries and further their interests in North-South PTAs through a policy known as 
‘competitive liberalization.’ Given the North-South power asymmetry, Northern countries have 
managed to exercise game-changing tactics and force Southern countries to sign North-South 
PTAs on terms largely dictated by the North, because being left out has been perceived by 
Southern countries as the least desirable option. Since Southern countries are in competition 
amongst each other for mobile international investment and access to industrial markets, they 
have been forced to liberalize regardless of their ‘prior policies or philosophies’ (Bergsten, 
1996:2). Putting competitive pressure on Southern countries has largely been a deliberate action 
as part of a broader trade policy of Northern counties, particularly the US (Zoellick, 2002). The 
PTAs with Singapore and Chile, two pro-free trade and relatively open countries, for example, 
were signed by the US to, inter alia, exert pressure on other emerging and developing economies 
in Asia and Latin America and force them to seek similar agreements (BusinessWeek, 2003; 
DeRosa, 2004; Weintraub, 2004).14    
Enabled by North-South power asymmetries, Northern countries have exploited the inherent 
discriminative nature of PTAs to marginalize Southern countries and force them to join the 
bandwagon on terms largely dictated by the North. Gruber (2000), for example, illustrates the 
exploitation of North-South power asymmetries by the ability of the more powerful actor to alter 
the status quo and make the weaker party choose between an asymmetric outcome and a new 
status quo, which is even less desirable. If a Southern country does not wish to sign a North-
South PTA because it sees the terms of the perspective agreement as unfavorable, a Northern 
																																								 																				
14 The notion that power can be used to extract greater gains from international trade, when there is ‘power 
disequilibrium’ between countries, was earlier advanced by Hirschman (1969:12). Hirschman argued that such 
power disequilibrium served as a means of coercion and shaped the direction and composition of trade between an 
imperial power and its colonies that largely favored the former.   
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country can ‘go it alone’ and sign an agreement with countries that are relatively open and 
willing to engage in bilateral trade. By doing so, it exerts pressure on non-participating countries 
(while their competitors enjoy preferential access to a Northern market), making the cost of non-
participation even greater than joining the bandwagon on less favorable terms. This mechanism, 
as hypothesized in this thesis, is better utilized by Northern countries during first-order North-
South PTA negotiations. The mechanism of the ‘go-it-alone’ power is illustrated in Figure 2.3.1 
below. 
 
Figure 2.3.1. Illustration of the ‘go-it-alone’ power 
 
 
Figure 2.3.1 illustrates the ‘go-it-alone’ power of a hypothetical Northern country (portrayed 
on the y-axis) vis-à-vis a hypothetical Southern country (portrayed on the x-axis). To make the 
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Southern country agree on the outcome D, which reflects the power asymmetry between the 
negotiators, the Northern country alters the status quo (point A) and shifts it to the point C. By 
doing so, it leaves the Southern country with two undesirable options: the new status quo (point 
C) and the outcome D, which is asymmetric but less undesirable.  
Gruber (2000) argues that the power play illustrated in Figure 2.3.1 is exactly what happened 
during the NAFTA negotiations between the US and Mexico. According to Gruber, sticking to 
the status quo (point A), i.e., no agreement at all, may have been Mexico’s preferred choice. But 
when the US ‘went alone’ and signed a PTA with Canada, it altered the status quo (point A) and 
shifted it to the point C. As reflected in the figure, the new status quo (point C) was an even less 
desirable option for Mexico, for it could not afford to be left out while Canadian exports were 
enjoying preferential success to the US market. As a result, Mexico was forced into a situation 
whereby joining NAFTA, albeit on undesirable terms largely dictated by the US, was a better 
option than the alternatives. Thus, Mexico’s decision to join NAFTA was to a considerable 
extent influenced by the ability of the US to exercise its ‘go-it-alone power’ and alter the status 
quo, rather than by possible costs and benefits of the agreement. As argued by Moe (2005:227), 
institutions, usually defined as structures of cooperation, are also structures of power, which are 
often not mutually beneficial for the parties involved. In line with Gruber’s argument, when 
power is exercised, (weaker) parties’ ‘voluntary’ choice has to be made from a ‘power-
constrained choice set,’ which implies choosing options they otherwise would have not.   
At first, as quoted by the New York Times (1988), President-elect Carlos Salinas ruled out 
the possibility of even a modest agreement with the US. However, Mexico was soon forced to 
change its attitude towards NAFTA and start the negotiations. This was made possible by 
unilateral trade retaliations and coercive actions from the US (Cameron and Tomlin, 2000), as 
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well as the power play depicted in Figure 2.3.1. The asymmetry between the parties enabled the 
US to easily achieve its negotiating objectives during the negotiations in a number of areas, 
including sensitive sectors such as agriculture, investment measures, and IPRs, where the text of 
the agreement was basically dictated by the US (Maxfield and Shapiro, 1998; Cameron and 
Tomlin, 2000; Dumberry, 2001; Interview 10).  
Other US North-South PTAs, such as the US-Colombia and US-Peru agreements that 
emerged as a result of the stalemate in the US-Andean15 negotiations, followed the mechanism 
illustrated in Figure 2.3.1. After the collapse of the US-Andean talks in the wake of serious 
disagreements, including over IPRs and the liberalization of agriculture, the US was quick to go 
bilateral with Peru and Colombia. Being left out for either Colombia or Peru, given the other’s 
conclusion of talks with the US, was the least acceptable outcome, which neither of the Andean 
countries could afford. This brought about pressures on both Andean countries. Although both 
Colombia and Peru successfully resisted pressures from the US during the US-Andean talks, 
including in relation to unacceptable clauses on IPRs, they could not afford to do it after the US 
went bilateral with them. As a result, the fear of being left out made both Colombia and Peru 
ready for painful compromises, as the US was swift to extract the concessions from Colombia 
and Peru it failed to achieve during the US-Andean talks (von Braun, 2012; Interview 11).    
Other developed economies, such as the EU, also used their economic weight to trigger 
actions from Southern countries. Following a stalemate in the negotiations with ASEAN, which 
as a bloc was not ready to accept the terms demanded by the EU, the EU started separate 
negotiations with individual ASEAN countries. As a result, the negotiations with Singapore 
triggered responses from Malaysia and Vietnam, while Thailand was next in line. Apart from the 
																																								 																				
15 The US-Andean agreement was being negotiated between the US, Colombia, Peru, and Ecuador. 
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talks with Singapore that were concluded in December 2012, the EU negotiations with individual 
ASEAN countries are still under way. Nevertheless, the EU hoped to achieve with individual 
countries what had failed to accomplish during the negotiations with ASEAN as a bloc 
(Interview 4; Interview 5; Interview 8). 
The positions of Southern countries in North-South power relations are exacerbated even 
further when they have strong trade dependence on Northern countries, calculated as the share of 
their exports that goes to a single Northern market. Higher trade dependence reduces the 
negotiating power of Southern countries in North-South PTAs even further, as being left out of 
vital markets becomes especially costly.16 In the case of political trade dependence, calculated 
based on the share of a Southern country’s exports to a Northern market through the GSP and 
other unilaterally granted preferential schemes, Southern countries look even more vulnerable, as 
they are constantly exposed to the threat of the removal of such preferences at the discretion of 
their trading partner. As a result, in order to transform unilaterally granted preferences into stable 
and predictable provisions under North-South PTAs, Southern countries agree to asymmetric 
concessions in North-South PTA negotiations (Shadlen, 2008; Manger and Shadlen, 2014). The 
argument for trade dependence influencing trade relations between countries was also advanced 
by Hirschman (1969). This ‘influence effect of foreign trade’ raises the bargaining power of 
economically stronger countries because weaker countries cannot dispense without trade with it, 
nor can they replace it with other countries (Hirschman, 1969:17). 
Power asymmetries are best utilized when there is competition among Southern countries, 
which augments the discriminative pressure on non-participants. As argued by Guzman 
																																								 																				
16 For example, although it was initially reluctant to sign an agreement with the US, the Dominican Republic 
suddenly became enthusiastic about one when the US started negotiating the Central American Free Trade 
Agreement (CAFTA) with Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua (Shadlen, 2008). This 
does not seem surprising as, in 2002, two years before the completion of the CAFTA-DR, 85 per cent of the 
Dominican Republic’s merchandise exports were absorbed by the US (Hornbeck, 2004:15). 
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(1997:666) in the example of bilateral investment treaties (BITs), Southern countries as a group 
are interested in utilizing their collective bargaining power and securing favorable provisions 
under BITs, ‘that leaves significant power in the hands of the sovereign state in its relations with 
investors.’ Individually, however, Southern countries seek BITs with Northern nations that will 
give them advantage over other Southern counties in the competition to attract FDI. As a result, 
Southern countries not only sign BITs that leaves them worse off in the long run, but also trigger 
actions from other Southern countries to sign similar agreements in order not to fall behind in the 
fierce competition for FDI.  
The proposition that Southern countries are ‘compelled’ to join PTAs that are not necessarily 
in their best interests is confirmed by, for example, a World Bank study of 91 trade agreements 
negotiated since 1980, which recons lack of evidence of reciprocity in North-South agreements, 
which mostly favor developed nations, while it reports strong evidence of reciprocity in North-
North and South-South agreements (Freund, 2003).  
Market regulated trade is ‘a non-zero-sum game: It will benefit each party to the transaction. 
But while each gains from trade, we also teach that power can be used to extract greater gains 
from trade from the other party’ (Bhagwati, 1991:52). Thus, a North-South PTA may be a non-
zero-sum arrangement that increases the overall welfare pie, but within that non-zero-sum 
arrangement there is a zero-sum game of who gets what piece of the increased pie. In line with 
the illustration in Figure 2.3.1, the zero-sum game of who gets what piece of the increased pie is 
dominated by power asymmetries between the parties. Developed countries change the game 
into one where developing and emerging economies are forced to choose between being 
marginalized (while competitors enjoy preferential treatment) and joining the bandwagon on 
terms largely dictated by developed countries instead of claiming their ‘symmetric’ share of the 
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increased pie. Hence, Southern countries agree on restrictive WTO-plus provisions under North-
South PTAs that circumscribe their policy space and limit their policy choices to cope with 
different developmental challenges and national emergencies.17  
It is worth noting, however, that the argument that Southern countries seek to preserve the 
policy space available under the WTO when entering into North-South PTAs does not go 
unchallenged. A competing view on North-South PTAs argues that leaders in Southern countries 
may want their countries to enter into such agreements in order to tie their hands and implement 
painful and unpopular domestic economic reform that would, in fact, limit the policy space in 
these countries. For instance, Baccini and Urpelainen (2015) argue that Southern countries may 
enhance the credibility of commitment to reform if they are bound to implement such reform as 
part of the deal under a PTA. Moreover, the authors argue, PTAs can create domestic political 
support for economic reform, because the expected benefits from PTAs may not materialize 
without economic reform committed to as part of the deal with a Northern country. While the 
argument advanced by Baccini and Urpelainen (2015) is convicting for certain countries, 
particularly for new democracies with unstable new leaders, there have been instances when 
resistance to economic reform that would limit the policy space in Southern countries has been a 
key reason behind inconclusive North-South PTA negotiations. For example, the EU 
negotiations with Mercosur and ASEAN did not produce conclusive results, among other things, 
because of these regions’ resistance to the type of beyond-the-border liberalization, including in 
IPRs, investment measures, and trade in services, demanded by the EU (Interview 4; Interview 
7).  
																																								 																				
17 The shrinking policy space in Southern countries as a result of North-South PTAs is discussed in detail in Chapter 
3.  
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Because intentions behind the governments of Southern countries to pursue North-South 
PTAs are key to the analysis carried out on this thesis, this study has sought to unveil whether 
economic reform that, in fact, limits the policy space in Southern countries was a predetermined 
goal of the governments of the Southern countries discussed in this study or whether reforms 
were agreed to as part of the North-South bargain. In fact, as the analyses carried out in Chapters 
4, 5, and 6 show, resisting to restrictive terms under PTAs and preserving the policy space 
available under the WTO seem largely to be part of the negotiating agenda of the five Southern 
countries in question.  
The chapter next advances a new framework, whereby the effects of power asymmetries are 
mitigated, and North-South PTA negotiations produce a more symmetric outcome for Southern 
countries. 
 
2.4. A Novel Approach to North-South Power Relations: The ‘Order’ of a North-South 
PTA 
 
When the non-zero-sum game of increasing the welfare pie by signing a PTA transforms into a 
zero-sum game of who gets what share of the increased pie, power politics dominate the game. 
As shown in Figure 2.3.1, other things being equal, power asymmetries imply that weaker 
countries lose in the zero-sum game of dividing the increased welfare gains. Other things, 
however, are not always equal, as not all North-South PTAs share the same characteristics As 
introduced above, this thesis distinguishes between first-order, i.e., Southern countries’ first, and 
second-order, i.e., Southern countries subsequent, agreements. The novelty of the approach 
introduced by this thesis suggests the acknowledgement of different characteristics of North-
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South PTAs that can affect the outcomes of the negotiations and hence the nature of North-South 
power relations. In second-order North-South negotiations, the factors that enable Northern 
countries to exploit North-South power asymmetries, namely the fear of exclusion and 
competition between Southern countries, are eliminated, mitigated, or reversed. First, having 
secured preferential access to Northern markets as a result of first-order agreements, Southern 
countries become immune to marginalization. Second, the discriminative pressure, as a result of 
the proliferation of North-South PTAs, creates a complex structure where the direction of 
discriminative pressures can go either way. North-South PTAs exerts discriminative pressure on 
Northern countries too.  
The proliferation of North-South PTAs has created competition between the US and EU in 
third markets. The expansion of US PTAs starting from the 2000s has triggered a reaction from 
the EU, which, in order to protect the interests of its firms in third markets, began to negotiate 
counter-PTAs (Sbragia, 2010).  For example, the US engagement in preferential trade with 
countries, such as Colombia, Peru, and the members of ASEAN, triggered actions from the EU, 
as European businesses felt discriminated in these markets vis-à-vis their American counterparts. 
The EU was lobbied by export-oriented European firms that pressured the EU to redress the 
situation by establishing its own terms for preferential access to these markets and make sure EU 
companies are provided the same terms as other multinationals. As a result, the EU was quick to 
initiate its own preferential trade negotiations with Colombia, Peru, and ASEAN countries, 
including Singapore, Malaysia, Vietnam, and Thailand (Interview 1; Interview 3; Interview 4; 
Interview 5; Interview 8). Moreover, the competition between developed economies in third—
usually developing and emerging—markets has not been limited to the US and EU. The signing 
of NAFTA, for instance, exerted pressure on both the EU and Japan and forced them to seek 
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redressing agreements with Mexico to level the playing field for their multinationals competing 
with US firms. After the EU signed a PTA with Mexico, it augmented the discriminative 
pressure on Japan and made it seek a counter-agreement with Mexico in the shortest possible 
period of time (Keidanren, 1999; Reiter, 2003; Yoshimatsu, 2005; Manger, 2009; Interview 1; 
Interview 2).  
Japan’s other second-order North-South PTAs, more specifically with Chile and Peru, were 
also largely motivated by the diminishing share of Japanese businesses in Southern countries. 
The Japan-Chile PTA was largely motivated by the discrimination of Japanese export-oriented 
companies, especially in the auto industry, vis-à-vis American and European multinationals in 
Chile. It was largely due to the lobby by domestic pro-liberalization forces led by the auto 
industry that pushed the Japanese government to sign an agreement with Chile in the shortest 
possible time (Wehner, 2007). Meanwhile, Japan’s diminishing market share in Peru and Latin 
America in general made the Japanese government to pursue a PTA with Peru and make all the 
efforts to conclude the talk as soon as possible. A Japan-Peru PTA was to, among other things, 
level the playing field for Japanese multinationals with their American and European rivals in the 
Peruvian market (Gonzalez-Vigil and Shimuzu, 2012). 
Hence, against the backdrop of the discrimination-fuelled proliferation of North-South PTAs, 
Southern countries may become immune to marginalization once they secure stable preferential 
access to Northern markets via first-order North-South PTAs. Moreover, first-order North-South 
PTAs can reverse the arrow of discriminative pressure towards Northern countries and make 
them seek redressing agreements with Southern countries. This can potentially strengthen the 
positions of Southern countries and leverage their bargaining powers in subsequent—i.e., 
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second-order—PTA negotiations. Figure 2.4.1 below illustrates the logic of second-order North-
South PTA negotiations.  
 
Figure 2.4.1. Illustration of the logic of second-order North-South PTA negotiations 
 
 
Figure 2.4.1 illustrates a hypothetical model of second-order North-South PTA negotiations. 
Here, in contrast to the scenario depicted in Figure 2.3.1, the status quo (point A) is not easily 
altered. Having secured preferential access to a Northern market, the Southern country 
(portrayed on the x-axis) is not easily marginalized when the stronger party (portrayed on the y-
axis) signs a PTA with its competitors. Hence, the attempt to shift the status quo to the point C 
fails, and the status quo (point A) persists. In this case, the choice for the Southern country is 
between the status quo (point A) and a more symmetric outcome (point D), and not between a 
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new (and extremely unfavorable) status quo (point C) and an asymmetric outcome pursued by 
the Northern country (point B), like it was in first-order PTA negotiations. Thus, the outcome is 
either no agreement at all (point A) or one with a more symmetric result (point D).  
As seen from Figures 2.3.1 and 2.4.1, the settings in which power asymmetries are utilized 
matter. Power asymmetries are efficiently utilized when the powerful country is successful in 
altering the status quo. In first-order PTA negotiations (Figure 2.3.1), the status quo is easily 
altered. As a result, Southern countries face a choice between being marginalized and joining the 
bandwagon on terms largely dictated by Northern countries. Meanwhile, in second-order PTA 
negotiations (Figure 2.4.1), the status quo persists and the choice for Southern countries is one 
between a more symmetric outcome and no outcome at all. 
In first-order North-South PTA negotiations, the ‘no agreement’ outcome is costlier for the 
Southern country, because a ‘no agreement’ comes with an additional cost in the form of 
diverted trade as a result of North-South agreements elsewhere. In second-order North-South 
PTA negotiations, on the other hand—because Southern countries proceed to them with stable 
preferential access to a Northern market and can themselves exert pressure on Northern 
countries—the ‘no agreement’ outcome becomes costlier for the Northern country, for its 
multinationals lose out in the competition with their peers from other developed economies. 
Thus, in second-order North-South PTA negotiations, Southern countries can afford to 
procrastinate and stick to the status quo until the alternative becomes attractive enough.  
 In line with this logic, one of the explanations as to why the Uruguay Round of negotiations 
was successful and the Doha Round was not is that in the first case, Northern countries, namely 
the US and EC, managed to alter the status quo by withdrawing from the GATT 1947. That left 
Southern countries with the option to either ratify the WTO with its different agreements as a 
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‘single undertaking’ or be left with the old GATT 1947 that had no meaningful economic 
significance as major countries had withdrawn from it. While in both rounds of negotiations 
deals could have been better for developing and emerging economies, the Doha Round did not 
materialize due to, among other reasons, the inability of developed countries to exercise a ‘power 
play’ and alter the status quo. Southern countries could afford to say no to the Doha Round and 
stick to the status quo, i.e., the Uruguay Round provisions, because these provisions were there 
to remain. Of course, Northern countries could hypothetically leave the WTO too, but this would 
entail lots of technical problems with binding consequences (Steinberg, 2002:360; Shadlen, 
2010). 
The second type of utility that first-order North-South PTAs provide to Southern countries, 
i.e., the ability to reverse the arrow of discriminative pressure towards Northern countries, 
derives from the competition among developed economies for accessing important production 
destinations and levelling the playing field for their multinationals vis-à-vis their competitors 
from other developed economies. Because multinationals in developed countries influence trade 
policies via well-organized lobbying activities, they push for counter-agreements to redress the 
negative consequences of discriminatory PTAs (Manger, 2005; 2009). In fact, as highlighted by 
Dür (2007; 2010) and Baccini and Dür (2012), a number of US, EU, and Japanese (North-South) 
PTAs concluded during the 1990s and 2000s were signed as a result of lobbying by American, 
European, and Japanese industries that were discriminated in terms of access to emerging and 
developing economies. Thus, enabled by first-order agreements, Southern countries can 
potentially use domestic lobbying by multinationals in Northern countries in their favor during 
second-order North-South PTA negotiations and extract more concessions and/or resist 
unfavorable provisions from Northern countries.   
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For example, having signed NAFTA, albeit with terms and provisions mostly dictated by the 
US, Mexico managed to exert pressure on the EU and Japan. The EU’s share of Mexico’s total 
trade slipped from around 11 per cent in the beginning of the 1990s to about 6.5 per cent in 2001 
(Reiter, 2003; Espach, 2006). The EU was losing out in Mexico because of NAFTA provisions, 
and it was one of the main reasons why it started negotiating a PTA with Mexico and put every 
effort to conclude the talks as soon as possible. NAFTA gave an idea of the type of liberalization 
the EU could demand from Mexico, but at the same time, the ‘NAFTA factor’ enhanced 
Mexico’s negotiating position, which it exploited very well and resisted a number of key EU 
proposals it deemed unfavorable. In addition to NAFTA, the proliferation of North-South PTAs 
elsewhere in Latin America and East and Southeast Asia during the 1990s and 2000s made the 
EU react to American and Japanese preferential trading initiatives in these regions by pursuing 
its own PTAs with countries and regions, such as Colombia, Peru, Central America, and ASEAN 
(Interview 1; Interview 2; Interview 3; Interview 4).  
By the same logic, NAFTA and the EU-Mexico PTA exerted pressure on Japan.  According 
to Yoshimatsu (2005), the share of Japanese products in Mexican imports shrank from 6.1 per 
cent in 1994 to 3.7 per cent in 2000, equivalent to an estimated loss of USD 3.54 billion for 
Japanese exporters. Meanwhile, tariff elimination on EU steel products, which resulted from the 
EU-Mexico PTA, would have caused an anticipated USD 300 million annual loss for Japanese 
steel exporters. Such threats eventually pushed Japan to initiate bilateral trade talks with Mexico 
and put every effort to complete them in the shortest possible time (Yoshimatsu, 2005; Solís and 
Katada, 2007a; 2007b). In fact, the pressure on Japan to conclude a deal with Mexico as soon as 
possible may have increased Mexico’s bargaining power during the negotiations with Japan, 
whereby Mexico managed to reject a number of key proposals from Japan. Among other things, 
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Mexico was able to achieve ‘a policy change [in Japan] away from the absolute exclusion of 
agricultural products to their inclusion in the FTA.’ This seems to be a significant achievement, 
given Japan’s historically high tariffs on agricultural products and the fact that more than 20 per 
cent of Mexico’s exports to Japan consisted of agriculture-related products in 2001 (Yoshimatsu, 
2005:271; Pempel and Urata, 2006:89-90).  
Other North-South PTA negotiations by Japan, such as those with Chile and Peru, were 
motivated, among other things, by discriminative pressures from other North-South PTAs. 
Levelling the playing field for Japanese firms operating in Chile and Peru vis-à-vis their 
competitors from the US and EU was among the main reasons why Japan started PTA 
negotiations with Chile and Peru (JETRO, 2001; Gonzalez-Vigil and Shimuzu, 2012). 
Meanwhile, Japan’s desire to sign an agreement with Korea was invigorated by the signing of the 
US-Korea PTA (and its belated ratification in 2011), which was going to produce only modest 
gains for the US but had the potential of producing catalytic effects on trade liberalization in the 
region (Choi and Schott, 2004; Financial Times, 2007a).  
In sum, by distinguishing between the ‘orders’ of PTAs, this thesis suggests a novel approach 
towards reassessing North-South preferential trade relations, which takes a differentiated and 
longer-term view on North-South trade relations that have conventionally been presented as a 
phenomenon largely dominated by power asymmetries.  
 
2.5. The Research Questions and Hypothesis  
 
North-South trade relations have been conventionally presented as an interaction largely based 
upon power asymmetries between the parties. The North-South cleavage over who gets what 
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share of the increased welfare pie as a result of preferential trade liberalization raises some 
important questions that have strong developmental implications. It has been argued that, due to 
North-South asymmetries, preferential trade liberalization through North-South PTAs has mostly 
favored developed countries and have circumscribed policy autonomy in developing and 
emerging economies, thus impeding with development in Southern countries (Gallagher, 2005; 
2008; 2011; Shadlen, 2005c; 2008; 2009; Kumar and Gallagher, 2007). Moreover, despite the 
adverse developmental implications of North-South PTAs, these agreements have proliferated 
during the last quarter century because of the agreements’ discriminative and contagious nature. 
Utilizing North-South power asymmetries, Northern countries have succeeded in marginalizing 
Southern countries and changing the game of North-South PTA negotiations into one where 
joining the bandwagon on terms dictated by developed countries has been the least bad outcome 
for developing and emerging economies (see Figure 2.3.1) (Gruber, 2000; Shadlen, 2008).  
As illustrated in Figures 2.3.1 and 2.4.1, the successful utilization of power asymmetries by 
developed countries depends on the latter’s ability to alter the status quo. In first-order PTAs, 
altering the status quo is relatively easy, for Southern countries are in stiff competition for access 
to Northern markets. Hence, being left out while competitors enjoy preferential treatment can be 
unbearably costly. Here the status quo does not depend only on the two countries that intend to 
negotiate an agreement. It also depends on whether third country competitors remain in their 
initial positions. Once competitors gain preferential access to a Northern market, the status quo is 
effectively altered, and the choice for Southern countries becomes one between a new status 
quo—staying out while competitors’ exports enjoy preferential treatment—and joining the 
bandwagon on terms dictated by the North. However, once the problem of market access is 
resolved—albeit at the expense of restrictive first-order North-South PTAs—the positions of 
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Southern countries become less shaky, and altering the status quo by Northern countries more 
difficult. In fact, the very existence of a first-order PTA can exert pressure on other developed 
countries and potentially redress North-South power asymmetries during the negotiations of 
second-order PTAs.  
This thesis argues that North-South preferential trade relations can be better explained 
through a novel approach that takes a differentiated view towards North-South PTAs, based on 
the sequential order of these agreements. First-order agreements—however restrictive or 
unfavorable for Southern countries—can make these countries less vulnerable to the game-
changing aggressive policies of Northern countries and strengthen their positions in 
subsequent—i.e., second-order—North-South trade negotiations by providing secure access to 
Northern markets and by enabling them to exert pressure on other Northern economies.  
 
RQ1. Do first-order North-South PTAs increase the bargaining powers of Southern countries in 
subsequent North-South negotiations?  
RQ2. Are Southern countries’ second-order North-South PTAs substantively different from first-
order North-South PTAs, as a result of improved bargaining powers in second-order 
negotiations? 
 
Hypothesis: Second-order North-South PTAs are more favorable to Southern countries than 
first-order agreements because of the following two factors made possible by first-order PTAs: 
1. Southern countries are immune to marginalization when negotiating second-order PTAs 
because they already have stable preferential access to Northern markets via first-order 
agreements. 
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2. Southern countries can exert discriminative pressure on Northern countries that are in 
competition amongst each other for accessing important production destinations in 
Southern countries and leveling the playing field for their multinationals vis-à-vis their 
competitors from other Northern countries. 
 
2.6. The Research Design, Methodology, and Data Sources 
 
As per the hypothesis of this thesis, second-order North-South PTAs are more favorable to 
Southern countries than first-order agreements, and this difference comes from the proposition 
that first-order agreements raise the bargaining powers of Southern countries in subsequent 
agreements by providing them with stable access to Northern markets and enabling them to exert 
pressure on Northern countries. To reveal Southern countries’ improved bargaining positions in 
second-order PTA negotiations (RQ1), this study carries out process tracing (based on the 
author’s personal interviews with EU and US trade officials and other primary and secondary 
data) with the view to account for the negotiations of the first-order and second-order North-
South PTAs of Mexico, Chile, Korea, Colombia, and Peru, five countries of the Global South 
that have North-South PTAs with at least two developed countries. 
In addition, to account for the actual effects of Southern countries’ increased bargaining 
powers in second-order negotiations (RQ2), the study carries out an analysis of the first-order 
and second-order North-South PTAs, based on their actual texts, focusing on policy areas that 
have shaped the North-South divide in international trade, as discussed and justified in Chapter 
3. These policy areas of North-South trade relations that include tariffs and related measures, 
agricultural liberalization, government procurement, trade in services, investment provisions, and 
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IPRs, have, according to a widely held view (Wade, 2003; 2006; Rodrik, 2008b; Gallagher, 
2008; Shadlen, 2008), circumscribed the policy autonomy in developing and emerging 
economies with adverse effects on economic development in the Global South.  
The thesis has adopted the methodology of process tracing because it is suitable for 
conducting an empirical analysis of both agent- and structure-related issues aimed at establishing 
a relationship between variables: in my case, between the dummy variable of a first-order North-
South PTA and the outcomes of second-order agreements (George and Bennett, 2005; Odell, 
2006; Checkel, 2008). Tracing ‘recurrent processes linking specified initial conditions and a 
specific outcome’ (Mayntz, 2004:241, italics in the original) has been hereby regarded as 
suitable to trace the events that unfolded during the period between signing a first-order North-
South agreement and the conclusion of second-order PTA negotiations for each of the five 
Southern countries. The unfolding events this thesis has particularly looked at include the 
developments that have emerged because of first-order agreements and have affected the 
negotiations and outcomes of second-order agreements. Because ‘[p]rocess tracing is strong on 
questions of interactions’ (Checkel, 2008:116), the choice of this method has hereby been 
deemed efficient in explaining the highly interactive process of North-South preferential trade 
negotiations.  
The examination of North-South PTAs has been conducted based on the actual texts of the 
agreements and secondary sources related to the negotiations and outcomes of these PTAs. In 
addition, interviews have been conducted with the officials of the Directorate-General for Trade 
of the European Commission in Brussels in December 2012, as well as with USTR officials in 
Washington, DC in April 2012. The author of the thesis has personally interviewed EU and US 
trade officials involved in trade policy coordination with countries and regions discussed in this 
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study. The interviewees are referenced in the text on a non-personified basis, which was a 
precondition for the interviews.   
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3. From Developmental State to PTAs and the Shrinking Policy Space 
 
The ultimate aim of this chapter is to discuss the policy areas that have been most affected by 
North-South PTAs and where Southern countries have seen their policy space circumscribed the 
most. The outline of these policy areas will serve as a set of criteria based on which the 
assessment and comparative overview of the first-order and second-order North-South PTAs in 
question are carried out in Chapters 4-6. For this reason, this chapter reveals the most 
contentious policy areas that have shaped the North-South divide in multilateral and preferential 
trade liberalization. More specifically, Chapter 3.1 sketches a brief overview of the debate over 
which policies are better suited for industrialization and economic development with a particular 
focus on developing and emerging economies. It outlines specific policy areas that have been 
especially crucial in boosting developmental policies in Southern countries. Furthermore, 
Chapter 3.2 discusses how the policy autonomy of Southern countries has been circumscribed as 
a result of North-South PTAs, which has led not only to the limited flexibility of the 
governments in Southern countries to deploy effective policies to spur economic development, 
but has also circumscribed their options in dealing with national emergencies. Finally, the key 
policy areas of North-South PTAs are outlined as the criteria based on which the comparative 
assessments of the first-order and second-order North-South PTAs are carried out in Chapters 4-
6.   
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3.1. Industrial Development Policies and Economic Growth: The Role of the 
Developmental State and the Policy Space 
 
There is a raging debate about economic liberalization as the strategy for Southern countries. 
Many of the proponents of liberalization are in the developed world. Many of the critics, on the 
other hand, have argued differently, pointing to the experience of East Asian economies and 
today’s developed economies in their early stages of industrialization, which have combined 
export-led growth policies with unorthodox measures to protect and nurture infant industries 
until they are ready to compete on the global scale. Liberal economic policies promoted by 
developed countries and international trade and financial institutions, such as the WTO, 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), and World Bank, have been countered by the critics of 
orthodox policies (Amsden, 1989; Wade, 1990; 2006; Rodrik, 2001; 2004; 2008b; Chang, 
2002b; 2003; 2007; Chang and Green, 2003; Gallagher, 2005; Studwell, 2013), who argue that 
liberalization in the form promoted by today’s orthodox policies is not a panacea for 
development and growth. According to these scholars, although it is hard to envisage rapid and 
high economic growth without outward orientation and specialization, economic liberalization is 
better carried out gradually and timely, by giving domestic perspective industries time to become 
competitive internationally. This chapter seeks to highlight how this debate has emphasized the 
shrinking policy space and specific policy areas that have been especially crucial in boosting 
developmental policies in developing and emerging economies. 
One of the key aspects of the debate is whether there is a positive correlation between 
openness and growth. A number of studies (Dollar, 1992; Sachs and Warner, 1995) have shown 
that there is, indeed, a positive link between openness and growth. These claims do not go 
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unchallenged, however. An important question remains the definition of openness. Both studies 
by Dollar (1992) and Sachs and Warner (1995) include countries in their samples (e.g., Korea), 
which, in fact, have had a heavy involvement of the state in the process of industrialization and 
economic policies in general (Rodriguez and Rodrik, 1999). Moreover, openness that is often 
measured by average tariffs may not reflect the true nature of managed industrialization, as the 
newly industrialized countries adopted a selective approach, keeping tariffs high in strategic 
industries and low for other product lines, thus ensuring that the average tariff is not significantly 
high (Wade, 1990; Chang, 2007).  
Rodriguez and Rodrik (1999) show that the relationship between a country’s average tariff 
level and non-tariff trade barriers and its economic growth is, at best, ambiguous. A more recent 
study by Ortega and Peri (2014), too, fails to establish an effect of trade openness on income, 
while Abbas (2014) finds that trade liberalization deteriorates economic growth in developing 
countries. Meanwhile, Kim and Kose (2014) find that trade liberalization can result in welfare 
gains if the lost tariff revenues are financed by consumption and labor income taxes, while in the 
attempt to finance them with capital income taxes may result in welfare losses. In sum, although 
a number of studies find a positive correlation between openness and growth, the relationship, in 
the words of Singh (2010:1554), is ‘not ubiquitously unambiguous.’ 
According to Chang (2003), the correlation between liberal policies and growth has not just 
been ambiguous but negative for developing countries. During 1960-1980—a period of strong 
involvement of the state in economic development activities—developing countries grew at an 
annual per capita rate of 3 per cent, whereas during 1980-2000—a period characterized by more 
integration and liberalization—the growth rate was only 1.5 per cent. Moreover, if China and 
India (two interventionist states) are taken out of the sample, the growth rate falls below 1 per 
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cent. Similarly, Stiglitz (2005) and Chang (2007) showed that growth rates in Latin America in 
the 1960s and 1970s, when the economies of the region were relatively less open, were around 
3.1 per cent compared to 1.7 per cent in the 1980s and 1990s, when neo-liberal policies were 
embraced more vigorously in the region. In the first half of the 2000s, growth rates in Latin 
America dropped even further to as low as 0.6 per cent.   
Nor has FDI alone been correlated with growth in developing countries (Gallagher and 
Zarsky, 2005). Moreover, capital market liberalization not only did not lead to faster growth, but 
also led many developing and emerging countries to be exposed to the risk of capital outflow, 
which, in the words of Stiglitz (2005:17), represents ‘risk without reward.’ The effects of sudden 
capital outflows are well known to East Asia as a result of the 1997 financial crisis and to Latin 
America as a result of the 1980s debt crisis. As argued by Wade (1998:1535), capital account 
liberalization, which left ‘hot’ capital to flow unrestrictedly in and out of East Asian countries, 
was ‘the single most irresponsible act of public authorities in the whole crisis.’ Under-regulation 
of capital accounts (financial liberalization), coupled with careless investment practices as a 
result of the abundance of ‘hot’ foreign capital, has been, in fact, widely cited as one of the major 
causes of the 1997 Asian financial crisis (Chang, 1998; Chang et al, 1998; Jomo, 1998; 
Lauridsen, 1998; Amess and Demetriades, 2010).  
Ironically, the East Asian crisis of 1997 came after the East Asian ‘miracle’ and revealed the 
weaknesses of liberalization. The run on the Thai, Indonesian, Philippine, Malaysian and other 
East Asian currencies resulted in the breach of the peg of these currencies to the US dollar and 
caused their sharp depreciation. The short-term ‘hot’ capital that had entered the region in the 
boom years ‘rapidly fled through the liberalized market channels,’ triggering debt and financial 
crises (Yamazawa, 2003:277). A similar scenario was observed during the Latin American debt 
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crisis of the 1980s that left the continent in its ‘lost decade.’ The abundance of hot and cheap 
money, among other things a result of the oil shock of the 1970s, fuelled Latin American 
economies with easy credit, adding onto their debt pile. When the right-wing governments of 
Thatcher and Reagan in the UK and US raised interests rates to combat high inflation, the non-
regulated ‘hot’ money left Latin America for more attractive destinations, leaving Latin America 
with piles of debt and no means to repay it (Shadlen, 2005a). High external debt in developing 
countries, as argued by Haggard (1995:7), ‘produced strong incentives for policy change, 
especially so that developing countries could regain access to foreign investment and 
borrowing.’ Such policies led to liberalized investment measures, stricter investment protection, 
and the alignment of domestic policies with international neoliberal norms, which constrains 
policy autonomy in developing countries and hinders development in the long run.  
Policy autonomy (or policy space)—generally referred to ‘the flexibility under trade rules 
that provides nation states with adequate room to maneuver to deploy effective policies to spur 
economic development’ (Gallagher, 2008:63)—has been a crucial aspect of industrial 
development across time and across countries. The lack of policy space has been argued to have 
impeded with long-term growth, while its availability, if utilized correctly, can bring about 
industrialization and rapid economic growth (Amsden, 1989; Wade, 1990; Chang, 1993; 2002a; 
2007; Gallagher, 2005; 2008). Rodrik (1996), for example, argues that the role of the state is 
essential in moving a developing country into a higher-value added specialization track and 
upgrading into a high-income equilibrium. Without such a boost from the state, poorer countries 
may get stuck in a low-income equilibrium, specializing in traditional low-tech and low-skill-
intensive productions. Thus, as also argued by Akyuz (2005), lowering industrial tariffs should 
not be viewed as simply achieving short-term efficiency-related gains. Longer-term 
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consequences should also be taken into consideration, for opening up may lock developing 
countries in labor-intensive industries and hinder capital accumulation, technological progress, 
and productivity growth.  
State-directed industrialization with unorthodox economic policies played a crucial role in 
the late industrialization of East Asian countries. In the words of Alice Amsden (1989:8, italics 
in the original), ‘[i]n late-industrializing countries, the state intervenes with subsidies 
deliberately to distort relative prices in order to stimulate economic activity.’ Wade (1990) 
provides evidence of state-led industrialization coupled with free-market policies in Japan, 
Taiwan, Korea, Hong-Kong, and Singapore that produced continuous growth rates of about 7 per 
cent per annum for two and a half decades starting from 1960. Meanwhile, Amsden (1989; 2001) 
and Chang (1993; 2002a; 2007) demonstrate state-managed rapid economic growth in Korea 
during the same period. A mix of orthodox and unorthodox policies was employed in East Asian 
countries to achieve significant growth rates since the early 1960s. East Asian countries 
implemented selective unilateral reduction of tariffs and non-tariff barriers to attract investment. 
They, however, also ‘tended to retain governmental guidance and interventions in sectors of high 
growth potential’ (Yamazawa, 2003:273). During the 1970s industrialization process in Korea, 
‘[s]pending foreign exchange on anything not essential for industrial development was 
prohibited or strongly discouraged through import bans, high tariffs and excise taxes.’ 
Euphemistically labeled as ‘luxury consumption tax,’ a levy was introduced in Korea that 
covered even items like foreign produced small cars, whiskey, and cookies (Chang, 2007:8).  
The Korean government not only exercised ‘absolute control over scarce foreign exchange,’ 
but also managed the inflow of FDI based on its priorities, selectively welcoming them in certain 
sectors and banning them in others (Chang, 2007:14). The ultimate destinations of FDI inflows 
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mattered, and East Asian countries, including Korea, were successful in directing FDI inflows 
via unorthodox policies into high-tech and export-oriented sectors. Selectively picking industries 
with high growth potential and providing government support for them was part of Korea’s 
economic development policies from the 1960s to the 1980s. Tariff protection and government 
subsidies were commonplace for these industries until they could stand on their own feet and 
compete internationally. All the banks were government owned, thus credit was channeled based 
on the priorities of overall economic and industrial development and not solely for the sake of 
maximizing bank profits. State-owned enterprises (in steel and chemical production, for 
example) played a crucial role in leading the country’s industrialization process (Chang, 2007).  
The proponents of neo-liberal policies have mostly viewed Korea as a free-trade economy 
following neo-liberal policies during its miracle years until the 1990s. Export-led growth, 
however, which was a significant factor in Korea’s overall economic achievements, did not 
always include free-market policies. In fact, in some cases Korea employed targeted government 
intervention to promote specific promising industries (World Bank, 1993; Akyuz et al, 1998; 
Chang, 2007; Rodrik, 2001; 2008a). As noted by one scholar (Yamazawa, 2003:273), the 
‘interventions conflicted with the free trade principles of GATT and the World Bank’ but were 
nevertheless accepted by the World Bank (1993) as ‘market-friendly’ for the high rates of growth 
they ensured. In fact, ‘[t]he Korean economic miracle was the result of a clever and pragmatic 
mixture of market incentives and state direction’ (Chang, 2007:15). Korea was successful in 
applying selective high tariffs in industries that were vital for its economic development, and 
keeping the tariffs lower for other sectors, thus keeping the average tariff levels not very high 
(Chang, 2007).  Moreover, despite its current status as an ‘innovative’ nation, Korea was a major 
infringer of intellectual property (IP) rights during the course of its industrialization and was 
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using ‘reverse engineering’18 to copy leading technologies for local production. The IP regimes 
of other late industrializers and now-developed countries during the periods of their rapid 
industrialization would have been deemed as insufficient in today’s standards that are being 
imposed onto developing countries (Chang, 2001; 2007; Kumar, 2003).  
Korea’s economic growth rates slowed down after the 1997 financial crisis, which was partly 
because the country made a significant shift towards open-market neoliberal policies. This policy 
shift in Korea and other crisis-hit East Asian countries was partially IMF-imposed, as part of the 
bailout conditions. Another reason was that once Korea became economically bigger, it became 
harder for it to hide behind high tariffs with the sole justification of nurturing infant industries 
and implementing development policies (including import bans and restrictions) that hurt its 
trading partners (Chang, 2007).  
Another success story in export-led growth and industrialization was Chile during the period 
of its impressive growth of 7 per cent in the 1970s and 1980s. Chile has often been praised by 
neo-liberals for maintaining high rates of growth during this period, but was not in fact fully 
liberalized. Most importantly, capital accounts in the country were not fully liberalized and Chile 
was selective in attracting FDI. The tax on short-term capital prevented a surge of hot and 
footloose capital into the economy. Privatization, despite pressures from the IMF, was not to its 
fullest scale either, and government enterprises continued to play an important role in the 
economy. Even as of the mid-2000s, some 20 per cent of Chile’s exports came from one 
government owned enterprise, CODELCO (Stiglitz, 2005).  
The policies used by the newly industrialized countries of East Asia have not been unique to 
East Asia alone. Many of today’s developed countries used similar policies during their own 
																																								 																				
18 ‘Reverse engineering’ refers to infringing with IPRs by copying technology through dismantling a product and 
reproducing its part to get the replica.   
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periods of rapid industrialization. It has been argued that, having achieved rapid industrialization 
and impressive economic growth by means of non-orthodox economic policies, such as high 
tariffs and subsidies, today’s developed countries are preaching different policies for developing 
countries, which are yet to go through their own industrialization processes. The metaphor used 
here is ‘kicking away the ladder,’ used in 1841 by the German economist Friedrich List, who 
accused Britain of advocating against policies for other countries that helped its own economy to 
gain global economic supremacy in the nineteenth century (Wade, 1990; Chang, 2001; 2002b; 
2003; 2007; Chang and Green, 2003; Akyuz, 2005; Kumar and Gallagher, 2007).  
The automobile industry in Japan, which has become an iconic symbol of Japan’s economy, 
was struggling to compete against American manufacturers for many years in the mid-20th 
century. Toyota’s unsuccessful attempt to compete in the American market in 1958 would have 
prompted many that 25 years after its establishment as a car manufacturer in 1933 it was time to 
explore other competitive advantages. The Japanese government, however, did not give up and 
provided the industry the needed support through high protective tariffs and management of 
investment. As a result of such protective measures, the Japanese car industry became what it 
currently is—both a symbol of Japanese economic success and the locomotive of its economy 
(Chang, 2007). The industrial development policies that were at the core of Japan’s economic 
success in the second half of the 20th century were carried out by the Ministry of International 
Trade and Industry (MITI) and the Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO), which were also 
promoting the outward orientation of Japanese firms by providing information and marketing 
support. Although the tariff levels were not particularly high in Japan after World War II, 
imports and foreign exchange were under the tight control of the Japanese government, which 
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also provided subsidized credit to the promising strategic industries and strictly regulated inward 
FDI (Johnson, 1982; Chang, 2007).  
The role of MITI in the Japanese ‘miracle’ cannot be underestimated. In the post-World War 
II period, the Japanese state was extremely successful in implementing its priorities in economic 
development and industrialization policies. Through MITI, with its unique design of vertical 
bureaus for each strategic industry, the Japanese state oversaw the economic rise of the country 
after World War II through subsiding strategic sectors with high growth potential, channeling 
investment, providing subsidized credit and selective tax breaks to export-oriented industries  
(Johnson, 1982).  
To conclude, the relationship between openness and growth is, at most, ambiguous. 
Moreover, as seen from the experience of the newly industrialized countries of East Asia and 
today’s developed countries, state involvement in industrial development policies, in a manner 
highly contradictory to today’s orthodox policies preached by high-income countries, can be 
vital in promoting development and growth in the early stages of industrialization. If utilized 
correctly, development policy space is an important lever that allows the implementation of 
developmental policies to raise the competitiveness of developing countries internationally and 
close the income gap between the world’s rich and poor countries. As will be seen next in 
Chapter 3.2, this policy space has been restricted as a result of multilateral and, especially, 
preferential trade liberalization through North-South PTAs.  
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3.2. North-South PTAs and the (Severely Constrained) Policy Space 
 
Following the emphasis on the importance of developmental industrial policy made in Chapter 
3.1, this chapter discusses how the policy autonomy of developing and emerging economies has 
been circumscribed as a result of multilateral and, especially, preferential trade liberalization, 
which has led not only to the limited ability of Southern county governments to boost economic 
growth, but has also circumscribed their options of dealing with national emergencies. Most 
importantly, this chapter outlines the policy areas, where the diminished or forgone sovereign 
control as a quid pro quo deal for secure and better-than-MFN access to Northern markets has 
had significant developmental implications. These policy areas are subsequently used in 
Chapters 4-6 as criteria for the comparative analysis of the first-order and second-order North-
South PTAs. 
It has been widely argued that, as a result of orthodox policies promoted by developed 
countries, policy autonomy of developing and emerging countries has been circumscribed, while 
with the proliferation of North-South PTAs, the options for national governments have become 
narrower not only for promoting economic growth but also for coping with national emergencies 
(Rodrik, 2001; Wade, 2003; Gallagher, 2005; 2008; 2011; Shadlen, 2005c; 2009; Kumar and 
Gallagher, 2007). As shown in Chapter 2.3, Southern countries have been forced to sign North-
South PTAs, because power asymmetries enabled Northern economies to change the North-
South PTA negotiation game into one whereby being left out (while competitors enjoy 
preferential access to Northern markets) has been less desirable than singing North-South PTAs 
on terms largely dictated by Northern countries (Gruber, 2000; Shadlen, 2008).   
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Thus, preferential access to the US and other developed countries’ markets comes with a high 
price for Southern countries, i.e., ‘to sacrifice many important and traditional tools of 
development policy’ (Shadlen, 2008:10). The key policy areas, where Southern countries see 
their policy autonomy diminished, include tariffs and related measures (including in agriculture), 
government procurement, trade in services, investment measures, and IPRs. These are the sectors 
where Northern countries have vested interests. At the same time, these are the areas where 
Southern countries still have certain leeway for autonomous industrial policies under multilateral 
agreements, particularly the WTO. These loopholes are, however, effectively eliminated in 
North-South PTAs (Shadlen, 2008). This chapter next looks at how policy autonomy is 
circumscribed in each area as a result of North-South PTAs.  
 
Tariffs and Related Measures  
Tariff reduction starting from the second half the 20th century both as a result of multilateral 
WTO negotiations and regional and bilateral preferential trade arrangements has been quite 
impressive. According to the WTO (2011), the average applied tariff was as low as 4 per cent in 
2009, down from the recent peak of over 9 per cent in 1994, and close to 40 per cent when 
GATT was established in 1947. However, the estimates of the distribution of welfare gains 
brought about as a result of tariff cuts vary among developing and developed countries.   
By one account (Brown et al, 2001, Table 1, p. 32), the estimated increase in global welfare 
of USD 75 billion, as a result of the Uruguay Round tariff cuts, went predominantly to developed 
countries (about USD 70 billion), while the remaining went to the newly industrialized countries, 
with only small benefits for developing countries. Bouët (2006) provides an overview of studies 
that put the welfare increase as a result of possible full trade liberalization at 0.3-3.1 per cent. 
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The effects on poorer countries, however, were estimated to be much lower because of soaring 
food prices and eroded preferential access to richer markets. Meanwhile, Yanikkaya (2003:84) 
found that the relationship between trade barriers and growth, contrary to all orthodox theories, is 
positive, which provides ‘considerable evidence for the hypothesis that restrictions on trade can 
promote growth, especially of developing countries under certain conditions.’ 
Anderson (2004) puts the amount of estimated annual welfare gains as a result of the full 
trade liberalization and abolition of agriculture subsidies in the range of USD 254 billion (of 
which USD 108 billion accruing to developing countries) to USD 2080 billion (of which USD 
431 billion accruing to developing countries). The share accrued to developing countries, 
according to this estimate, is around 20-40 per cent, which is not just low but also highly 
dependent on the abolition of agricultural subsidies (agriculture is 60-70 per cent contributor to 
the gains accruing to developing countries). Given that main beneficiaries of agricultural 
liberalization are food producing bigger emerging economies and the consumers in developed 
countries, the overall impact of trade liberalization on least developed countries was estimated to 
be very small. Some food-importing least developed countries may even be left worse-off 
(Francois et al, 2003).19 Other studies (Harrison, 1996; Cernat et al, 2002; IMF and World Bank, 
2002; Baldwin, 2003) produced more optimistic estimates of welfare gains for developing 
countries as a result of trade liberalization. Nevertheless, there does not seem to be much 
reciprocity between the North and the South in relation to welfare gains as a result of trade 
liberalization; there rather is an asymmetry with unequal exchange (Akyuz, 2005).  
																																								 																				
19 There is a negative estimated welfare change of around 1 per cent of GDP for most of the food-importing least 
developed countries as a result of Uruguay Round agricultural tariff liberalization (Ingco, 1997).  
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Unlike the WTO, where member-countries are required to bind their tariffs for different 
categories of goods at certain levels,20 most PTAs require parties to lower and eventually 
eliminate all import tariffs, exposing their industries to an uneven competition from giant 
multinationals. The WTO allows generous safeguard clauses to protect infant industries from 
competition and promote industrial policy measures. More specifically, GATT Article XVIII 
allows countries to use safeguard measures for balance of payment purposes. Article XIX allows 
temporary safeguarding measures in case of import surge, whereas Article VI sanctions anti-
dumping and countervailing duties as a response to unfair trade practices. The pre-1994 GATT 
did not formally limit the duration of safeguards, while the WTO restricts them to a maximum of 
eight-year period. In addition to the formal safeguard tools allowed by the WTO, developing 
countries can unilaterally raise their tariffs up to their bound levels (which for most developing 
countries are significantly higher than the applier tariff levels) with no whatsoever violation of 
WTO rules and, in effect, enjoy additional safeguard measures (Amsden and Hikino, 2000; 
Amsden, 2003).  
Although the WTO has limited the choices for Southern countries, there still remain policy 
options that developing and emerging countries utilize. Although historically dominated by 
developed countries, antidumping cases have recently widely involved Southern countries too. 
India, for example, has been especially active in taking advantage of antidumping measures, 
maintaining ‘almost permanent import surcharges to protect its balance of payments’ (Amsden, 
2003:86). Turkey is another country that successfully took advantage of trade policy flexibilities 
allowed under the WTO and navigated its economy through the post-2008 recession relatively 
																																								 																				
20 Unlike in most developed countries, the bound tariff levels for many developing countries are higher than the 
applied tariff levels. This fact gives developing countries an opportunity to raise tariffs to the bound levels without 
whatsoever violation of WTO rules (Amsden, 2003; Shadlen, 2005b; Gallagher, 2008).  
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smoothly. Its policy-makers introduced changes to its relatively liberal import regime by 
applying new WTO-consistent import restrictions exercised through changes to its applied tariffs 
and the use of anti-dumping and safeguards measures and ‘managed a remarkable recovery’ 
from the 2007 financial crisis (Bown, 2014:215). 
Provisions of the WTO agreement on subsidies and countervailing measures do provide WTO 
members with policy space to address problems ranging from poverty reduction to 
environmental sustainability. Article 8 of the agreement defines three broad categories of non-
actionable (i.e., permitted) subsidies: for research and development, for regional development, 
and for environmental protection (Aguayo and Gallagher, 2005). Meanwhile, GATT Article XIX 
sanctions the use of safeguards when an import surge ‘threaten[s] serious injury to domestic 
producers’ (Bown and Wu, 2014:181). In practice, however, safeguards and other temporary 
trade barriers may also be utilized by countries, in line with WTO provisions, to cope with 
recession and other unfavorable economic situations (Bown, 2014). The use of safeguards and 
options for other temporary trade barriers, however, have been severely circumscribed under 
PTAs, as ‘PTAs may impose additional constraints on a country’s ability to exercise policy 
options to respond to increased foreign competition through escape clause mechanisms’ (Bown 
and Wu, 2014:183).  
Most PTAs do have safeguard clauses, but these clauses are much restricted compared to 
those under the WTO. Most notably, the conditions under which safeguard clauses can be 
applied in most PTAs require compensation in the form of concessions. Such compensations are 
not required under the WTO, and the maximum possible period for safeguards is substantially 
longer than that under most PTAs (Shadlen, 2005b). In addition, WTO rules allow countries to 
provide subsidy-like support to local companies. Called duty drawbacks, these subsidy-like 
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provisions provide import tax rebates on goods used as inputs for exports. Consistent with WTO 
provisions, duty drawbacks have been efficiently utilized by governments, such as that of Brazil, 
to compensate for the higher cost of capital for local producers (Abbott, 1995; Shadlen, 2005b). 
Similarly, duty drawbacks significantly contributed to export promotion in South Korea (Mah, 
2007). Duty drawbacks have gained higher importance due to the increasing number of global 
value chains and the change in the nature of international trade, whereby the imported content of 
the average export accounts about 40 per cent. Drawbacks are, however, restricted in most PTAs. 
The abolition of duty drawbacks was especially significant in NAFTA, which were widely used 
in the Maquiladora system, whereby Mexican assemblers (usually located along the US border) 
were using imported inputs from third countries to assemble final products and re-export them to 
the US. The ban of duty drawbacks in NAFTA was meant to raise the cost of non-NAFTA inputs 
in Mexican products designed for the US market, which restricted the ability of outsiders to use 
Mexico as an export platform for accessing the US market (Shadikhodjaev, 2013).  
 
Agriculture 
The protection of agriculture in Northern countries remains an important obstacle for agriculture 
producing Southern countries to expand exports to the rich world. Although agriculture and 
textile are the main sectors where developing countries have comparative advantage, these are 
also sectors that are highly protected in developed countries (Khor and Ocampo, 2010). 
Agricultural subsidies are huge in the EU, for example, which spends about 40 per cent of its 
budget on agriculture, despite the fact that the industry generates less than 2 per cent of its GDP 
and employs less than 5 per cent of its workforce (Economist, 2012). 
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According to Anderson et al (2000), developing countries incur an annual loss of around USD 
11.6 billion as a result of the agricultural policies of OECD countries. Ironically, developed high-
income countries themselves would have benefited hugely (USD 110.5 billion) as a result of the 
abolition of agricultural trade barriers. Hence, because the overall gain from agricultural 
liberalization would be more than what producers would lose, in theory, OECD countries could 
produce mechanisms to compensate agriculture producers who oppose liberalization. However, 
despite the urge to lower or abolish industrial tariffs in Southern countries during PTA 
negotiations, the protection of agriculture remains relatively untouched (OECD, 2010).  
GATT Article XXIV requires that PTAs cover ‘substantially all’ trade, which in theory makes 
the exclusion of whole sectors, such as agriculture, from PTAs not an easy task for Northern 
countries. The interpretation of ‘substantially all’ trade, however, has been quite vague, and 
Northern countries have managed to exclude sensitive commodity lines from liberalization, 
while PTAs have mostly covered agricultural product lines that had already had low or zero 
tariffs as a result of WTO or unilateral liberalization. This, in particular, was the case with 
Japan’s PTAs with countries, such as Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines, where 
tariffs on major agricultural commodities comprising around half of Japan’s agricultural imports 
from the above-mentioned countries were barely affected by the PTAs (Ando and Kimura, 
2008). As reckoned by Shearer et al (2009), by year 10 of the implementation of 33 PTAs signed 
during the 1990s and 2000s, on average only 81 per cent of agricultural tariff lines were to go 
down to zero, which is below the stringent 90 per cent mark that justifies the inclusion of 
‘substantially all’ trade in a PTA as per GATT Article XXIV.  
Agricultural liberalization was estimated to benefit Southern countries to different extents. It 
would be more favorable to bigger agricultural producers than to smaller least developed 
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countries that have been net importers of agricultural products. For most of the food importing 
less developed countries the negative welfare change would amount around 1 per cent of GDP, 
which was believed to be offset by positive changes elsewhere (Ingco, 1997).  
GATT Article XVI allows export subsidies for agricultural products ‘as long as the country 
using them did not gain more then an equitable share of the world market.’ According to 
Binswanger and Lutz (2003), however, the equitable share condition has been neglected, and 
most OECD countries have been using subsidies, which have lowered the world price and have 
harmed efficient producers elsewhere, including in Southern countries, which have not enjoyed 
the privilege of government subsidies.   
 
Government Procurement 
Government procurement has been an important area in PTA negotiations for Southern countries 
because it has largely been omitted from the WTO agreement. Hence, the PTAs have been 
imposing new obligations on most developing and emerging economies regarding government 
procurement. WTO members are currently allowed to keep government procurement out of the 
WTO market access provisions. In the multilateral settings, government procurement is regulated 
by the WTO plurilateral Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA), which is optional for 
WTO members to join.  As of December 2015, the GPA had 17 signatories (the 28 EU countries 
counted as one party),21 most of which are high-income countries, including the US, Japan, and 
the EU. Given that most Southern countries have not signed to the optional provisions of the 
agreement, Northern countries have been trying to introduce binding market access and national 
treatment rules in government procurement ever since the conclusion of the Uruguay Round, 
																																								 																				
21 The list of GPA signatories can be fount at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/memobs_e.htm 
(accessed 3 December 2015).  
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including during the 1996 Singapore and 1999 Seattle Ministerial Conferences. So far 
unsuccessful in multilateral setting, developed countries have been promoting strong government 
procurement clauses in North-South PTAs (Khor, 2001). 
In a number of countries, government procurement represents a bigger industry than their 
total imports, thus it is not surprising that this sector has attracted a lot of attention, especially by 
multinationals from Northern countries. By keeping out of the GPA, many Southern countries 
shield local firms from outside competition for government contracts. Thus, liberalizing 
government procurement in both the federal and sub-federal levels has been a means to access 
government contracts in developing and emerging countries by firms from developed countries, 
such as the US and EU (Khor, 2001). 
Clauses regulating government procurement have been an integral part of PTAs. Two-thirds 
of PTAs signed in the 2000s and notified to the WTO include government procurement clauses 
and close to one-third of them include comprehensive regulation of government procurement 
(Dawar and Evenett, 2011). Public procurement clauses can have developmental consequences, 
ranging from increased cost efficiency to the promotion of small- and medium-sizes companies 
in Southern countries. For this reason, the nature of government procurement clauses under 
PTAs, such as the levels of government (federal vs. sub-federal) affected and procurement 
thresholds applied, matter. An important factor is whether government procurement regimes in 
PTAs follow a positive list approach, like in the GPA, or a negative-list approach. The positive-
list approach, with pre-defined coverage of commitments that applies to specifically listed 
procurements, provides for ‘greater national flexibility and a more incremental approach to 
procurement reform’ in Southern countries. The negative list approach, on the other hand, 
implies that all procurements are subject to the clauses of the agreements, except those explicitly 
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listed as exempt (Dawar and Evenett, 2011:374). The negative-list approach in government 
procurement implies that the provisions on liberalization will also apply to future activities, 
because such activities are not subject to limitations at the time of the signing of the PTA. Thus, 
the negative list approach provides ‘an automatic commitment to free trade’ regarding future 
activities (Fink and Molinuevo, 2008:275). 
 
Trade in Services  
Although the liberalization of trade in services can bring about efficiency and reform in Southern 
countries, it is better implemented with caution. If the liberalization is ‘inadequate,’ it ‘may 
affect the strength of the domestic regulatory function, especially if the right to regulate—
following best international practice—is not adequately preserved.’ Moreover, ‘developing 
countries may assume significant regulatory obligations that may not be appropriate for the 
reality and level of development of their markets.’ Thus, governments need to retain control of 
the regulation of trade in services, in order to make sure the benefits of liberalization are shared 
among all stakeholders (Sáez, 2010:11).  
The WTO General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) has limited the ability of the 
governments of Southern countries to regulate services industries, ranging from financial 
services to education, and protect their industries from unfair competition from well-established 
foreign firms (Wade, 2003). Thus, rapid liberalization in cross-border provision of services that 
may affect the control over regulation may not be in the best interest of developing and emerging 
economies.  In Latin America, for example, early reformers, such as Chile and Mexico, were less 
successful in exporting services than Brazil, which is relatively less open. India is another 
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example of a Southern country, which has been one of the leaders in providing cross border 
services, while having a high service restrictiveness index (Sáez, 2010). 
Many PTAs take the liberalization of trade in services much further than what has been 
agreed on in the WTO GATS agreement. As was the case with government procurement, PTAs 
often require a negative-list approach in services, which means that governments can exclude 
certain services from liberalization, while the rest of the services, including the ones that can 
emerge in the future, are subject to liberalization. This, in effect, circumscribes a governments’ 
ability to effectively regulate industries in services (Fink and Molinuevo, 2008).  
 
Investment Measures 
FDI and other types of investment have historically been an important source for the 
development of national economies in Southern countries. With the increased mobility of 
investment across national boundaries, however, host countries, mostly in the Global South, have 
been facing the dilemma of retaining full control over investment regulation versus attracting 
FDI that increasingly requires lighter regulation. Because capital has become highly mobile, 
while unskilled labor in Southern countries remains highly immobile, FDI recipient countries, in 
effect, compete for investment from developed countries, which, enabled by the high relative 
mobility of FDI over unskilled labor, enjoyed enhanced bargaining power and the privilege to 
choose the most attractive investment destinations. As a result, developing and emerging 
economies have felt the need to become more attractive to FDI, among other things, by giving up 
lots of policy measures related to investment regulation (Frieden, 1991; Rodrik, 1997).  
Global investment rules have became more stringent with the establishment of the WTO 
Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMS). For example, a number of 
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measures, such as local content requirements, which oblige foreign investors to use certain 
amount of local input in their productions, and trade balancing requirements, which obliges the 
use of a sufficient amount of local inputs in exports to maintain the import-export balance, are 
outlawed under TRIMS (Shadlen, 2005b). The TRIMS agreement, however, does not prevent 
countries from imposing certain performance requirements, such as export requirements in 
relation to investments in free-trade zones, local participation in equity, technology transfer, and 
local employment. These measures are, however, almost entirely restricted under most PTAs 
(Correa and Kumar, 2003). 
PTAs have provisions, such as establishment, non-discrimination, national treatment, 
investment regulation and protection, which define the scope and depth of these agreements. 
Establishment is a critical market access component for foreign investors referring to either the 
creation of a new firm in the host country or the acquisition of an existing firm. It defines the 
terms under which foreign investors can invest and manage their investment, and hence the 
scope and depth of these rules define the scope of a PTA. Non-discrimination limits the ability of 
the host country to distinguish between different categories of investment when applying 
regulatory measures, while national treatment implies that domestic and foreign-owned 
companies must be treated equally. Investment regulation and protection provide for terms that 
limit a governments’ ability to restrict the activities of foreign investors and expropriate their 
investment (Miroudot, 2011).  
Investment-related dispute settlement is one area where Southern countries have experienced 
limited policy autonomy. The Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) of the WTO TRIMS 
agreement provides a new platform for binding international rules, which is different from the 
consensus-based dispute settlement mechanism under the pre-1994 GATT, whereby a single 
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country could block decisions.  Notwithstanding its novel approach, however, the DSU appears 
‘as inadequate in the eyes of investors’ that seek further-reaching investment protection rules 
under preferential accords (Horlick and Marti, 1997:43-44). Moreover, the TRIMS agreement, as 
the term suggests, focuses merely on ‘trade-related’ investment, whereas capital-rich developed 
countries seek to negotiate further-reaching investment-related clauses in PTAs that would 
regulate all types of investment, including in services and financial institutions (Shadlen, 2008; 
van Harten, 2005; Capling and Nossal, 2006; Miroudot, 2011).   
A major provision that exists in many PTAs (and in virtually all the US agreements22) is 
investor-state arbitration, which allows private firms to file lawsuits for damages against nation-
states at the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) or the United 
Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) arbitration tribunals. These 
tribunals can award monetary compensations and restitution of property, which can be enforced 
in US courts through the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Arbitral Awards (Dumberry, 2001; Hufbauer and Schott, 2005). In contrast, under the WTO, 
where dispute settlement is strictly a government-to-government affair, the dispute settlement 
body does not provide relief in the form of compensation to the winning party.  It rather obliges 
the party that has violated the rules to ‘bring its measure into compliance with the obligation’ 
(Price, 2000:108). Intended to protect foreign investors from unfair treatment by host countries, 
investor-state arbitration clauses require countries to give up some of their sovereignty, including 
over matters such as environment and public health. Many investor-state arbitration cases under 
NAFTA, for example, had little to do with the seizure of property, which is what such clauses are 
intended to prevent. Instead, the cases have challenged national environmental and public health 
																																								 																				
22 With probably the only exception being the US-Australia PTA (Capling and Nossal, 2006). 
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laws and regulations, obliging governments to pay significant sums to private firms as 
compensation for forgone profits (Public Citizen, 2001; 2005; Economist, 2014c). 
In fact, with the proliferation of PTAs during the last quarter century, the number of cases 
filed at ICSID rose rapidly (see Figure 3.2.1). As of 30 June 2014, ICSID had registered a total 
of 473 cases. 421 of these cases were registered between 1997 and 2013. Only 38 cases were 
registered before 1997, and 14 cases during the first half of 2014. South America and East 
Europe & Central Asia were the two biggest regions involved in ICSID arbitration. States from 
these regions were involved in 27 per cent and 24 per cent of ICSID cases, respectively, as of 
June 2014. On the other hand, states from developed regions, such as North America and 
Western Europe, were involved in only 5 per cent and 3 per cent of all cases, respectively. 63 per 
cent of all ICSID cases were filed under BITs, and the remaining cases under other 
arrangements, including PTAs (ICSID, 2014). 
 
Figure 3.2.1. The number of ICSID cases, 1972-2014 
 
Source: ICSID (2014:7) 
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One aspect of investor-state arbitration that has been widely criticized by development NGOs 
is that many developing and emerging economies, recipients of investment, lack an appropriate 
legal system or judicial traditions so that investor-state arbitration is conducted based on their 
jurisdictions. As a result, investor-state arbitration has been carried out in jurisdictions other than 
that of the host state, which has circumscribed the abilities of host governments (mostly in 
Southern countries) to control the process of litigation (Kurtz, 2002). Such provisions of North-
South PTAs have made the protection of public welfare increasingly difficult for Southern 
countries. NAFTA and CAFTA-DR, for example, prohibit direct or indirect expropriation of 
foreign investment unless it is for public purpose and with full compensation. Moreover, the 
definition of expropriation is quite broad, covering also direct and indirect measures ‘tantamount 
to nationalization or expropriation’—a wording that gives ICSID arbitrators broad room for 
interpretation (Hufbauer and Schott, 2005:206-207; Robert, 2011). The very idea of public 
purpose seems to be a matter of challenge at ICSID hearings. Even measures like a government’s 
anti-smoking policies have been viewed by tobacco producers as violating investment protection 
provisions, as Philip Morris International, a US firm, filed a lawsuit at ICSID against Uruguay 
for alleged violation of their BIT as a result of smoking restriction policies by the Latin 
American country (Economist, 2013b).  
Moreover, clauses prohibiting indirect expropriation under PTAs might extend to areas such 
as tax legislation, which has historically been a strictly domestic matter. As noted by Rodriguez 
(2006:3), ‘protection to USA investors under an FTA could reach unsuspected dimensions via 
indirect expropriation arbitration claims where domestic tax matters could rise to the level of 
investment disputes.’ This will inevitably lead to restrictions in Southern countries’ ability to 
implement fully autonomous domestic tax policies. The example cited by Rodriguez (2006) was 
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a VAT dispute between Occidental Exploration and Production Company and Ecuador (1 July 
2004), over which the London Court of International Arbitration ruled that the claimant, a private 
company, had the right to a VAT refund from Ecuador. Notwithstanding Ecuador’s intentions to 
challenge the decision before a local court, the very possibility of such a ruling circumscribes 
Southern countries’ sovereignty over domestic tax policy. In another dispute between Occidental 
and Ecuador, ‘over its (apparently lawful) termination of an oil-concession contract,’ ICSID 
tribunal awarded in 2012 damages of USD 2.3 billion, the largest award as of 2012 to be issued 
by an ICSID tribunal, to be paid to Occidental by the state of Ecuador (Economist, 2014d; Cheng 
and Bento, 2012).  
Although the supporters of strong investment protection rules, including direct investor-state 
arbitration, argue that such clauses are necessary for protecting investors from state seizure of 
private property, ‘investor-state cases filed to date have had little to do with government seizure 
of property. Instead, the cases challenge laws, regulations, court decisions and other government 
actions at the national, state and local level’ (Public Citizen, 2005:xix). Investor-state arbitration 
clauses considerably constrain the sovereignty of nation-states in the management of foreign 
investments. By giving private arbitrators power to judge on claims by private investors against 
nation-states, this ‘hybrid’ legal system ‘provides significant advantages to multinational 
enterprises at the expense of governmental flexibility’ (van Harten, 2005:600). 
Investment-related clauses of most PTAs are, therefore, highly restrictive for autonomous 
industrial policies of nation-states. These restrictive provisions have been more of a concern for 
Southern countries, as although the trend may have started to reverse itself since recently, 
developing and emerging economies have traditionally been net recipients of FDI (Kurtz, 2002). 
In order to maintain ‘investor confidence’ and secure more investment amid stiff competition for 
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FDI, investment regulation in developing and emerging countries has often been relaxed, which 
has harmed the working class in many Southern countries (Arnold, 2006:196).  
 
 IPRs  
The overarching debate in IPRs rests within the dichotomy of granting innovators temporary 
exclusive private rights over the invention (thus, giving them incentives to keep on inventing and 
furthering the boundaries of science) and giving the users of inventions, who, by definition, are 
the beneficiaries of technological progress, better access to these inventions. In the current 
setting, the global policy of IPRs is dominated by the ‘producers’ of IP, meanwhile ‘consumers,’ 
predominantly consisting of Southern countries, lack the voice and political clout to push for 
their own agenda (CIPR, 2002). It is worthwhile to mention that, despite some evidence that 
weak IPRs protection in host countries deter investment in high-tech industries (Smarzynska 
Javorcik, 2005), in general, strong IPRs protection alone in Southern countries does not 
necessarily ensure technology transfer and FDI. If this were the case, most FDI flows would 
have gone to Sub-Saharan Africa and Eastern Europe and not to Brazil, China, and other high-
growth countries with weak protection of IPRs. Thus, FDI flows are more correlated with factors 
like market size, growth rates and prospects, factor prices, and trade costs rather than with the 
level of IPRs protection (Maskus, 2005).  
IPRs have probably been the most sensitive area of North-South cooperation. This is not 
surprising, given that developing countries’ share in patents held globally has historically been at 
very low levels, comprising less than 2 per cent during 1977-1996 (Correa, 2000b:5). The picture 
has not changed much recently, for the share of developing countries in the filings for IPRs in 
2012 was around 3 per cent (WIPO, 2013). Moreover, as of 2000, developed countries received 
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97 per cent of all patent royalties, while the World Bank estimated figure of annual South-to-
North profit transfer under the TRIPS agreement was about USD 41 billion (Gallagher, 
2008:69). As a result, the profit of the ten largest pharmaceutical companies in the US, for 
example, amounted to some USD 36 billion in 2002, who also made generous contributions to 
political campaigns, which amounted to almost USD 30 million in 2003 (Oxfam, 2003). In fact, 
the negotiations for the establishment of the TRIPS agreement were one of the most 
controversial in the Uruguay Round. The inclusion of IP rights into the negotiation agenda was 
initiated by the US, which was backed by other developed economies, such as the EC, Japan, and 
Switzerland. The US and EC even exerted pressure in the form of trade retaliations on major 
economies in the Southern country camp, such as Brazil, Korea, and India, who resisted the 
inclusion of IPRs in the Uruguay Round of negotiations. Through its Section 301 of Trade Act of 
1974 and its amendments, namely the 1984 amendment and the Special 301 of 1988, the US 
made the violation of IPRs ‘actionable’ and provided the USTR the authority to act against 
countries that provided insufficient protection of IPRs. In the words of one participant of the 
negotiations (cited in Shadlen (2004:83)), ‘given a choice between American sanctions or a 
negotiated multilateral agreement, the TRIPS agreement began to look better.’ The strong North-
South divide over the terms of the inclusion of IP rights into the new agreement was finally 
reconciled as a result of strong pressure from Northern countries, and the TRIPS agreement was 
signed, representing mostly the preferences of developed countries (Pugatch, 2004; Shadlen, 
2004). 
Contrary to the promise that Northern and Southern countries alike would enjoy the benefits 
of TRIPS, the supposed inflow of capital and innovation into developing and emerging 
economies remained unproven (Correa, 2000a). In fact, it has been argued that the IPRs 
	 79 
measures incorporated into trade-related agreements have been specifically tailored to the needs 
of technology-intensive industries in Northern countries, while Southern countries could, at best, 
marginally benefit from international IPRs rules (Dutfield, 2008; von Braun, 2012).  
IP regimes influence national public health policies by affecting access to pharmaceutical 
products in developing and emerging economies. The proposed TRIPS-plus provisions of the 
Doha Round and most North-South PTAs would restrict the public health safeguards available 
for Southern countries under the WTO. As a result, millions in Southern countries have not been 
able to afford vital new medicines for diseases, such as HIV/AIDS (Oxfam, 2003; 2004; 2006; 
MSF, 2003; 2004; Fink, 2011; Scott and Harman, 2013). Because pharmaceutical products were 
not patentable in many Southern countries until the TRIPS agreement came into force in 1995, 
developing countries were able to enjoy cheaper access to vital drugs. Many PTAs, however, 
through what is known as ‘pipeline’ protection, require Southern countries to automatically grant 
patents to non-novel23 drugs that were invented before they became patentable in their countries. 
A drug that was developed, say, in 1990 and was not patentable in a developing country, but was 
in a phase of clinical trials by 1995 and, thus, in the ‘pipeline,’ could be required by a PTA 
(NAFTA, in particular) to be granted a patent in a Southern country for the same period as in the 
original patent granted in another, usually Northern, country (Maskus, 1997; 2000; Shadlen, 
2005c; 2009). Subramanian (1994) reckons that welfare losses to smaller developing countries as 
a result of high levels of pharmaceutical patent protection outweigh the gains to pharmaceutical 
companies, hence hinting that stringent IPRs protection may result in net welfare loss. Moreover, 
retroactive ‘pipeline’ protection of IPRs would increase the welfare losses to individual 
developing countries by more than 2.5 times.  
																																								 																				
23 Novelty has traditionally been a key requirement for filing for a patent. Patentable drugs have to be novel, non-
obvious (include an inventive step), and have an industrial application (Correa, 2000a; Shadlen, 2009). 
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North-South PTAs restrict third party use of patented products. Most importantly, they limit 
governments’ ability to issue compulsory licenses on patented products. Defined as the host 
country’s ability to grant a local manufacturer rights to produce and distribute patented products 
without having to obtain consent from the patent holder, compulsory licenses have historically 
been in the arsenal of countries as a mechanism to interfere in the local IP regime (Maskus, 
1997; Correa, 1999; 2000a; Shadlen, 2005c; Fink and Reichenmiller, 2005; Timmermans, 2006; 
Fink, 2011). Under TRIPS, as reaffirmed under the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement 
and Public Health of 2001, countries are free to issue compulsory licenses on whatever ground 
they choose. There are, of course, certain conditions to be met, but the grounds on which 
compulsory licenses are issued are left to the discretion of the issuing country. These conditions 
can be avoided in cases of national emergency, and each country is free to define what 
constitutes a national emergency. This, however, is not the case under most PTAs. Compulsory 
licenses on the grounds of local working requirement—implemented by Brazil and India as an 
important part of their industrial policy under TRIPS—are prohibited under most PTAs (Abbott, 
2002; 2004; Fink and Reichenmiller, 2005; Odell and Sell, 2006; Shadlen, 2008).   
The Doha Declaration of 2001 was a major achievement for Southern countries, as before 
2001, many of them had difficulty using TRIPS-compliant measures for development- and 
emergency-related purposes. In 1997 and 1998, Thailand, for example, intended to produce a 
generic version of an AIDS drug to contain the AIDS epidemic in the country. Thailand, 
however, had to abandon this initiative when faced with sanctions threats by the US, lobbied by 
the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers Association (PhRMA), a group that represents 
the pharmaceutical industry in the US. A similar situation was around South Africa’s willingness 
to issue compulsory licensing for HIV/AIDS drugs to contain its own epidemic in December 
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1997. With a push from PhRMA, the US suspended South Africa’s duty-free access to the US 
market through the GSP, while local subsidiaries of PhRMA companies in South Africa 
challenged the Mandela government’s decision to issue compulsory licenses for HIV/AIDS 
drugs on the grounds that it violated the provisions of the TRIPS agreement. The whole issue 
attracted lots of attention from NGOs and mass media in the North, which eventually led to the 
Doha Declaration of 2001 (Odell and Sell, 2006). The 2001 Doha Declaration reaffirmed the 
right of developing countries to utilize TRIPS-compliant tools for development- and emergency-
related policies. Under PTAs, however, IP-related measures have been getting more restrictive. 
Notwithstanding the Doha Declaration, most North-South PTAs—especially those of the US—
prohibit Southern countries’ rights to utilize the development-friendly clauses of the TRIPS 
agreement (Oxfam, 2003; Abbott, 2004). 
Compared to TRIPS, most North-South PTAs are more restrictive on parallel importation, 
too. When a patented product is available in another market, it can be imported to the local 
market to create competition with the local producer, and thus push down the price. The 
exhaustion of IP rights can occur internationally, nationally, and regionally. Under international 
exhaustion, parallel importation is allowed because the right to control distribution is exhausted 
upon first sale. Whereas, under national exhaustion, IPRs holders can restrict parallel importation 
because sales within a specific nation exhausts only national rights to control distribution. A 
hybrid system of regional exhaustion allows parallel importation within a certain region but 
prohibits parallel importation from outside the region. TRIPS Article 6, as a result of strong 
pressure from Southern countries, maintains countries’ rights for parallel importation. Once the 
patented product is available in markets elsewhere, the patent holder exhausts its exclusivity and 
parallel importation becomes possible (Maskus and Chen, 2005). According to Chang 
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(2007:123), African countries with high rates of HIV/AIDS prevalence managed to import 
antiretroviral drugs (ARVs) from generic producers, such as India and Thailand, at around 2-5 
per cent of the cost of the patented drugs. Parallel importation has been especially important for 
countries that lack capacities for domestic production in order to take advantage of compulsory 
licensing provisions of the TRIPS agreements. Parallel importation is, however, prohibited under 
NAFTA and other North-South PTAs on the grounds of national doctrines of patent exhaustion 
(Correa, 2000a; Levis, 2006; Shadlen, 2009).  
Most North-South PTAs call for the protection of test data on drugs’ safety and efficacy 
submitted to national regulatory authorities for the approval of new pharmaceutical products. 
During the period of protection, generic producers cannot use or rely upon these data to apply for 
marketing approval of generic drugs based on their bioequivalence to the already approved 
products (Shadlen, 2005c; Fink and Reichenmiller, 2005; Correa, 2006; Fink, 2011). Test data 
exclusivity is also provided by the TRIPS agreement. More specifically, TRIPS Article 39.3 
states:24 
Members, when requiring, as a condition of approving the marketing of 
pharmaceutical or of agricultural chemical products which utilize new chemical 
entities, the submission of undisclosed test or other data, the origination of which 
involves a considerable effort, shall protect such data against unfair commercial use. 
In addition, Members shall protect such data against disclosure, except where 
necessary to protect the public, or unless steps are taken to ensure that the data are 
protected against unfair commercial use. 
 
Data protection against ‘unfair commercial use’ gives the first applicant a temporary 
exclusive right over the use of test data obtained via lengthy and costly procedures. Data 
exclusivity under TRIPS does not, however, prevent generic producers in Southern countries 
from developing and marketing generic versions of off-patent drugs. In a number of countries, 
																																								 																				
24 The text of the WTO TRIPS agreement, available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-
trips_04d_e.htm (accessed 3 December 2015). 
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such as Argentina, Brazil, and Israel, authorities have approved third party applications for 
similar products based on their bioequivalence to the already approved products (Correa, 2002; 
2006; Reichman, 2004). TRIPS Article 39.3 does not explicitly provide for a period of data 
exclusivity, but merely states that ‘undisclosed test or other data’ must be protected from ‘unfair 
commercial use’ and ‘disclosure,’ and leaves it up to the individual country to determine what 
constitutes as ‘unfair commercial use’ (Mercurio, 2007:226). Some additional loopholes in 
TRIPS Article 39 include the following. Firstly, TRIPS allows countries to rely upon data 
approved in foreign countries. Secondly, TRIPS refers to ‘undisclosed data’ and does not cover 
data that are publicly available. Thirdly, data protection encompasses only new chemical entities, 
which at the discretion of national governments can exclude second indications, new 
formulations, and other types of new use of old drugs. Finally, the data should be a result of 
‘significant investment’ to qualify for protection under TRIPS Article 39. In other words, the 
formulation under TRIPS is quite vague that leaves Southern countries with leeway in their 
interpretation and treatment of test data (Correa, 2006:84).  
Because, data exclusivity under TRIPS was not what developed countries were seeking in the 
TRIPS negotiations, Northern countries managed to incorporate further-reaching test data 
exclusivity clauses in North-South PTAs that go much beyond the TRIPS provisions. Most US 
PTAs require the introduction of test data exclusivity for at least five years, which constitutes a 
far stronger wording compared to the TRIPS requirement of the protection of undisclosed test 
data against ‘unfair commercial use.’ The exclusive protection of test data was intended to cause 
an additional barrier for generic firms. Generic producers would have to undergo costly clinical 
trials to be able to market generic versions of products after patent periods are over and would 
not be able to free ride by merely demonstrating the bioequivalence of generic drugs to the 
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patented medicines. This raises ethical questions, as regulation under PTAs bring about repeated 
expensive clinical trials solely for commercial purposes (Shadlen, 2005c; Fink and 
Reichenmiller, 2005; Abbott, 2006a; 2006b; Correa, 2006; Fink, 2011). 
Although a test data exclusivity period of five years is less than the patent period of twenty 
years, it becomes an additional obstacle for Southern countries to make effective use of 
compulsory licenses. That is, even if a compulsory license has been granted, generic producers 
cannot produce drugs without undergoing costly and lengthy procedures of submitting trail data 
to prove the safety and efficacy of drugs (Fink and Reichenmiller, 2005). Moreover, when a drug 
is registered for a ‘second indication,’ before the expiry of the patent, a new period of test data 
exclusivity can be granted, which may be extended beyond the patent term, thus creating 
obstacles for generic production of off-patent drugs. Furthermore, a number of North-South 
PTAs refer to ‘information’ instead of ‘undisclosed data.’ The former is a broader term that may 
prevent generic producers from relying on data that are in the public domain (WHO, 2006).  
Some North-South PTAs allow early working provisions. When the patent period expires, the 
drug goes into the public domain, and companies can produce generic versions of the drug based 
on the patented information. If the generic product development was allowed only after the 
expiry of the patent, the term of the patent would be effectively extended by the time it takes 
generic producers to produce the drug based on the patented information and get approval from 
healthcare authorities. For this reason, generic producers usually start the production of generic 
drugs before the patent expires, even though they need to wait until the end of the patent period 
to start marketing their products (Shadlen, 2009). Test data exclusivity periods, however, restrict 
the options of generic producers to take advantage of early working requirements by providing 
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additional restrictions to get marketing approval of generic drugs based on their bioequivalence 
to the patented medicines (Correa, 2006; Fink, 2011).  
The potential negative effects of TRIPS-plus provisions of North-South PTAs on public 
health in Southern countries has raised concerns in a number of international organizations, 
which called for the relaxation or outright elimination of restrictive IPRs clauses in North-South 
PTAs (MSF, 2003; 2004; WHO, 2006). In fact, policies in Southern countries in response to the 
restrictive effects of the post-Uruguay Round IP regime were different. Brazil, for example, tried 
to push itself away from restrictive IP regimes, whereas Mexico’s IP regime went in the other 
direction. Brazil tightened the requirements of obtaining pharmaceutical patents and amended its 
IP regulations to push down drug prices by allowing for more compulsory licenses and 
competition from generic producers. The patent laws of Mexico, on the other hand, made 
obtaining compulsory licenses more difficult, while the production of off-patent generic drugs 
became more complicated. Although there is no single factor that explains such a diversion of IP 
policies between Mexico and Brazil, ‘the transformation of Mexico’s pharmaceutical sector is 
not unrelated to NAFTA’ (Shadlen, 2009:42). From the legal prospective, Brazil-style IP reforms 
were possible in Mexico, too, but political obstacles created by NAFTA prevented such reforms 
from occurring in Mexico, and the country went in the opposite direction (Shadlen, 2009).  
IP regimes matter a lot for public policies. The diverging IP regimes of Brazil and Mexico in 
the late 1990s and early 2000s considerably affected the domestic public health policies of these 
countries. Brazil, which succeeded in distancing itself from restrictive IP regimes, managed its 
public health challenges more successfully. Brazil’s response to an HIV/AIDS epidemic is a case 
to the point. Brazil passed a law in 1996 that entitled Brazilian citizens to free ARV drugs. 
Because of the epidemic by the late 1990s, the spending on ARVs was consuming a third of the 
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Health Ministry’s budget for drugs. To prevent the HIV/AIDS treatment program from becoming 
unsustainable, the Brazilian government took measures to lower its costs by moving to the 
generic versions of new drugs. In doing so, Brazil modified its IP regimes by granting more 
powers to its healthcare authorities in reviewing patent applications, making compulsory licenses 
more accessible and using them as a tool for lowering the prices of patented drugs, and 
facilitating the entry of post-patent generic drugs into the market (Cohen and Lybecker, 2005; 
Shadlen, 2009). 
In contrast, Mexico’s IP regime was becoming TRIPS-plus, inter alia, because of its 
accession to NAFTA. As a result, Mexico responded to its public health challenges in a 
fundamentally different manner. The response to its HIV/AIDS epidemic was less 
comprehensive. Mexico could neither afford a Brazilian style obligation of providing free ARVs 
to its citizens, nor was it able to prevent the price increase of medications at a rate well above the 
inflation rate in the wake of the 1994 peso devaluation. Drugs were provided through the private 
sector, and most of those without medical insurance lacked access to treatment (Shadlen, 2009). 
The subsequent three chapters discuss US, EU, and Japanese North-South PTAs with 
selective emerging and developing countries in the Global South that are especially active in 
North-South preferential trade relations, namely Mexico, Chile, Korea, Colombia, and Peru. 
Chapters 4, 5, and 6 provide comparative overviews of the North-South PTAs as per policy areas 
outlined in this chapter. Although the North-South PTAs are assessed from the Southern 
countries’ perspectives, for the sake of convenience, the subsequent three chapters are organized 
around Northern countries. 
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4. An Assessment of US North-South PTAs: A Comparative Overview 
 
The US became particularly interested in regional and bilateral trade agreements in the early 
1990s, when NAFTA was negotiated and signed. The second wave of US active pursuit of PTAs 
emerged during the 2000s, when a big number of US PTAs (mostly North-South) were 
negotiated. The signing of the TPP on October 5, 2015 and intensive negotiations with the EU in 
the framework of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) open up a new 
chapter of US preferential trade negotiations. All these periods coincided with Trade Promotion 
Authority (TPA) legislation (also known as ‘fast track’ authority), which, passed by Congress, 
gives the US executive branch a mandate and power to negotiate free trade agreements, which 
Congress can either approve or reject but cannot propose amendments or changes.25 The TPA 
legislation of 1988 and its extension during the early 1990s helped the US sign and implement 
NAFTA, whereas the TPA legislation of 2002 was successfully exploited by USTR Robert 
Zoellick to strike a number of PTAs in the 2000s, including with Chile, Singapore, Australia, 
Central America,26 Peru, Colombia, Panama, and Korea. No new US PTAs were signed between 
2007, when the TPA Act of 2002 expired, and June 2015, when TPA legislation was renewed 
with the aim of completing the TPP and TTIP. In fact, the US was quick to take advantage of that 
fact and swiftly concluded the TPP talks with 11 other Pacific Rim countries in October 2015. 
The agreement awaits ratification in the member-states’ parliaments (Sahakyan, 2015).  
Although NAFTA, one of the most prominent US PTAs, was signed in the early 1990s, the 
US embrace of preferential liberalization via PTAs started from the early 2000s, which was 
																																								 																				
25 TPA is believed to enhance the capability of the executive branch to strike free trade agreements. Moreover, there 
seems to be a positive relationship between the availability of TPA legislation and successful negotiations of free 
trade deals by the US (Destler, 2005; Sahakyan, 2015).  
 
26 Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua. 
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partly a result of the stalemate in multilateral negotiations. Because WTO deals require 
unanimous approval of all its members, progress in the WTO has been slow and mostly based on 
the lowest common denominator of its members’ aspirations, which could not satisfy the US 
with its ambitious trade liberalization agenda.  As a result, with the passage of the TPA Act of 
2002, the US decided to pursue a rigorous regional trade agenda and promote trade liberalization 
in other parts of the world via PTAs (Zoellick, 2003; Cooper, 2014).  
US national interests have been reflected in four main PTA strategies: firstly, create 
‘asymmetric reciprocity’ to open up markets favoring US exporters and investors; secondly, 
create catalysts for competitive liberalization; thirdly, support domestic pro-liberalization and 
reformist actors in potential partner countries; finally, strengthen strategic partnership (Feinberg, 
2006:95). With some overlap with the criteria outlined above, Schott (2004) lays out US PTA 
partner selection criteria that include the following: (1) domestic politics, i.e., gaining favorable 
attitude and support from domestic political forces and business lobby groups; (2) economic 
policy considerations, i.e., promoting the interests of US exporters and investors in the foreign 
country and leveling the playing field vis-à-vis their competitors from other countries; and (3) 
the commitment of the partner country to undergo comprehensive liberalization that goes beyond 
the WTO commitments.  
Opening up new markets through ‘competitive liberalization,’ i.e., forcing other countries to 
liberalize if they do not want to lose out while their competitors enjoyed preferential access to 
the US market, has been an important trade policy tool in the arsenal of US trade negotiators 
throughout the 1990s and 2000s (Zoellick, 2002, Weintraub, 2004; DeRosa, 2004). Although the 
US has been a path-breaker in promoting trade liberalization in other parts of the world, there 
were countries and regions where PTAs emerged without US participation. The proliferation of 
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such North-South PTAs would disadvantage US exporters and investors in these markets, and 
would trigger action to neutralize any possible adverse effects. Thus, in order to free itself from 
the need to mitigate the adverse effects of other North-South PTAs on its multinationals, 
proactive participation in North-South PTA negotiations, i.e., getting ahead of other developed 
economies to sign North-South PTAs, became a priority for the US (Schott, 2001). This is, in 
fact, what happened during the 2000s, when, having secured TPA legislation in 2002, the US 
government singed a number of important North-South PTAs with countries, such as Colombia, 
Peru, and Korea.  
The remaining part of this chapter seeks to account for ‘competitive liberalization’ in US 
preferential trade relations with developing and emerging economies, particularly Mexico, Chile, 
Korea, Colombia, and Peru. The following sections attempt to assess the US North-South 
agreements from the viewpoint of its trading partners and establish whether and to what extent 
the outcomes in first-order and second-order agreements are brought about by factors related to 
the sequential order of the agreements. The assessment of the US first-order and second-order 
North-South PTAs is carried out based on the criteria outlined in Chapter 3 and is summarized in 
Chapter 4.6.  
 
4.1. NAFTA27 
 
The initiative to create the North American agreement was announced in 1990 by Mexico’s 
president Carlos Salinas and US President George W. H. Bush. Canada also joined, motivated by 
the fear that its privileges from the 1989 US-Canada PTA would have diminished if it had stayed 
																																								 																				
27 For the purposes of this thesis, the examination of NAFTA has been carried out mostly from the lenses of the 
relationship between Mexico and the US. Canadian perspectives have been added occasionally as deemed necessary. 
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out. Formal negotiations started in 1991 and were completed with the signing of the North 
American Free Trade Agreement on 17 December 1992, which entered into force on 1 January 
1994 (Dumberry, 2001; Hufbauer and Schott, 2005).  
The asymmetric relationship between the countries, given the sheer size of the economies 
and Mexico’s high degree of trade and investment dependence on the US, was a distinctive 
feature of the NAFTA negotiations, which kept the Mexican government wary of possible 
negative consequences of the agreement. Thus, it was not surprising that until 1988 the Salinas 
government was considering multilateral liberalization in the framework of GATT and not a 
preferential deal with the US. President-elect Carlos Salinas opposed a preferential deal with the 
US and was quoted by The New York Times (1988), saying, ‘I believe that through the GATT 
we have a multilateral way to deal with our neighbors. There is such a different economic level 
between the United States and Mexico that I don’t believe such a common market would provide 
an advantage to either country.’ Moreover, he ruled out the possibility of even a modest 
agreement with the US ‘in the foreseeable future.’   
Notwithstanding some modest steps of liberalization in the 1980s, such as the reduction of 
import license coverage and average tariff rates, Mexican authorities perceived NAFTA-style 
liberalization as unfeasible only a few years before the signing of the agreement. The economic 
impact of the neoliberal reforms of the 1980s was not substantial enough to produce ‘a 
significant improvement in employment and social welfare,’ a fact that may have been 
responsible for Mexico’s skeptical attitude towards NAFTA during the late 1980s (Pastor and 
Wise, 1994; 1998:42). Moreover, in addition to multilateral liberalization in the 1980s, Mexico 
sought to reduce its dependence on the US economy, which had historically been at high levels 
even before NAFTA (see Figure 4.1.1). Assuming office in 1988, President Salinas made an 
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attempt to diversify Mexico’s trade away from the US and towards Western Europe and East 
Asia, but he failed to establish formal trade deals with these regions and had to embrace the US 
and reinforce Mexico’s economic ties with it by signing the NAFTA agreement in 1992 
(Feinberg, 2003).  
The reasons behind the shift in Mexico’s attitude towards NAFTA were numerous, ranging 
from unilateral trade retaliations and coercive actions from the US to changes in the geopolitical 
situation. ‘The US was brutal. Their positions were based on force more than on reasoning,’ said 
a Mexican negotiator, who could not explain such behavior on anything but the asymmetry 
between the countries (quoted by Cameron and Tomlin, 2000:225). 
 
Figure 4.1.1. Mexico’s trade with the US, as per cent of its total trade, 1986-2013 
 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) data, available at 
http://www.cepal.org/en (accessed 25 September 2014) 
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Figure 4.1.2. Mexico’s trade with the US, in thousand USD, 1986-2013 
 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) data, available at 
http://www.cepal.org/en (accessed 25 September 2014) 
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Chapter 2.3 of this thesis, an important factor that shifted Mexico’s attitude in relation to 
NAFTA was the US-Canada PTA that put pressure on Mexico and threatened marginalization if 
Mexico did not join the bandwagon. Given the US-Canada PTA, Mexico could not afford to be 
left out, while Canadian exports (which were converging in structure over time with that of 
Mexico) enjoyed preferential access to the US market. A senior Mexican diplomat was quoted 
by The New York Times (1988), saying that the US-Canada PTA augmented Mexicans’ fears 
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reluctant to renegotiate the terms of its bilateral agreement with the US. In the words of Michael 
Wilson, Canadian Trade Minister, at a conference in 1991, ‘Canada is not going to let the United 
States get through the back door [NAFTA] what it failed to get through the front [FTA] door’ 
(quoted by Cameron and Tomlin, 2000:77). Reassessing its priorities, however, the Canadian 
government decided to join NAFTA, since being left out would have been a costlier option.  
The NAFTA negotiations did not proceed without opposition in Mexico. The Foreign 
Ministry, for example, was against an agreement with the US, but all the negotiating authority 
was placed with the Trade Ministry, which was following the president’s instructions. The shift 
in trade policy and President Salinas’s views towards NAFTA made the agreement possible, 
which was approved by the Mexican Senate without much trouble (Ortiz Mena, 2004). In the 
fifth year of the agreement, a 1998 Newsweek article called President Salinas ‘Mexico’s all-time 
favorite villain,’ as after five years of implementation Mexicans would call the agreement ‘for 
the rich and people in power’ (quoted by Cameron and Tomlin, 2000:5). 
Accounting for the actual effects of the NAFTA agreement, which are at most quite 
ambiguous and difficult to measure,28 is not in the scope of this thesis. Instead, in light of the 
asymmetric relationship between the US and Mexico and the coercive power that forced Mexico 
to change its attitude towards NAFTA, this chapter attempts to assess NAFTA based on its 
provisions in tariff reduction, agricultural liberalization, government procurement, trade in 
services, investment measures, and IPRs, as outlined in Chapter 3.  
 
 
																																								 																				
28 While some scholars (Krueger, 1999; Kehoe, 2003; Caliendo and	Parro, 2012; Shikher, 2012) point to the trade 
creating effect of the agreements, others (Heath, 1998; Audley et al, 2004; Romalis, 2007) claim that trade creation 
and welfare effects did not go hand in hand and, despite increasing trade volumes, the NAFTA welfare effects 
remained modest. 
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Tariffs and Related Measures 
The NAFTA agreement (Annex 302.2) provides for the elimination of tariffs on most goods 
effective immediately. Other goods placed under categories ‘B’, ‘C’, and ‘C+’ had a phase out 
period of 5 to 15 years.29 As a result, the average Mexican tariff fell from 12 per cent in 1993 to 
1.3 per cent in 2001. For the same period, the US tariffs for Mexican exports fell from 2 per cent 
to 0.2 per cent (Lederman et al, 2005). The US tried to shield sensitive sectors, such as 
glassware, rubber and plastic footwear, ceramic tiles, leather goods, and a list of agricultural 
products, from liberalization by putting them under the ‘C+’ (longest phase out category). 
Although the US had to agree to shorten the period of longest phase out from 25 to only 15 
years, it still managed to place more item categories under the C+ list than Mexico: with three 
manufactured and eleven agricultural items in the C+ list, while Mexico did not place any 
manufactured good and only three agricultural items in the C+ category   (Maxfield and Shapiro, 
1998). 
In addition to trade liberalization, NAFTA also phased out trade-balancing and national value 
added requirements, which were important industrial policy tools used by Mexico. In the auto 
industry, for example, trade-balancing and national value added requirements gradually fell from 
USD 1.75 exports for every dollar of imports and 36 per cent, respectively, in the pre-NAFTA 
period to full abolition by 2004 (Hufbauer and Schott, 2005).  
Duty drawbacks, a measure under which tariffs on imported inputs are refunded if used as 
part of exported products, also were abolished as a result of NAFTA. The drawbacks were 
widely used in the Maquiladora system, whereby Mexican assemblers (usually located along the 
US border) were using imported inputs to assemble final products and re-export them to the US. 
																																								 																				
29 The text of the NAFTA agreement, available at https://www.nafta-sec-
alena.org/Default.aspx?tabid=97&language=en-US (accessed 3 December 2015). 
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Although duty drawbacks would have helped increase Mexico’s attractiveness to non-US foreign 
investors, Americans feared that the scheme, combined with free trade, would transform Mexico 
into a countrywide maquiladora with inputs from around the world entering the US market duty-
free as part of final Mexican products. Thus, the abolition of the drawback scheme was to raise 
the cost of non-NAFTA inputs into the Mexican products designed for the US market and to 
restrict the ability of outsiders to use Mexico as an export platform for accessing the US market 
(Abbott, 1995; Maxfield and Shapiro, 1998; Shadlen, 2005b; Shadikhodjaev, 2013; Villarreal 
and Fergusson, 2015). 
Autos and auto parts comprised about 20 per cent of intra-NAFTA trade, the largest single 
sector (Hufbauer and Schott, 2005). Mexican and US priorities varied widely, as the auto sector 
in Mexico was still highly protected, whereas in the US it was basically open. The so-called five 
Mexican ‘Auto Decrees’ enacted during 1962-1989 allowed the importation of autos into Mexico 
only by auto companies that also manufactured there. There was also an export-to-import ratio 
requirement, according to which, for each exporter the monetary value of auto exports should 
have been at least 2.5 times the monetary value of imports. As a result of these restrictive 
policies, the imports of finished automobiles into Mexico were kept at insignificant levels just 
before the NAFTA negotiations. The negotiations reduced the 2.5:1 export-to-import ratio 
requirement to 0.8:1, which was to be eliminated in ten years, allowing anyone, and not just auto 
manufacturers established in Mexico, to import cars into Mexico. The US auto industry called 
the compromise ‘the single most significant accomplishment of the NAFTA automotive 
negotiations,’ which was largely a result of asymmetric bargaining positions between the parties 
(Maxfield and Shapiro, 1998:90).  
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The second major obstacle created by the ‘Auto Decrees’ for US automotive firms in the 
Mexican market was the strict local-content requirements, which was at 36 per cent of the value 
of the domestically sold automobiles. This caused a number of problems for American 
manufacturers in Mexico, such as a dependence on unreliable Mexican suppliers. The Mexican 
side opposed the outright elimination of local content requirements and agreed to only a slight 
immediate drop of the local-content requirement to 34 per cent, which was to phase out gradually 
during the first 10 years of the implementation of NAFTA. The US, however, managed to secure 
preferential options for American producers already established in Mexico. The exploitation of 
such options would lower the local-content requirement level for the already established 
manufacturers to as low as 20 per cent  (Hufbauer and Schott, 1993; Maxfield and Shapiro, 
1998). As a result of the negotiations, Mexican tariffs on finished cars were reduced from 20 per 
cent to 10 per cent immediately, while the remainder would phase out in ten years. The US 
reduced its tariffs on light trucks from 20 per cent to 10 per cent, while it would phase out 
altogether in five years. The remaining tariffs on cars and car parts on both sides were to be 
eliminated immediately or during a phase out period of 5-10 years (Maxfield and Shapiro, 1998). 
 
Agriculture 
NAFTA does not have a single common text on agriculture. Instead, it is covered in three 
separate agreements between the US and Mexico, between Canada and Mexico, and between 
Canada and the US. Compared to the other two agreements, the US-Mexico agreement is far 
more liberalizing but it has longer phase out periods (Cameron and Tomlin, 2000; Hufbauer and 
Schott, 2005). At the time of the NAFTA negotiations, Mexico’s average trade weighted tariff on 
US agricultural exports was about 11 per cent, while about 60 per cent of US agricultural exports 
	 97 
to Mexico were subject to restrictive import licensing requirements, as well as ‘numerous other 
nontariff barriers’ (Villarreal and Fergusson, 2015:4). In contrast to the agreement between 
Canada and the US, the US-Mexico agreement provides steps for the complete liberalization of 
agricultural trade. With phase-out periods of up to 15 years for sensitive products, such as corn, 
dry beans, winter vegetables, orange juice, peanuts, and sugar, the US-Mexico agreement 
provided steps for the complete liberalization of agricultural trade, with an ultimate goal of 
eliminating all import quotas and tariffs with no exception (USDA, 2002; Hufbauer and Schott, 
2005; Cheong and Cho, 2007). The US was to eliminate 97 per cent of agricultural tariff lines on 
imports from Mexico within ten years, while the remaining 3 per cent would take a longer phase-
out period of 15 years. Mexico instead was to liberalize over 90 per cent of its agricultural tariff 
lines within ten years, and another 2 per cent during a longer phase-our period. Mexico kept 70 
tariff lines (7.6 per cent) out of the agreement (Cheong and Cho, 2007).  
During the negotiations, the Mexican government was concerned about the domestic political 
consequences of liberalizing maize (and grains in general), beans, dairy (milk powder), sugar, 
and pork markets. Nevertheless, Mexico had to open up agriculture, including the sensitive areas, 
in order to get access to the US market for its winter vegetable and fruits sector, which was an 
important and powerful export industry in Mexico. Putting maize on the negotiation table and 
liberalizing agriculture across the board ‘was probably the single most important concession 
made by Mexico,’ as it was going to affect the lives of millions in the country (Cameron and 
Tomlin, 2000:110).  
Agricultural interests in the US, on the other hand, were fragmented. Growers of certain 
crops lobbied for free trade, while a smaller number of producers were opposed to it. Fruit and 
vegetable procurers in the US, especially those growing oranges and tomatoes, were opposed to 
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free trade, arguing that even the longer phase out periods of tariff elimination will only ‘delay the 
pain’ caused by free trade  (Maxfield and Shapiro, 1998:102). The US was the largest producer 
of corn in the world, thus eliminating or substantially reducing tariffs on corn was a priority for 
the US. In fact, NAFTA did reduce the tariff rates on corn, which cost the Mexican government 
at least USD 2 billion in tariff revenues (Hufbauer and Schott, 2005). As a result of domestic 
lobbying, the US was inclined to concede in orange juice for better access to the Mexican market 
for corn and other products. This is what Mexico agreed to, ‘based on the fact that Mexico’s 
inefficient corn producers have little chance of ever becoming internationally competitive’ 
(Maxfield and Shapiro, 1998:102). As a result, Mexico received an immediate 50 per cent tariff 
cut for Mexican exports of 40 million gallons of orange juice per year to the US market, which 
would lead to tariff-free access within 15 years (Maxfield and Shapiro, 1998).  
The negotiations over agricultural subsidies, a sensitive issue in the US, produced mixed 
outcomes with an ambiguous wording. A number of agricultural producers were subsidized in 
the US. For example, in 2002, US corn exporters to Mexico received export credits of about 
USD 680 million, about 20 per cent of the US total (Hufbauer and Schott, 2005). Although the 
American Farm Bureau supported the elimination of agricultural subsidies, the wording on the 
issue was ‘imprecise,’ leaving the efficiency of the measures dependent on bilateral cooperation 
between Mexico and the US and the actions of dispute settlement committees (Maxfield and 
Shapiro, 1998:105).  
In sum, agricultural liberalization, albeit with longer phase out periods, went in line with the 
priorities of the parties. It should, however, be noted that priorities, especially in the US, were 
fragmented, with different groups lobbying for different outcomes. Mexico managed to secure 
preferential access to the US market for its key agricultural exports, such as orange juice and 
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fruits, while the US pushed for its priorities and opened up the Mexican market for corn (and 
grains in general), despite the worries south of the border that it may negatively affect the 
livelihood of poor Mexicans.  
 
Government Procurement 
The US wanted better access to government procurement in Mexico, from which US firms were 
largely excluded at the time of the negotiations. More specifically, the US wanted to limit the 
number of contracts available for internal bidders only, and increase the number available for 
open bidding on a non-discriminatory basis by both US and Mexican firms  (Maxfield and 
Shapiro, 1998). Unlike the US, Mexico was not a member of the WTO GPA,30 a plurilateral 
agreement on government procurement that is optional for WTO members to join, at the time of 
the negotiations. Hence the new government procurement-related provisions of NAFTA were 
going to have a greater effect on Mexico and its flexibility in regulating bidding for government 
purchases.  
The negotiations were mostly around the thresholds, above which government procurements 
were to be open for non-discriminatory bidding by firms from both countries. The initial US 
position for the thresholds was USD 25,000 for goods and services contracts procured by federal 
government entities, USD 175,000 for goods and services contracts procured by federal 
government enterprises, and USD 6 million for construction constructs procured by federal 
government entities. Meanwhile, the Mexican position was USD 200,000 and USD 400,000 for 
goods and services contracts procured by federal government entities and enterprises 
respectively, and total exclusion of US firms from construction contracts of Mexican federal 
																																								 																				
30 The list of GPA signatories can be found on the WTO website, available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/memobs_e.htm (accessed 3 December 2015). 
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entities. The actual figures (see Table 4.1.1) represent the bargained outcome, which favors the 
US position (Maxfield and Shapiro, 1998). 
The government procurement provisions of NAFTA go beyond those in the US-Canada PTA 
covering new entities and sectors, including services. The procurement thresholds outlined above 
are especially significant for Mexico because NAFTA allows competitive access to 
procurements of PEMEX, the Mexican government-owned oil giant, and CFE, the government-
owned major electricity producer. In return, the US waived its Buy America requirements but 
retained small-business set-asides, which represent federal government purchases of up to a 
certain level that are set aside for small businesses in the US (Cameron and Tomlin, 2000). 
 
Table 4.1.1. Government procurement thresholds of NAFTA 
 Procurement by 
federal 
government 
entities, in USD 
Procurement by 
federal 
government 
enterprises, in 
USD 
Construction 
contracts by 
federal entities, 
in USD 
Construction 
contracts by 
federal 
government 
enterprises, 
in USD 
Proposed by the US 25,000 175,000 6,000,000  
Proposed by Mexico 200,000 400,000 
Exclude from 
US bidding 
altogether 
 
NAFTA final text 50,000 250,000 6,500,000 8,000,000 
Source: Maxfield and Shapiro (1998) and the NAFTA text31 
 
The inclusion of procurements by sub-federal entities could have been regarded as more 
favorable for the Mexican side, for the amounts of procurement by Mexican states were small 
and not attractive for the US. However, the wording of the clause covering the procurement of 
sub-federal entities turned out to be quite vague, whereby ‘the Parties shall endeavor to consult 
																																								 																				
31 The NAFTA agreement, available at https://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/Default.aspx?tabid=97&language=en-US 
(accessed 3 December 2015). 
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with their state and provincial governments with a view to obtaining commitments, on a 
voluntary and reciprocal basis, to include within this Chapter procurement by state and 
provincial government entities and enterprises.’ This allowed leeway for different interpretation 
and loopholes to shield procurement by US states from outside participation. As a result, the 
negotiations on government procurement can be regarded as ‘a victory for the United States,’ for 
the NAFTA text goes mostly in line with US preferences (Maxfield and Shapiro, 1998:108).  
 
Trade in Services 
Services, especially financial services, were a contentious issue during the NAFTA negotiations. 
The initial positions of Mexico and the US on the liberalization financial services were 
diametrically opposed, with Mexico wanting to keep financial services off the table, while the 
US called for deep liberalization, favoring them so much that it did not envision NAFTA without 
financial services liberalization. Under US pressure, however, Mexico later modified its position 
calling for permanent caps on foreign ownership and insisting on subsidiaries over branches as a 
means of the establishment of foreign firms (Cameron and Tomlin, 2000).  
NAFTA liberalization of trade in services turned out to be deep and ‘far more extensive’ than 
WTO GATS measures. Firstly, the NAFTA services chapter provides a ‘negative list’ of the 
sectors that are not covered by the measures; that is, liberalization measures are extended to all 
services, except for those on the list. In contrast, GATS provides a ‘positive list’ of sectors that 
are covered by the liberalization measures, whereas all other services are excluded (Abbott, 
1995; Cameron and Tomlin, 2000; Hufbauer and Schott, 2005:80). NAFTA Chapter 14 went on 
to provide for the establishment of financial institutions in a judicial form chosen by an investor 
from a NAFTA country, as well as ensure National Treatment (Article 1405.1) and Most-
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Favored-Nation Treatment (1406.1) in the financial services sector.32 NAFTA, according to 
Robert (2011), prohibits a member-country to require a services provider from another member 
to establish a representation or any form of enterprise for the cross-border provision of services.  
 
Investment Measures 
The NAFTA chapter on investment contains three pillars: market access, protection, and dispute 
settlement. The market access component consists of four provisions: national treatment (Article 
1102), MFN treatment (Article 1103), performance requirements (Article 1106), and senior 
management and boards of directors. NAFTA prohibits the imposition of any form of 
performance requirements (including local content requirements, foreign exchange-balancing 
requirements, and transfer of technology) in all phases of an investment. Certain limited 
exceptions are allowed for domestic content requirements, if these are not arbitrary or 
unjustifiable and are put in place in order to secure compliance with laws and regulations. No 
restrictions on the nationality of the members of the board of directors related to the investment 
may apply (Robert, 2011).  
The protection component requires that investments from other NAFTA countries be treated 
in accordance with international law and be provided ‘fair and equitable treatment’ and full 
protection and security (Robert, 2011:4). NAFTA has strong provisions against any possible 
direct or indirect nationalization or expropriation of investment or measures ‘tantamount to 
nationalization or expropriation,’ except for a public purpose, on a non-discriminatory basis, in 
accordance with due process of law and on payment of compensation, which is equivalent to the 
fair market value of the expropriated investment and should be paid without delay (Robert, 
																																								 																				
32 The NAFTA agreement, available at https://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/Default.aspx?tabid=97&language=en-US 
(accessed 3 December 2015). 
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2011). This broad definition of expropriation, which covers also direct and indirect measures 
‘tantamount to nationalization or expropriation,’ gives ICSID arbitrators broad room for 
interpretation during investor-state arbitration (Hufbauer and Schott, 2005:206-207), hence are 
restrictive for the governments of developing and emerging countries who often lack the 
resources to fight litigation with multinationals in private arbitration courts (van Harten, 2005).  
In contrast to NAFTA, second-order agreements, such as the US-Chile and the US-Singapore 
PTAs, have a relatively modest scope of investor protection, which limits the ability of firms to 
claim that environmental and health measures are ‘tantamount to expropriation’ (Hufbauer and 
Schott, 2005:207). In fact, many investor-state arbitration cases under NAFTA challenged 
national environmental and public health laws and regulations, obliging governments to pay 
significant sums to private firms as compensation for forgone profits (Public Citizen, 2001; 
2005). In the Metalclad vs. Mexico case, for example, related to the refusal of a Mexican 
municipality to grant a permit for a toxic waste dump, a ‘NAFTA tribunal ruled that the denial of 
the contraction permit and the creation of an ecological reserve are tantamount to an “indirect” 
expropriation’ (Public Citizen, 2005:iii). As a result, the Mexican government was ordered to 
pay Metalclad, a California-based company, compensation worth USD 15.6 million, ‘a large 
amount relative to Mexico’s environmental protection budget’  (Public Citizen, 2005:ix).  
NAFTA investment liberalization adopts a ‘negative list’ approach (Hufbauer and Schott, 
2005). Moreover, the definition of Investment under NAFTA is ‘enormously broad’ (Price, 
2000:109). Article 1139 defines investment as equity and debt security of an enterprise and loans 
to an enterprise, as well as real estate and other tangible and intangible property ‘owned or 
controlled directly or indirectly by an investor’ for receiving a profit or other business purposes. 
Moreover, as accounted by Maxfield and Shapiro (1998), the US even pushed for a definition of 
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a ‘NAFTA investor,’ which includes any enterprise doing business in a NAFTA country, 
regardless of the nationality of its owners. 
NAFTA Article 1102 (National Treatment) states that ‘[e]ach Party shall accord to investors 
of another Party treatment no less favorable than that it accords, in like circumstances, to its own 
investors,’ while Article 1105 (Minimum Standard of Treatment) calls for ‘fair and equitable 
treatment and full protection and security’ of the investments of investors from another Party. 
The wording of Article 1105, according to Meltz (2003:9), although ambiguous, has the purpose 
‘to guarantee the foreign investor a minimum standard of treatment not contingent on domestic 
law in the event that national treatment and most-favored-nation treatment by the host country 
are not adequate.’ Article 1105 provides that foreign investment must be treated ‘in accordance 
with international law.’ This is a clause that, in the words of a former ICSID arbitrator and 
NAFTA negotiator, ‘should not be underestimated,’ because ‘[i]t incorporates into NAFTA the 
evolving standard of customary international law,’ which diminishes the influence of national 
laws over investment-related matters (Price, 2000:111). In addition, Article 1106 (Performance 
Requirements) prohibits the imposition of performance requirements, including balance of trade, 
domestic content, earnings of minimum level of foreign exchange, and technology and know-
how transfer requirements.33  
These restrictive investment clauses of NAFTA have been especially significant for Mexico, 
for it had been a proponent and champion of strict regulation of foreign investment under the so-
called ‘Calvo Doctrine.’ For example, a 1973 law on foreign investment that limited foreign 
equity to a maximum stake of 49 per cent, screened investments through the National Foreign 
Investment Commission, as well as required foreign investors to balance their import and export 
																																								 																				
33 The NAFTA agreement, available at https://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/Default.aspx?tabid=97&language=en-US 
(accessed 3 December 2015). 
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activities and locate their production sites away from Mexico City and in rural and less 
developed areas. This and other regulations of the ‘Calvo Doctrine’ were going to be scrapped 
under NAFTA (Hufbauer and Schott, 2005:201; Robert, 2011).  
In contrast to the WTO TRIMS agreement, where investment-related dispute settlement is a 
government-to-government affair, NAFTA Chapter 11 provides an investor-state direct 
arbitration clause. In fact, the investor-state arbitration clause has proven to be quite popular 
among businesses and ‘fostered litigation by business firms against a broader range of 
government activity than originally envisaged’ (Hufbauer and Schott, 2005:54). NAFTA Chapter 
11 allows firms to bring lawsuits directly against governments before arbitration tribunals 
operating under the arbitration rules of either ICSID or UNCITRAL that have the authority to 
award monetary relief to the winning party. In addition, under NAFTA articles 1116 and 1117, 
private firms can enforce government obligations in US courts through the New York 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (Hufbauer and 
Schott, 2005; Dumberry, 2001; Public Citizen, 2005).  
NAFTA Chapter 11 allows not only lawsuits from member-country firms, but also from any 
firm that is incorporated in a NAFTA country, albeit with some limitations, such as the absence 
of diplomatic relations with the non-NAFTA country where the investment comes from. The 
NAFTA chapter on investment dispute settlement has a broad definition of investment that also 
includes minority interests, portfolio investment, and real property. Article 1139 defines an 
investor as a party that ‘seeks to make, is making or has made an investment.’ The controversial 
wording of ‘seeks to make’ entails privileges not only for the parties that have already invested 
by also for those that are yet to become an investor. This broad definition thus expands the scope 
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of private firms that could bring lawsuits against sovereign countries before ICSID tribunals 
(Horlick and Marti, 1997; Dumberry, 2001).  
The innovative feature of NAFTA Chapter 11 is its internationalization of investment dispute 
settlement. The Calvo doctrine and the 1973 law, which implied stricter regulation of foreign 
investment in the pre-NAFTA period, postulated that investment disputes were to be resolved 
strictly in local courts. The very purpose of the Calvo doctrine was to emphasize national 
sovereignty over foreign investment, depriving foreign investors of diplomatic protection. The 
shift of investment regulation and dispute settlement away from national jurisdictions and 
towards interdependent arbitration, as a result of NAFTA, prioritizes investor rights over national 
sovereignty. Hence, the ‘protection of investor rights has since become the most contentious 
feature of the NAFTA dispute settlement system’ (Hufbauer and Schott, 2005:204).  
NAFTA allows for dispute settlements in a number of areas. Chapter 11 covers investor-state 
disputes over property rights; Chapter 14 is designed to handle disputes in financial services; 
Chapter 20 provides for government-to-government consolation to resolve disputes at higher 
levels. Article 1110 has been especially controversial for it favors investor rights over 
governments’ measures to protect public welfare. It prohibits direct or indirect expropriation of 
foreign investments unless it is done explicitly for a public purpose, on a non-discriminatory 
basis, and with fair compensation. The controversial wording of the article extends the restriction 
to direct and indirect measures ‘tantamount to nationalization or expropriation,’ which could 
potentially be interpreted by arbitration panels broadly enough to also cover ‘regulatory takings.’ 
In such cases, host governments will be obliged to compensate investors for the investment and 
future profits lost (Hufbauer and Schott, 2005:206). In fact, an ICSID tribunal provided a very 
broad interpretation of expropriation in its decision in August 2000. In the Metalclad case, 
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expropriation was defined not just as ‘outright seizure,’ but was extended to cover ‘covert or 
incidental interference with the use of property which has the effect of depriving the owner, in 
whole or in significant part, of the use or reasonably-to-be-expected economic benefit of 
property even if not necessarily to the obvious benefit of the host State’ (Dumbery, 2001:171; 
Hufbauer and Schott, 2005:207). 
 
IPRs 
IPRs were another sphere where the positions of Mexico and the US differed diametrically. The 
initial position of Mexico was to have a deal similar to TRIPS and consolidate the changes 
already undertaken. The US, on the other hand, insisted on TRIPS-plus measures (Cameron and 
Tomlin, 2000). The actual text of NAFTA turned out to be TRIPS-plus, with the IPRs chapter of 
NAFTA ‘basically dictated by a determined U.S. negotiating team’ (Maxfield and Shapiro, 
1998:115). More specifically, NAFTA Article 17.11.6 provides for the protection of test data 
submitted for the approval of pharmaceutical or agricultural chemical products for ‘not less than 
five years.’34 In addition, NAFTA restricts the options for compulsory licenses and prohibits 
parallel importation of patented medicines on the grounds of national doctrines of patent 
exhaustion (Cameron and Tomlin, 2000; Shadlen, 2009). 
NAFTA turned out to be TRIPS-plus in a number of aspects, thus making the IPRs regime in 
Mexico less development-friendly. For example, as a result of the adverse changes in its IPRs 
regime, Mexico failed to adequately respond to its public health challenges, more specifically, to 
the HIV/AIDS epidemic during the late 1990s. Mexico could neither afford to provide ARVs 
free of charge to its citizens (like it was done in similar circumstances in Brazil, which had less 
																																								 																				
34 The NAFTA agreement, available at https://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/Default.aspx?tabid=97&language=en-US 
(accessed 3 December 2015). 
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restrictive IP regime) nor was it able to prevent the price increase of medications at a rate well 
above the inflation rate in the wake of the 1994 peso devaluation. Drugs were provided through 
the private sector and most of those without medical insurance lacked access to treatment. 
Mexico’s difficulties in efficiently coping with pubic health challenges were ‘not unrelated to 
NAFTA,’ which circumscribed its autonomy over public health policies (Shadlen, 2009:42). 
 
4.2. The US-Chile PTA 
 
The second-order US-Chile negotiations started in 2000 and an agreement was signed in 2003. 
Although both countries took NAFTA as a guide throughout the negotiations, each party had its 
priorities and interests in the negotiations. The agreement was especially important for the US, 
for, among other things, the agreement was to set precedent for other PTAs with the region, as 
well as for a possible ambitious hemispheric agreement, the Free Trade Agreement of the 
Americas (Kuwayama, 2003). 
According to a statement released by the US House of Representatives,35 leveling the playing 
field for US exporters and investors in Chile was a priority for American negotiators. The US 
sought to ensure its businesses’ and investors’ enjoyed a treatment no worse than what Chile 
accorded to its preferential trade partners, particularly the EU (but also Mexico and Canada). 
According to the statement, trade advantages accorded to other countries as a result of Chile’s 
PTAs, coupled with other factors, eroded the volume of US exports to Chile. More specifically, 
the US share of Chile’s total imports fell from 24 per cent in 1997 to under 17 per cent in 2002. 
																																								 																				
35 A statement by the US House of Representatives (Statement on How the United States-Chile Free Trade 
Agreement Serves the Interests of United States Commerce), available at 
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/media/pdf/chile/hr2738docbenefitschilefta.pdf (accessed 8 October 2014).  
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Likewise, the US share of services imported by Chile fell from 35 per cent in 1997 to 27 per cent 
in 2001.36 The US was particularly worried about the EU-Chile PTA, ‘Chile’s most significant 
FTA, prior to the U.S.-Chile FTA,’ which was signed in 2002 and was going to enter into force 
in 2003. Countering the EU in Chile had become an urgent task for the US, for according to the 
National Association of Manufacturers, ‘6,000 U.S. jobs will be lost if the EU’s advantage is not 
quickly eliminated.’37 
According to US congressional records, the US lost nearly a third of its share in Chile’s 
import market during 1997-2003, which was largely a result of Chile’s PTAs with other 
countries, chief among them the EU. The EU-Chile PTA resulted in the surge of EU exports to 
Chile that were in direct competition with goods and services exported by the US. Thus the US-
Chile PTA was perceived as a necessity to level the playing field for American firms and raise 
their competitiveness in the Chilean market. The lack of an agreement with Chile was estimated 
to cost the US USD 800 million in sales and 10,000 in employment per annum (US Congress, 
2007:18958, 20450).  
The PTA with Chile was the first for the US in South America, and besides providing trade 
benefits to the US, it was also to set a precedent for future PTAs in the region. In line with 
Robert Zoellick’s doctrine of ‘competitive liberalization,’ the agreement with Chile, a relatively 
open and economically successful country in Latin America, was going to, among other things, 
discriminate against other developing and emerging countries in the region and make them seek 
																																								 																				
36 A statement by the US House of Representatives (Statement on How the United States-Chile Free Trade 
Agreement Serves the Interests of United States Commerce), available at 
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/media/pdf/chile/hr2738docbenefitschilefta.pdf (accessed 8 October 2014).  
 
37 A statement by the US House of Representatives (Statement on How the United States-Chile Free Trade 
Agreement Serves the Interests of United States Commerce), available at 
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/media/pdf/chile/hr2738docbenefitschilefta.pdf (accessed 8 October 2014).  
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similar agreements, in order not to fall behind in competition with Chile for FDI and access to 
the lucrative US market (Weintraub, 2004). 
Chile, on the other hand, with its relatively open economy with a 6 per cent applied MFN 
tariff rate and zero-tariff trade in certain capital goods (WTO, 2009), had set a target of covering 
90 per cent of its trade by PTAs by 2010. Hence, an agreement with one of the major economic 
powers was considered to be a solid move towards this direction (Kuwayama, 2003). The US 
had been a major trade and investment partner for Chile, consuming 20 per cent of Chilean 
exports and providing 30 per cent of Chile’s inbound FDI during the six years preceding the 
completion of the PTA (Roffe, 2004). The dynamics of the US-Chile trade is presented in Figure 
4.2.1 below. 
 
Figure 4.2.1. US trade with Chile, in thousand USD, 1981-2013 
 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) data, available at 
http://www.cepal.org/en (accessed 7 October 2014)  
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Because both the US and Chile were already quite liberalized before starting the PTA 
negotiations, the welfare impact of tariff elimination on both countries was going to be ‘from 
negligible to very small’ (USITC, 2003:xiii). The bulk of the welfare gains were thus to come 
from the removal of non-tariff barriers, including in services, investment, and IPRs. Using the 
Michigan Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) Model of World Production and Trade, 
Brown et al (2010) estimated the welfare effect of the agreement on the US to be USD 6.9 
billion (0.1 per cent of GNP), while on Chile the estimated impact was USD 1.2 billion (1.3 per 
cent of GNP).  
The rest of the section looks at the negotiations and outcome of US-Chile PTA with a 
particular focus on a number of the key areas, including tariffs and related measures, agriculture, 
government procurement, trade in services, investment provisions, and IPRs, as outlined in 
Chapter 3.  
 
Tariffs and Related Measures 
Chile’s exports to the US during the 1990s, as percentage of total exports, were in the range of 
17-19 per cent, while its imports from the US amounted to about the same percentage of its total 
imports over the same period. Some 64 per cent of Chilean exports entered the US duty free 
before the agreement, while another 16 per cent enjoyed GSP treatment. Chile’s position was to 
further increase the share of products that enter the US tariff-free and make the concessions 
under GSP permanent (Kuwayama, 2003).    
As a result of the US-Chile PTA signed in 2003, 85 per cent of industrial and consumer trade 
between the two countries became tariff-free immediately. By 2008 almost of all the remaining 
industrial tariffs between Chile and the US were going to be eliminated. By that time, two-thirds 
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of farm products were scheduled to become tariff-free, with subsequent elimination of all tariffs 
in 12 years. Especially crucial for Chile was the achievement of tariff-free trade for important 
export sectors, including textiles, clothes, and shoes. Moreover, Chile managed to convert the 
unilateral concessions provided by the US through the GSP into a permanent deal. All product 
lines included in the GSP became tariff-free as a result of the PTA (Roffe, 2004).  
Article 3.8 of the US-Chile PTA prohibits the use of duty drawbacks, the subsidy-like 
provisions that provide import tax rebates on goods used as inputs for exports. The agreement, 
however, provides for an eight-year phase-out period before taking into effect. After the eight-
year period, duty drawbacks would be eliminated only gradually with a period of 4 years by 
equal 25-per cent reductions, implying a complete elimination of duty drawbacks in 12 years 
after the implementation of the agreement.38 In addition, Article 8.1 of the US-Chile PTA allows 
the imposition of safeguard measures, if, as a result of tariff elimination, ‘a good originating in 
the territory of the other Party is being imported into the Party’s territory in such increased 
quantities… as to constitute a substantial cause of serious injury, or threat thereof, to a domestic 
industry producing a like or directly competitive good.’39  
 
Agriculture 
Although more than 60 per cent (by value) of Chile’s merchandise exports came from mining, 
agriculture has been an important sector contributing to the diversification of Chile’s export 
profile and comprising up to 19 per cent of all exports in 2009 (WTO, 2009). Chile did get 
agricultural concessions from the US, albeit phased out over a period of 10-12 years for the most 
																																								 																				
38 The text of the US-Chile PTA, available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/chile-
fta/final-text (accessed 3 December 2015). 
 
39 The text of the US-Chile PTA, available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/chile-
fta/final-text (accessed 3 December 2015). 
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sensitive products. For Chile, too, tariff elimination on sensitive products, again mostly in 
agriculture, were to be implemented over twelve years. The US would eventually completely 
liberalize its agricultural sector, with 85 per cent of tariff lines reduced to zero within ten tears 
and the remaining 15 per cent in twelve years. 81 per cent of Chile’s tariff lines in agriculture 
would go down to zero within ten years, with the remaining 19 per cent to be liberalized in two 
more years  (Weintraub, 2004; Cheong and Cho, 2007).  
Article 3.16 of the US-Chile PTA calls for the abolition of export subsidies in agriculture, 
while Article 3.18 allows agricultural safeguard measures in the form of additional import duties, 
‘if the unit import price of the good enters the Party’s customs territory at a level below a trigger 
price for that good as set out in that Party’s section of Annex 3.18.’ Tariff-rate quotas have been 
provided for a number of agricultural products. These quotas were to be phased out during a 4-
12-year period, after which an unlimited number of products could be exported duty-free.40 The 
abolition of agricultural subsidies seems to be especially significant for Chile, for, as accounted 
by a WTO Trade Policy Report (WTO, 2009), unlike in the US, agriculture in Chile, although a 
major contributor to the country’s economic development, had fairly low protection and 
subsidization. To the disappointment of certain industry representatives in the US, sensitive 
products, such as sugar, were not kept out of the agreement,41 which was the case with the US 
agreements with Colombia and Peru, for example, which protect the sugar industry in the US 
even after the full implementation of the US-Colombia and US-Peru PTAs.42 Thus, the US-Chile 
																																								 																				
40 The text of the US-Chile PTA, available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/chile-
fta/final-text (accessed 3 December 2015). 
 
41 USTR Trade Advisory Committee Reports, Feb 2003, available at 
https://ustr.gov/archive/assets/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Chile_FTA/Reports/asset_upload_file362_4932.pdf 
(accessed on 3 December 2015). 
 
42 See Chapter 4.4 and Chapter 4.5 of this thesis. 
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negotiations over agriculture represented a case where the US could not pick and choose the 
areas it wanted to open up or keep off the agreement.  
Moreover, in relation to certain product lines, such as farmed salmon and other types of fish, 
US congressmen expressed concerns over Chile’s competitive advantages that were going to 
have adverse effects on the fish industry and employment in the US. According to congressional 
statements, the US-Chile PTA would only exacerbate the situation for the US farmed salmon 
industry, as Chile’s exports doubled during 1998-2002  (US Congress, 2007:20440-1). 
 
Government Procurement 
Unlike the US, Chile was not a member of the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement 
(GPA)43 at the time of the negotiations of the US-Chile PTA. Thus, it can be presumed that 
government procurement clauses of the PTA were going to have a higher significance for Chile. 
Chapter 9 of the US-Chile PTA covers government procurement-related measures between the 
countries. It provides for ‘national treatment and non-discrimination’ that obliges the Parties to 
provide treatment to the goods, services, as well as the suppliers of the other Party ‘no less 
favorable than the most favorable treatment the Party accords to its own goods, services, and 
suppliers.’44 Annex 9.1 lists the thresholds of procurement contacts as follows: 
 
 
 
 
																																								 																				
43 The list of GPA signatories can be found on the WTO website, available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/memobs_e.htm (accessed 3 December 2015). 
 
44 The text of the US-Chile PTA, available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/chile-
fta/final-text (accessed 3 December 2015). 
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Table 4.2.1. Government procurement thresholds of the US-Chile PTA 
Procurement by Central 
government entities, in 
USD 
Procurement by sub-
central government 
entities, in USD 
Construction 
contracts by Central 
government entities, 
in USD 
Construction 
contracts by sub-
central government 
entities, in USD 
56,190 460,000 6,481,000 6,481,000 
Source: Annex 9.1 of the US-Chile PTA45 
In addition, Section H (General Notes) of Annex 9.1 provides set-asides for US small 
businesses, a scheme that is designed to promote small businesses in the US.  
 
Trade in Services 
The US-Chile PTA adopts a ‘negative list’ approach, which specifies the sectors that are not 
covered by the agreement, while everything else is up for liberalization. This, according to a 
statement by the US House of Representatives,46 has been especially important for the US cross-
border services providers that were particularly well-positioned to build on existing market 
access opportunities in Chile and expand their presence in the country. According to US 
congressional records (US Congress, 2007:20446), the negative list approach was significant for 
the US, as services were an important sector for the US, accounting for 65 per cent of the 
economy and 28 per cent of export value in 2003.  
Chapter 11 of the US-Chile agreement calls for ‘National Treatment’ and ‘Most- Favored 
Nation Treatment’ that obliges each Party to treat services suppliers of the other Party no less 
favorably than how it treats, in like circumstances, its own services suppliers, as well as services 
suppliers of a non-Party. In addition, Article 11.5 bans the conditioning of the provision of cross-
																																								 																				
45 The text of the US-Chile PTA, available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/chile-
fta/final-text (accessed 3 December 2015). 
46 A statement by the US House of Representatives (Statement on How the United States-Chile Free Trade 
Agreement Serves the Interests of United States Commerce), available at 
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/media/pdf/chile/hr2738docbenefitschilefta.pdf (accessed 8 October 2014). 
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border services on establishing a representative office or any form of enterprise.47 In addition, 
Article 11.12 of the US-Chile agreement has a NAFTA-like definition of a service supplier as ‘a 
person of a Party that seeks to supply or supplies a service.’48 As it was the case with the EU-
Chile PTA, the wording ‘seeks to supply’ broadens the scope of the agreement providing for a 
greater coverage of the services provisions. Hence, according to a USTR official (Interview 10), 
the services section of the US-Chile turned out to be broadly in line with US preferences, as it 
was a sensitive area where US negotiators had to push for deep liberalization. 
 
Investment Measures 
Chapter 10 of the US-Chile PTA establishes provisions regulating investment-related measures. 
More specifically, it calls for ‘National Treatment’ and ‘Most-Favored Nation Treatment’ that 
establish the treatment of investors of a Party no less favorably than their own investors, as well 
as investors from a non-Party.49 Article 10.5 prohibits performance requirements, including 
export requirements, local content requirements, export-to-import ratio requirements, and 
technology transfer requirements.50 
In addition, Article 10.9 prevents any direct nationalization or expropriation of investment or 
indirect measures ‘equivalent to expropriation or nationalization,’ except for a public purpose, in 
a non-discriminatory manner, in accordance with due process of law, and on the payment of 
																																								 																				
47 The text of the US-Chile PTA, available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/chile-
fta/final-text (accessed 3 December 2015). 
 
48 The text of the US-Chile PTA, available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/chile-
fta/final-text (accessed 3 December 2015). 
49 The text of the US-Chile PTA, available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/chile-
fta/final-text (accessed 3 December 2015). 
 
50 The text of the US-Chile PTA, available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/chile-
fta/final-text (accessed 3 December 2015). 
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compensation, which is equivalent to the fair market value of the expropriated investment and 
should be paid without delay and be fully realizable and freely transferable. The wording sounds 
similar to NAFTA, but the US-Chile agreement, like most post-NAFTA US PTAs, contains an 
important exception formulated under Annex 10-D, whereby a government’s nondiscriminatory 
regulatory actions directed towards the protection of public welfare, including public health, 
safety, and the environment, do not constitute indirect expropriation.51 This is important, because 
environmental measures have been regarded as ‘tantamount to expropriation’ by private 
arbitration rulings in relation to PTAs, such as NAFTA, that have significant policy and 
monetary implications for governments (Public Citizen, 2005). Most importantly, Chapter 10 
provides for investor-state dispute settlement clauses. Under Chapter 10, investors can submit 
direct claims for damages against nation-states at ICSID or UNCITRAL arbitration tribunals. 
According to a USTR official, investment provisions of the US-Chile PTA turned out to be 
quite strong, as investment was a crucial aspect for the US. However, the agreement does not 
seem to match the highly restrictive clauses of NAFTA and, on the insistence of the Chilean side, 
includes provisions that mitigate some of the strong wording seen in other US PTAs and 
provides the parties a narrower scope of investor-state arbitration under ICSID (Interview 10). 
 
IPRs 
In negotiating the IPRs clauses of PTAs, the US has been keener to establish stricter rules with 
relatively high-income countries, such as Singapore and Chile, than with lower income countries, 
such as the five Central American countries, because higher-income countries are assumed to 
																																								 																				
51 The text of the US-Chile PTA, available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/chile-
fta/final-text (accessed 3 December 2015). 
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have higher capabilities for taking advantage of the loopholes in the agreements, such as 
producing generic drugs under compulsory licensing provisions (Abbott, 2006a). 
As a result, the final text of the US-Chile PTA incorporates a number of TRIPS-plus 
measures. The IPRs clauses of the agreement with the US are much more restrictive than in other 
PTAs signed by Chile, and in many aspects are WTO-plus. The Chilean pharmaceutical industry, 
meeting about 90 per cent of the public health sector needs, was concerned by the restrictive 
clauses of the agreement, such as the increase in patent terms, pipeline protection of 
pharmaceutical products, restricted parallel importation, introduction of exclusivity of 
undisclosed information, and restricted grounds for compulsory licensing. It was not a secret that 
IPRs, especially pharmaceutical patents, were a priority in the US agenda, thus the US was going 
to push for them during the negotiations (Roffe, 2004).  
As a consequence, provisions for pipeline protection of patents (including pharmaceutical) 
were incorporated in the agreement. Some argue that this was not going to have a considerable 
impact on Chile, because the country had already made changes to its industrial property law in 
1991 extending the scope of patentability to all kinds of products and processes (Roffe, 2004). 
However, the pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical test data exclusivity clauses were a 
novelty for Chile. According to Article 17.10.1 of the US-Chile PTA,52 undisclosed test data are 
granted exclusivity ‘for a period of at least five years from the date of approval for a 
pharmaceutical product and ten years from the date of approval for an agricultural chemical 
product.’  
The TRIPS-plus clauses of the US-Chile PTA notwithstanding, Chile was successful in 
mitigating the pressure from the US. As a result, Chile managed to strike clauses that are not as 
																																								 																				
52 The text of the US-Chile PTA, available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/chile-
fta/final-text (accessed 3 December 2015). 
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restrictive as they could have been, as well as compared to other US North-South PTAs 
negotiated almost simultaneously. As mentioned by Roffe (2004), the initial proposal by the US 
was more restrictive and contained broader scope of protection of pharmaceutical products. 
Chile, however, was successful in opposing more restrictive provisions and getting a relatively 
more favorable IPRs section in the agreement with the US. 
On the one hand, the US attached a high priority to IPRs and was going to push its line all the 
way through to establish IPRs clauses in the agreement with Chile that reflect the interests of the 
US pharmaceutical industry. On the other hand, however, Chile apposed some of the highly 
restrictive wordings in IPRs, arguing it needs larger leeway in its policy autonomy in this field. 
As a result of the negotiations, the US managed to incorporate most but clearly not all its 
proposals and had to compromise in a number of issues. The compromise is largely due to 
Chile’s strong bargaining power that was enabled by its wide network of PTAs, including North-
South, and the determination of US negotiators to seal a deal with Chile as soon as possible, to 
redress the US declining positions in Chile (Interview 10).  
The ‘shortcomings’ of the US-Chile PTA in IPRs were also acknowledged by a USTR Trade 
Advisory Committee Report, compiled by the Committee on Intellectual Property Rights for 
Trade Policy Matters. The report called it ‘unfortunate’ that the agreement with Chile falls short 
of providing the same level of IPRs protection as other US agreements negotiated 
simultaneously, such as with Singapore. The report also expressed concerns that ‘the most 
serious deficiencies in the Chile intellectual property chapter’ may set precedent in future US 
PTAs.53 
																																								 																				
53 USTR Trade Advisory Committee Report (The US-Chile Free Trade Agreement (FTA): The Intellectual Property 
Provisions), p.2-3, Feb 2003, available at 
https://ustr.gov/archive/assets/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Chile_FTA/Reports/asset_upload_file799_4936.pdf 
(accessed on 3 December 2015). 
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In particular, Article 17.10.1 of the US-Chile PTA has an important nuance that is different 
from other US PTAs concluded after NAFTA. Article 17.10.1 states: 
If a Party requires the submission of undisclosed information concerning the safety and 
efficacy of a pharmaceutical or agricultural chemical product which utilizes a new 
chemical entity, which product has not been previously approved, to grant a marketing 
approval or sanitary permit for such product, the Party shall not permit third parties not 
having the consent of the person providing the information to market a product based on 
this new chemical entity, on the basis of the approval granted to the party submitting 
such information. A Party shall maintain this prohibition for a period of at least five 
years from the date of approval for a pharmaceutical product and ten years from the date 
of approval for an agricultural chemical product. (Italics added)54 
 
The relevant article (Article 16.8.1) of the US-Singapore agreement, for example, states: 
If a Party requires the submission of information concerning the safety and efficacy of a 
pharmaceutical or agricultural chemical product prior to permitting the marketing of 
such product, the Party shall not permit third parties not having the consent of the party 
providing the information to market the same or a similar product on the basis of the 
approval granted to the party submitting such information for a period of at least five 
years from the date of approval for a pharmaceutical product and ten years from the date 
of approval for an agricultural chemical product. (Italics added)55 
 
As illustrated above, Article 16.8.1 of the US-Singapore agreement does not specify new 
chemical entities, thus making the scope of the article much broader. Another ‘important 
accomplishment’ in the US-Chile PTA is the reference to undisclosed information56 in Article 
17.10.1. The initial US proposal referred to ‘information’ (as in Article 16.8.1 of the US-
Singapore agreement above), whether undisclosed or not, and was changed as a result of the 
negotiations. The US-Chile agreement obliges the parties to protect undisclosed information 
‘except where necessary to protect the public’, while definitions of such situations are left to 
domestic legislations (Roffe, 2004:25).   
																																								 																				
54 The text of the US-Chile PTA, available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/chile-
fta/final-text (accessed 3 December 2015). 
 
55 The text of the US-Singapore PTA, available at 
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/fta/singapore/asset_upload_file708_4036.pdf (accessed 3 
December 2015). 
 
56 The US-Chile PTA does not define ‘undisclosed information,’ and hence, argues Roffe (2004:25), the less 
stringent TRIPS definition (Article 39.2) apples to the agreement.  
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While the US-Singapore agreement allows no generic producer to rely on test data submitted 
to a foreign regulator, even if it seeks marketing approval domestically, the US-Chile agreement 
is friendly enough to omit such restrictive provisions. As distinct from the US-Chile agreement, 
the US-Morocco, US-Australia and US-Bahrain agreements include obligations to provide 
patents for the ‘new’ use of the known products (Fink and Reichenmiller, 2005). Moreover, 
‘Chile resisted the US demand for commitments that would have gone beyond the WTO rules by 
reducing the Chilean Government’s ability to override drug patents through compulsory licenses’ 
(Kuwayama, 2003:207).   
Provisions for compulsory licenses in the US-Chile agreement are not much innovative and 
are according to TRIPS standards (Fink and Reichenmiller, 2005; Roffe, 2004), leaving Chile 
with a full set of tools to make full use of compulsory licenses as reaffirmed in the Doha 
Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health of 14 November 2001. In contrast, PTAs, such as 
CAFTA-DR and the US-Morocco PTA, ‘are intended to restrict the flexibilities inherent in the 
TRIPS Agreement, Doha Declaration and Decision on Implementation of Paragraph 6…. They 
appear designed to negate the effective use of compulsory licensing by blocking the marketing of 
third party medicines during the term of patents’ (Abbott, 2004:12).  
Based on a comprehensive review of the IPRs-related provisions of the US-Chile PTA, Roffe 
(2004:49) concludes that ‘the levels of its IPRs protection and enforcement provisions are less 
stringent than those negotiated by the USA—simultaneously with Singapore and subsequently 
with CAFTA, Australia, Bahrain and Morocco’. The reason why Chile managed to resist more 
restrictive terms in IPRs can be explained, among other things, by the fact that the Chilean 
agreement was second-order and its formal trade ties with the EU and other parts of the world 
enabled it to approach the negotiations with the US from a better position than did other 
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countries of the Global South. It can be argued that more restrictive IPRs-related provisions in 
the US-Singapore and US-Australia PTAs are due to the fact that Singapore and Australia are 
high-income countries, thus they would not lack the industrial capacity to take advantage of the 
leeway and loopholes in their PTAs (Abbott, 2006a). However, this argument will not prove to 
be robust for Central America and Morocco, whose first-order agreements with the US had a far 
more restrictive IPRs section than that of the second-order US-Chile agreement. 
 
4.3. The US-Korea PTA 
 
Trade relations with the US, albeit with serious trade disputes, have been an important 
contributor to Korea’s spectacular economic rise since the 1960s. Given the growing economic 
interdependence between the two countries, talks on a US-Korea PTA began in the late 1980s 
when, faced with trade sanctions by the US, Korea wanted to secure steady access to the US 
market to level the playing field and get ahead of its competitors in East Asia, while the US 
wanted enhanced access to the booming Korean market (Choi and Schott, 2001; Schott et al, 
2006; Koo, 2006; Cooper and Manyin, 2007). Although the US was not among the first countries 
to complete a PTA with Korea, it was the first big industrialized country to do so, thus getting in 
ahead of Japan and the EU in establishing preferential bilateral trade ties with Korea (Cheong, 
2007). 
Following its solid economic growth of about 7 per cent per annum for more than two 
decades starting from the 1960s, Korea could no longer afford the ‘passive trade opening policy’ 
of the 1980s while it was challenged by developed and emerging economies in its big export 
destinations, including the US. To maintain its export-oriented trade policy and compete with 
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developed and emerging economies in big export markets, as well as cope with the consequences 
of the 1997 Asian financial crisis, Korea had to embrace the globalization era of the 1990s. Thus, 
starting from the 1990s, Korea began to consider regionalism as a complementary option to 
multilateral liberalization (Sohn, 2001; Sohn and Yoon, 2001). 
 
Figure 4.3.1. US trade with Korea, in thousand USD, 1981-2013 
 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) data, available at 
http://www.cepal.org/en (accessed 15 October 2014)  
 
There have been close economic and political ties between Korea and the US. As of 2005, 
two years before the US-Korea negotiations completed, external trade between the countries 
(imports plus exports) exceeded USD 70 billion (the 2013 figure was above USD 100 billion 
(see Figure 4.3.1). Korea was absorbing more than 3 per cent of US exports, making it the 
seventh largest consumer of American goods and services, while the US was Korea’s second 
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largest export market (RIETI, 2006; Cheong, 2007).57 Political cooperation between the parties 
was significant, too. The US was crucial in helping South Korea resist the invasion of the North 
in 1950, and has helped the South to defend its territorial integrity ever since (Choi and Schott, 
2001). The dynamics of US-Korea trade is presented in Figure 4.3.1 above. 
Given the close economic and political ties between the two countries, a US-Korea PTA was 
long overdue. The talks between the countries, however, were prone to producing stalemates, 
primarily due to pressures from uncompetitive industries in Korea, such as agriculture and 
financial services, which lobbied against the agreement with the US (Koo, 2006). When asked 
why the US had not considered a deal with Korea before, USTR Robert Zoellick answered in 
May 2004, ‘They’re not ready to talk about agriculture’ (cited by Schott et al, 2006:1). These 
impediments were, however, eventually resolved when preferential access to the US market 
acquired a greater priority for Korea, in order to get ahead of it competitors in the region and 
reignite its export-led growth (Schott et al, 2006). Thus, fuelled by competitive pressures, the 
negotiations resumed with greater vigour and an agreement was signed in June 2007, which 
USTR Rob Portman called ‘the most commercially significant free trade negotiation’ since 
NAFTA.58 
The ratification of the PTA, however, was delayed for another four years, coming eventually 
in both countries only at the end of 2011. The reason for a delayed ratification was the different 
viewpoints, primarily over treatment of auto and beef, held by the executive under George W. 
Bush and the Democratic leadership of Congress. As a result, President Bush withheld the 
																																								 																				
57 In 2013, the two-way trade in goods exceeded USD 100 billion, making Korea the sixth largest trading partner of 
the US, while the US became Korea’s second largest trading partner. Services accounted for another USD 30 billion 
in two-way trade (CRS, 2014:8). 
 
58 USTR Press Release, Feb 2, 2006, available at 
https://ustr.gov/archive/Document_Library/Press_Releases/2006/February/United_States,_South_Korea_Announce_
Intention_to_Negotiate_Free_Trade_Agreement.html (accessed 3 December 2015).  
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submission of the agreement to Congress and it was ratified during President Obama’s term 
when modifications in the agreement, including over autos and beef, were agreed upon by Korea 
and the US in February 2011. The agreement entered into force on 15 March 2012 (CRS, 2014). 
Although the actual effects of the US-Korea PTA are yet to be seen, studies (Cheong and 
Wang, 1999; Choi and Schott, 2001; USITC, 2001; Cheong, 2007) estimate the long run welfare 
gains from the agreement to be in the range of USD 4 billion to 20 billion for Korea and USD 9 
billion to 20 billion for the US, or around 2.41 per cent of GDP for Korea and 0.13 per cent of 
GDP for the US. Similarly, a study by the US International Trade Commission (USITC, 2007) 
put the estimated US GDP growth at USD 10-12 billion or approximately 0.1 per cent.  
A distinctive feature of the US-Korea PTA has been its discriminative effect on non-
participants. The agreement was estimated to have negative welfare implication for a number of 
countries and regions, such as Australia, New Zealand, ASEAN, Japan, China, Canada, and 
Mexico, in the range of 0.07 to 0.14 per cent of GDP (Choi and Schott, 2001). Considering the 
anticipated increase in FDI in Korea, other developed economies, namely the EU and Japan, 
were predicted to incur negative welfare effects as a result of the US-Korea PTA (Kiyota and 
Stern, 2007). The US-Korea agreement was argued to have big discriminative effects, especially 
on Japan, for among the countries negatively affected by the US-Korea PTA, Japan had the 
highest export similarity index, defined as having an export structure similar to Korean exports 
to the US market, as well as an import structure similar to Korean imports from the US (Choi 
and Schott, 2001).59  
Thus, the 2011 ratification of the US-Korea PTA looked especially timely for putting 
additional pressure on Japan amid discussions on the TPP, an ambitious free trade agreement that 
was signed on October 5, 2015 by the US and 11 other Pacific Rim countries, including Japan. 
																																								 																				
59 The closer the similarity in export structure, the greater the possibility of trade diversion (Choi and Schott, 2001). 
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As argued by the Economist (2011), the ratification of the US-Korea PTA put pressure on large 
Japanese exporters, which would struggle to compete against Korean rivals without preferential 
access to the US market. In this context, the pressure on the Japanese government from 
Kiedanren, a large Japanese business lobby, to pursue countervailing agreements does not seem 
surprising. This argument looks complementary with the assertion that the US-Korea PTA was 
going to produce only modest gains for the US, and its main objective was the catalytic effect on 
trade liberalization in the region. Like it was the case with the US agreements with Chile and 
Singapore, the US-Korea agreement was part of the broader US strategy aimed at creating 
competitive pressures and inducing competitive liberalization in a specific region (Choi and 
Schott, 2004; Financial Times, 2007a). As a result, in November 2011, Prime Minister 
Yoshihiko Noda announced ‘Japan’s intention to begin consultations with Trans-Pacific 
Partnership countries toward joining the TPP negotiations’ (USTR, 2011), while Japan 
participated for the first time in the 18th round of negotiations in July 2013 (CRS, 2015). In fact, 
the catalytic effect of the US-Korea PTA went beyond the region and, in the words of EU Trade 
Commissioner Peter Mandelson, ‘strengthen[ed] the prospects for the planed EU-Korea free 
trade agreement’ (Financial Times, 2007b). 
The rest of the section looks at the negotiations and outcome of the US-Korea PTA, with a 
particular focus on tariffs and related measures, agriculture, government procurement, trade in 
services, investment protection, and IPRs, as outlined in Chapter 3.  
 
Tariffs and Related Measures 
As a result of the US-Korea agreement, within three years of the PTA’s entry into force, about 
95 per cent of trade in consumer and industrial products between the parties would become duty-
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free, of which about 80 per cent immediately. Virtually all of the remaining tariffs would be 
eliminated within 10 years (USITC, 2007; USTR, 2009; CRS, 2014). This was not going to 
change US tariff levels much, as by the beginning of the 2000s, the US trade-weighted average 
import duty was as low as 1.6 per cent, with most US tariffs already low or eliminated altogether 
(with the exception of limited high-tariff product lines, such as textile and apparel and leather 
goods). Korea, too, had a relatively low average tariff level at 9 per cent. The relatively low 
figure in Korea, however, was deceptive, for important sectors, such as agriculture and fisheries, 
were protected behind high tariffs, some of them with no bound level, while tariff levels in 
competitive industries were lower than the average (USITC, 2001).  
After signing the agreement in June 2007, the two sides agreed to incremental changes to the 
agreement in December 2010, mostly related to trade in autos and light trucks and US pork 
exports. More specifically, the new agreement established a new auto-specific safeguard 
procedure and slowed down the pace of the elimination of tariffs on cars in both countries. In 
addition, the US maintained its 25 per cent tariff on light trucks until 2019, to be later gradually 
eliminated in the next three years, instead of the original agreement of eliminating tariffs on light 
trucks in 10 equal annual increments. Korea, however, did not slow down its reform of tariffs on 
light trucks and had to eliminate them upon entry into force of the PTA. As per the agreement, 
Korea cut its 8 per cent tariff on US-built passenger cars to 4 per cent and removed its 10 per 
cent tariff on trucks. The remaining tariffs were to be eliminated entirely in 2016. The US 
maintained its 2.5 per cent duty on passenger vehicles until 2016 (Schott, 2010; CRS, 2014). As 
a result of the changes, as a quid pro quo to the US maintenance of full tariffs on light trucks, 
Korea retained the right to maintain its 25 per cent tariff on US frozen pork until January 2016, 
two years longer than originally agreed (Schott, 2010). 
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In addition to tariff elimination, the agreement provides for ‘special motor vehicle safeguard’ 
clauses that allow the US to raise its tariffs to the pre-PTA levels in the case of ‘any harmful 
surges in South Korean auto imports due to the agreement.’ Moreover, a safeguard action ‘can be 
initiated by the United Auto Workers union, the domestic auto industry, or the U.S. government’ 
(CRS, 2014:3). The agreement includes a ‘special textile safeguard,’ allowing the parties to 
impose duties on certain textile goods, in case they cause injury to the domestic industry (USTR, 
2009). Textiles, in fact, together with other manufacturing goods, such as chemicals and 
electronics, was the area where Korean exporters to the US were expected to have the largest 
gains, for Korea had been a net exporter of textile products. Thus, the incorporation of the 
‘special textile safeguards’ in the agreement can be regarded as an achievement for the US 
(USITC, 2001; Lee et al, 2011).  
 
Agriculture 
Agriculture was an important component of the US-Korea PTA negotiations, especially for the 
US. According to the US International Trade Commission (USITC, 2001:ix), ‘[t]he largest gains 
from an FTA for U.S. exports to Korea are expected in agriculture.’ Moreover, in 2013, Korea 
was the fifth largest destination for US agricultural exports (at over USD 5 billion), 
notwithstanding Korea’s historical record of protecting agriculture due to farmers’ political 
influence in the country. Korean agricultural exports to the US have been relatively small and, 
thus, did not cause controversy during the negotiation of the agreement. However, Korea wanted 
to exclude certain agricultural products from the agreement, fearing that its agriculture would not 
survive the competition with the US60 (Cooper and Manyin, 2007; Lee et al, 2011; CRS, 2014). 
																																								 																				
60 In 2007, the year the PTA was signed, Korea’s average applied tariff on agricultural goods was 52 per cent, while 
in the US it was only 12 per cent (Cooper and Manyin, 2007).  
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The agreement turned out to be very much in line with US expectations and negotiating 
priorities. As accounted in a 2007 report by the US Agricultural Policy Advisory Committee for 
Trade,61 the US-Korea PTA was going to benefit US farmers and ranchers in providing 
additional export opportunities for a number of agricultural products. The only disappointment 
was rice, which as a sensitive product in Korea, was kept out of the agreement. Due to the 
differences in the competitiveness of agriculture in the two countries, Korea was estimated to 
incur a production decrease worth USD 20-23 billion and a loss of more than 130,000 jobs in 
agriculture as a result of the PTA. Hence, the opening up of the agricultural sector could threaten 
‘the very survival of Korean agriculture’ (Lee et al, 2011:135). 
Despite the expected negative consequences, Korea agreed to provide preferential market 
access to all agricultural products, except rice (Lee et al, 2011). Almost two-thirds of US 
agricultural exports to Korea would become duty-free immediately after the agreement entered 
into force. These products included wheat, feed corn, soybeans, and cotton, as well as a range of 
high-value agricultural products such as almonds, pistachios, bourbon whiskey, wine, raisins, 
grape juice, orange juice, fresh cherries, frozen french fries, frozen orange juice concentrate, and 
pet food. Other products, such as avocados, lemons, and sunflower seeds, had a two-year phase 
out period. Certain sensitive agricultural products had longer phase-out periods of up to 10 years 
under Korean import quotas  (USTR, 2009; CRS, 2014).  
The key agricultural products in the negotiations were beef, rice, and oranges—all of great 
export interest to the US. As a result of the agreement, Korea agreed to eliminate its 40 per cent 
tariff rate on US beef muscle meats, albeit over a 15-year period. Oranges, too, were accorded 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																																			
 
61 Report of the US Agricultural Policy Advisory Committee for Trade on the US-Korea PTA as part of the USTR 
Trade Advisory Committee Report, April 2007, available at 
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/Countries%20Regions/africa/agreements/korus/Agricultural%20Policy%2
0Advisory%20Committee.pdf (accessed 3 December 2015). 
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special treatment in the agreement through a special tariff rate quota. Oranges were subject to a 
50 per cent MFN duty in Korea. A small duty-free quota was allocated for US ‘in-season’ 
oranges, while the 50 per cent duty was to be reduced to 30 per cent in the first year of 
implementation of the agreement, and gradually eliminated in seven years.  The US, however, 
did not manage to secure additional access for its rice and rice products to the Korean market. 
Rice was a make-or-break issue for Korea, and US negotiators had to either agree on a good 
agreement without liberalization in rice or no agreement at all. They eventually decided not to 
lose the entire agreement because of one product line. The US, on the other hand, agreed to 
eliminate all its tariffs and quotas on agricultural products imported from Korea during a phase-
out period lasting up to 15 years (CRS, 2014).  
The importance of agricultural liberalization during the US-Korea PTA negotiations was 
significant, as it was a sensitive and well-protected sector in Korea and provided huge export 
opportunities for the US. Thus, the question during the negotiations was how many concessions 
could the US get from Korea, given the estimated negative consequences of agricultural 
liberalization in Korea. As it turned out, the US managed to achieve almost all its negotiating 
targets. The only exception was the liberalization of rice, which was too sensitive and too 
important for Korea to concede in. One of the main reasons for such an ‘asymmetric’ outcome in 
agricultural liberalization was that Korea felt the need to establish preferential trade ties with the 
US as soon as possible. In fact, the US-Korea negotiations had been previously interrupted due 
to Korea’s unwillingness to concede in agriculture. However, once pressure on Korea began to 
increase, as it was feeling left behind by its competitors, mostly in East and South East Asia, due 
to the absence of preferential trade relations with the US, it had to give in in a lot of areas, 
including agriculture. The considerable and painful concessions in agriculture were brought 
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about by pressure from Korean competitive industries on the Korean government to do whatever 
it takes and sign a PTA with the US, in order to bolster the competitiveness of Korean businesses 
vis-à-vis their competitors from East and Southeast Asia (Interview 12).  
 
Government Procurement 
Both Korea and the US were signatories of the WTO GPA agreement at the time of the PTA 
negotiations. The US-Korea agreement reaffirms the parties’ obligations under the GPA as a 
baseline to further mutual obligations in government procurement under the PTA.  The GPA 
applies to contacts valued at USD 203,000, while the PTA lowered this threshold to USD 
100,000. Moreover, as a result of the PTA, Korea added 9 more agencies to the list of 42 central 
and sub-central agencies covered under the GPA (CRS, 2014). This seems to be in line with US 
preferences that, as accounted by Cooper and Manyin (2007:17), ‘press[ed] South Korea to 
expand its commitments under the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement to cover more 
government agencies and at lower contract-value thresholds.’ The government procurement 
thresholds of the US-Korea PTA are presented in Table 4.3.1 below. 
 
Table 4.3.1. Government procurement thresholds of the US-Korea PTA 
 Procurement by 
Central 
government 
entities 
Procurement by 
sub-central 
government 
entities 
Construction 
contracts by 
Central 
government 
entities 
Construction 
contracts by sub-
central 
government 
entities 
For the US 100,000 USD Non-applicable 7,407,000 USD Non-applicable 
For Korea 100 million Won Non-applicable 7.4 billion Won Non-applicable 
Source: Annex 17-A of the US-Korea PTA62 
 
																																								 																				
62 The text of the US-Korea PTA, available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/korus-
fta/final-text (accessed 3 December 2015).  
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Although sub-central entities in both parties are not covered in government procurement 
clauses of the agreement, they are covered under the GPA. The threshold for the procurement of 
goods and services by Korean sub-central entities is 200,000 SDRs, while the threshold for the 
procurement of construction services is 15 million SDRs. The thresholds for US sub-central 
entities are 355,000 SDRs and 5 million SDRs, respectively.63 
 
Trade in Services 
The services sector is another area where the US had had competitive advantage over Korea, thus 
the liberalization of the services sector was going to benefit especially the US. Not surprisingly, 
the US made all the efforts to remove all regulatory barriers to cross-border trade in services 
(Lee et al, 2011). The services chapter of the US-Korea PTA turned out to be WTO-plus. The 
commitments under the PTA were novel especially for Korea that extended WTO-plus 
commitments ‘across virtually all major service sectors’ (USTR, 2009). The services chapter 
adopted a ‘negative list’ approach to the liberalization of trade in services. For the first time, 
Korea agreed to open up its legal consulting and accounting services to foreign investors. Broad 
concessions were also made in the field of healthcare and education. Moreover, under ‘Improved 
Financial Services,’ US financial institutions obtained the right ‘to establish or acquire financial 
institutions in Korea to supply a complete range of financial services’ (USTR, 2009), including 
portfolio management services for Korean investment funds. In addition, within two years after 
the agreement entered into force, US companies were going to be allowed 100 per cent 
ownership of telecommunications operators in Korea (Cooper and Manyin, 2007; USTR, 2009).  
Despite broad concessions in the liberalization of services acquired from Korea, the US 
refused a number of requests that were initially included in the negotiating positions of Korea. 
																																								 																				
63 The WTO GPA: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/thresh_e.htm (accessed 3 December 2015). 
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More specifically, the US did not concede on issues related to the provision of temporary visas to 
Korean executives and professionals and denied opening up the US coastal shipment market for 
Korean shippers (Lee et al, 2011). Furthermore, Chapter 12 of the US-Korea PTA calls for 
‘National Treatment’ and ‘Most-Favored Nation Treatment,’ while Article 12.5 bans 
conditioning the provision of cross-border services on establishing a representative office or any 
form of enterprise.64  
In trade in services, too, the US managed to get what it intended during the negotiations. It 
was able to push for concessions from Korea, which was, among other things, made possible by 
the settings of the agreement, whereby Korea was feeling the pressure to conclude the talks as 
soon as possible (Interview 12).  
 
Investment Measures 
The US-Korea PTA provides ‘New Protections’ for US investors operating in Korea. These 
include protection of all forms of investment, including enterprises, debt, concessions and similar 
contracts, and IP. Moreover, the agreement draws from US legal principles and practices ‘to 
provide substantive and procedural protection’ for US investors in Korea (USTR, 2009). Chapter 
11 of the US-Korea PTA establishes provisions regulating investment-related measures. More 
specifically, it calls for ‘national treatment’ and ‘MFN treatment’ that establish the treatment of 
investors of a Party no less favorably than their own investors, as well as investors from a non-
Party. Article 11.6 prevents any direct nationalization or expropriation of investment or indirect 
measures ‘equivalent to expropriation or nationalization,’ except for a public purpose, in a non-
discriminatory manner, in accordance with due process of law, and on the payment of 
																																								 																				
64 The text of the US-Korea PTA, available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/korus-
fta/final-text (accessed 3 December 2015). 
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compensation, which is equivalent to the fair market value of the expropriated investment and 
should be paid without delay and be fully realizable and freely transferable. Unlike NAFTA and 
like many post-NAFTA US PTAs, Annex 11-B of the US-Korea agreement asserts that a 
government’s non-discriminatory regulatory actions directed towards the protection of public 
welfare, including public health, safety, and the environment, do not constitute indirect 
expropriation.65 This is important, because environmental measures have been regarded as 
‘tantamount to expropriation’ by private arbitration rulings in relation to PTAs, such as NAFTA, 
with significant policy and monetary implications for governments (Public Citizen, 2005). 
Article 11.8 of the US-Korea PTA prohibits performance requirements, including export 
requirements, domestic content requirements, export-to-import ratio requirements, and 
technology transfer requirements.66 Moreover, Section B of Chapter 11 provides for investor-
state dispute settlement clauses, whereby investors can submit direct claims for damages against 
nation-states at ICSID or UNCITRAL arbitration tribunals.67 
 
IPRs 
As the leading producer of intellectual property in the world, the US demanded strong IPRs 
protection from Korea that would go beyond the country’s commitments under the WTO TRIPS 
agreement. In fact, the IPRs chapter of the US-Korea agreement establishes TRIPS-plus 
commitments for the parties by exceeding ‘TRIPS Agreement provisions in terms of the 
duration, extent, and enforcement of IPRs’ (Lee et al, 2011:140). The PTA requires parties to 
																																								 																				
65 The text of the US-Korea PTA, available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/korus-
fta/final-text (accessed 3 December 2015). 
 
66 The text of the US-Korea PTA, available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/korus-
fta/final-text (accessed 3 December 2015). 
 
67 The text of the US-Korea PTA, available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/korus-
fta/final-text (accessed 3 December 2015). 
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extend national treatment to IPRs holders from the other country and provides an extension of 
patent terms to compensate for delays in the process of granting patents, as well as provides test 
data exclusivity for a period of five years for pharmaceutical products and ten years for 
agricultural chemicals (USTR, 2009).  
More specifically, Article 18.9.4 prevents the marketing of generic drugs while the patent on 
the drug is still in effect (a so called ‘patent linkage’ system) (USITC, 2007), while Article 
18.9.1 prevents the granting of marketing approval for ‘a new pharmaceutical or new agricultural 
chemical product’ based on the safety and efficacy information submitted for approval by the 
patent holder for at least 5 years for pharmaceutical products and 10 years for agricultural 
chemical products. Moreover, the agreement provides for a 3-year data exclusivity period for 
pharmaceutical products that include previously approved chemical entities. In addition, the 
article also prohibits the approval of new pharmaceutical or agricultural chemical products based 
on data submitted in another country without the consent of the patent holder.68  
It should be noted that Article 18.9.1 of the US-Korea PTA,69 which calls for the protection 
of submitted ‘information concerning safety or efficacy of the product,’ has a wording 
(‘information’) that makes the scope of the agreement very broad. Such a restrictive wording is 
also included in the US PTA with Singapore, for example. In contrast, a similar provision in the 
US-Chile agreement refers to ‘undisclosed information,’ which limits the scope of the article and 
is perceived to be more development-friendly (Roffe, 2004). 
Hence, also taking into consideration the fact that Korea is a relatively high-income country, 
which makes it more capable of taking advantage of loopholes in IPRs legislation, the US pushed 
																																								 																				
68 The text of the US-Korea PTA, available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/korus-
fta/final-text (accessed 3 December 2015). 
 
69 The text of the US-Korea PTA, available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/korus-
fta/final-text (accessed 3 December 2015). 
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for and achieved desired concession from Korea in IPRs. It proved relatively easy, for Korean 
negotiators were largely concerned about levelling the playing field for their multinational vis-à-
vis competitors in the region and were willing to make concessions for the quick conclusion of 
the talks (Interview 12). 
 
4.4. The US-Colombia PTA 
 
After rounds of negotiations during a two-year period, the first-order US-Colombia PTA was 
signed in November 2006. Upon ratification by the Colombian Congress in 2007 and US 
Congress in 2011, the agreement entered into force in May 2012 (Villarreal, 2014). At the time 
of the negotiations, more than 50 per cent of Colombia’s exports were consumed by the US, 
while it also accounted for a quarter of Colombia’s inbound FDI (von Braun, 2012). As of 2013, 
the US was still Colombia’s leading trading partner, while Colombia ranked 31st among US 
export markets, accounting for only 1 per cent of US trade. The dynamics of US-Colombia trade 
is presented in Figure 4.4.1 below. 
Due to the small amount of trade between the countries and the small size of the Colombian 
economy relative to that of the US, the effects of the US-Colombia PTA, albeit positive, were 
estimated to be very small (Villarreal, 2014). According to the US International Trade 
Commission (USITC, 2006a), for example, the US GDP was estimated to increase only 0.05 per 
cent as a result of the agreement, which is broadly in line with estimates by other studies, such as 
one by DeRosa and Gilbert (2006).  
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Figure 4.4.1. US trade with Colombia, in thousand USD, 1981-2013 
 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) data, available at 
http://www.cepal.org/en (accessed 13 November 2014) 
 
The negotiations of the US-Colombia agreement took place in a regional competitive 
context. Firstly, the talks between the US and Colombia triggered action from Peru and Ecuador, 
who could not afford to be left out while Colombian exports enjoyed preferential access to the 
US market. As a result, the US and the three Andean countries started to negotiate a US-Andean 
agreement (Shadlen, 2008). Until the very end of the US-Andean negotiations, disagreements 
between the US and the three Andean countries over key issues, such as agriculture and IPRs, 
persisted.70 While the US appointed special agricultural negotiators to Columbia and Peru to 
push for a final deal with the two countries, the negotiations with the Andean group collapsed as 
all three Andean countries withdrew from the negotiations due to irreconcilable differences with 
US negotiators, especially over IPRs and agriculture (von Braun, 2012). 
																																								 																				
70 The summaries of the rounds of US-Columbia (US-Andean) PTA negotiations provided by the Organization of 
American States. Available at http://www.sice.oas.org/TPD/AND_USA/col_usa_e.asp (accessed 3 December 2015). 
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Secondly, after the US went bilateral with the Andean countries, the conclusion of the US-
Peru talks triggered response from Colombia. Although Peru realized that resuming bilateral 
negotiations after the collapse of the Andean talks was going to diminish its negotiating power 
vis-à-vis the US, it decided to negotiate further, as stable preferential access to the US market 
was becoming a higher priority for Peru. As a result, Peru concluded its bilateral negotiations 
with the US in less than a month after the collapse of the US-Andean talks, albeit at the expense 
of considerable concessions to the US in a number of important areas. The reasons for such 
concessions was the fact that Peru could not have afforded to be left out of the US market, 
especially if its peers in the region had gotten ahead of it and had signed a deal with the US (von 
Braun, 2012). Furthermore, the US-Peru agreement triggered reaction from other countries in the 
region to follow suit and sign agreements with the US, notwithstanding the US stance in the 
negotiations that called for the incorporation of WTO-plus clauses into the agreements that were 
perceived by Southern countries as restrictive and non-development-friendly (Interview 11).  
More specifically, despite the fact that after the conclusion of the US-Peru talks ‘the 
negotiating flexibility of the Colombian team was even further reduced,’ Colombia could not 
afford to delay the conclusion of its bilateral negotiations with the US and, realizing that the US 
would hardly agree on anything less than the terms finalized with Peru, had to join the 
bandwagon on terms largely dictated by the US (von Braun, 2012:137). In fact, several staff 
members of the Colombian negotiating team had to withdraw and even resign as public servants 
as they felt that ‘in order to sign a FTA with the USA it is necessary to pass the “lineas rojas”’ 
(von Braun, 2012:136). Thus, the start of the talks with Colombia first triggered action from Peru 
and Ecuador, then in the wake of the stalemate of the US-Andean talks, the conclusion of the 
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negotiations with Peru prompted action from Colombia. As a result, both Colombia and Peru 
signed separate North-South PTAs with the US on terms largely dictated by the US.  
While Colombia needed stable and permanent preferential access to the US market to, among 
other things, not to fall behind its competitors in the region, one of the main motivations behind 
the US pursuit of a PTA with Colombia was to get ahead of rivals, particularly the EU, but also 
Canada and Mercosur, in the Colombian market.71 The agreement, in fact, turned out to be 
strongly in the interests of the US, which, as discussed above, was partly enabled by the 
competitive pressure the US managed to trigger among the Andean countries that could not 
afford to be left out while others enjoyed preferential trade relations with the US. According to a 
report of the Advisory Committee for Trade Policy and Negotiations,72 the US-Colombia 
agreement exceeds the negotiating objectives of the US in a number of areas, including 
investment protection, services, and IPRs.   
The rest of the section looks at the negotiations and outcome of the US-Colombia PTA with a 
particular focus on a number of the key areas, including tariffs and related measures, agriculture, 
government procurement, trade in services, investment measures, and IPRs, as outlined in 
Chapter 3.  
 
Tariffs and Related Measures 
Before the agreement went into force, the average tariff in the US was considerably lower 
compared to that in Colombia, while certain products lines in Colombia had exceptionally high 
																																								 																				
71 USTR account of the US-Colombia PTA, available at http://www.ustr.gov/uscolombiatpa/facts (accessed 3 
December 2015). 
 
72 The Advisory Committee for Trade Policy and Negotiations report to the President, the Congress, and the USTR, 
of 20 September 2006, available at 
https://ustr.gov/archive/assets/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Colombia_FTA/Reports/asset_upload_file920_9821.pdf 
(accessed 3 December 2015).  
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tariff rates, including automobiles (35%), beef and rice (80%), and milk and cream (98%) 
(USITC, 2006a; Villarreal, 2014). Moreover, Colombia enjoyed considerable preferential 
unilateral tariff concessions from the US under the Andean Trade Preference Act and GSP. The 
percentage of Colombian exports entering the US market duty-free through normal trade 
relations or preference programs was around 90 per cent for each year since 2004 with the 
exception of 2011. Thus, tariff liberalization as a result of the PTA was going to benefit US 
exporters more than their Colombian counterparts, although the overall effect was estimated not 
be very high due to the small amount of trade between the countries relative to the size of the US 
economy (Villarreal, 2014:13).  
As a result of the agreement, over 80 per cent of US exports of consumer and industrial 
products, including most key US exports in sectors, such as agriculture and construction 
equipment, aircraft and parts, auto parts, fertilizers and agro-chemicals, information technology 
equipment, medical and scientific equipment, and wood, were going to become duty-free 
immediately, with the remaining tariffs to phase out in a 10-19-year period.73 In addition, 99 per 
cent of industrial and textile tariff lines were to become duty-free upon the implementation of the 
PTA (USITC, 2006a). Subject to the agreement’s rules of origin, all textile and apparel products 
became duty free immediately. The agreement also provided for a ‘special textile safeguard’ 
provision for the parties in case textile and apparel import surges threaten to damage domestic 
producers (Villarreal, 2014).   
 
 
 
																																								 																				
73 USTR account of the US-Colombia PTA, available at http://www.ustr.gov/uscolombiatpa/facts (accessed 3 
December 2015). 
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Agriculture 
Businesses in the US were largely in support of a PTA with Colombia, among other things, 
because of America’s declining market share in Colombia, especially in agriculture, which, they 
argued, was because of Colombia’s participation in PTAs, particularly with Canada. For 
Colombia, on the other hand, agriculture was a sensitive industry, with tariff lines on certain 
agricultural products as high as 80-100 per cent and other types of protectionist measures, such 
as quotas and direct support for production (Salamanca et al, 2009; Villarreal, 2014). Moreover, 
Colombia was seeking moderate liberalization of agriculture, arguing that agricultural 
liberalization would have adverse effects on rural regions in the country and drive farmers into 
coca production. As a result, the US did agree on longer phase-out periods for sensitive products, 
such as rice and poultry, but managed to secure immediate full liberalization in other products, 
such as wheat and soybeans, as well as provide better access to the Colombian market for its 
pork exports (Villarreal, 2014).  
The agreement on agriculture turned out to be asymmetric in favor of the US. The estimated 
impact of the agreement, by at least one account (Salamanca et al, 2009), was not going to be 
positive on small farmers in Colombia, which provided significant employment in the 
agricultural sector. In fact, as a consequence of the PTA, pork and chicken producers in 
Colombia, in particular, were going to incur losses. As a result of the agreement, more than half 
of US farm exports to Colombia (representing 77 per cent of tariff lines), including wheat, 
barley, soybeans, high-quality beef, bacon, almost all fruit and vegetable products, cotton, and 
the vast majority of processed products, were to become duty-free immediately upon the 
implementation of the agreement, while virtually all of the remaining tariffs were to be 
eliminated in 15 years. The PTA also provided for tariff rate quotas on a number of agricultural 
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products, including standard beef, chicken leg quarters, dairy products, corn, and, rice.74 At the 
same time, 89 per cent of US agricultural tariff lines for imports from Colombia were to become 
duty-free immediately upon implementation of the agreement (USITC, 2006a). 
While Colombia was not allowed to exclude any agricultural product lines from liberalization 
and had to provide unconditional access for key US agricultural exports to its market, certain 
agricultural product lines important for Colombia, such as sugar and some high-sugar-content 
products, were excluded from tariff phase-out program in the US. Meanwhile, the elimination of 
non-tariff protection of other product lines important for Colombian exporters, such as beef, 
dairy products, fruits and vegetables, remained uncertain as the US maintained a good part of its 
domestic support for production (Salamanca et al, 2009).  
Colombia would phase out all agricultural tariff lines and tariff rate quotas in periods ranging 
from 3 to 19 years. Quotas and over-quota tariffs were to be eliminated in 12 years for corn, 15 
years for diary products, and 19 years for rice. Notwithstanding the longer phase-out periods, 
however, the US-Colombia PTA showed its negative effects on the Colombian agriculture in its 
first year of implementation. This was reflected in the growing concerns among Colombian 
farmers and agricultural producers, who, unable to compete against subsidized US exports, 
staged mass protests and nationwide strikes in 2013 against the US-Colombia PTA (Villarreal, 
2014). 
Agriculture was an important component of the US-Colombia negotiations. On the one hand, 
the agricultural sector was an important job creator in Colombia, hence Colombian negotiators 
intended to shield it from competition from the US by favoring moderate liberalization. On the 
other hand, agriculture was where US businesses saw big opportunities in and wanted enhanced 
																																								 																				
74 USTR account of the US-Colombia PTA, available at http://www.ustr.gov/uscolombiatpa/facts (accessed 3 
December 2015).  
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access to the Colombian agricultural market in par with other countries, most notably Canada. As 
a result of the negotiations, the US managed to get almost every possible concession from 
Colombia, notwithstanding the anticipated adverse effects of deep agricultural liberalization in 
Colombia. At the same time, the US was able to shield some of its sensitive agricultural products 
from liberalization. This largely asymmetric outcome is, to a large extent, a result competitive 
pressures felt by Colombia that were compelling it to strike a deal with the US in the shortest 
period of time. Competition with its peers in terms of preferential access to the US market made 
Colombia ready for painful compromises in a number of areas, including agriculture. Colombia 
could not afford to depend on unilateral, albeit significant, concessions by the US, while its 
competitors in the Andean region were negotiating permanent bilateral preferential measures 
with the US (Interview 11).  
 
Government Procurement 
Unlike the US, Colombia was not a member of the WTO GPA at the time of the PTA 
negotiations. The PTA was intended to expand government procurement opportunities for the 
parties by expanding the list of central and sub-central government entities covered in 
procurement provisions and by providing national treatment to each other’s firms (Article 9.2).75 
The government procurement chapter of the US-Colombia PTA provides a wide list of central 
and sub-central government entities covered under government procurement provisions. 
Moreover, among other entities, Colombia’s legislature, courts, and a number of key government 
enterprises, including its oil company, became subject to the agreement (Villarreal, 2014). The 
government procurement provisions of the US-Colombia-Peru PTA provide access to the 
																																								 																				
75 The text of the US-Colombia PTA, available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-
agreements/colombia-fta/final-text (accessed 3 December 2015).  
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procurements of both central and sub-central government entities.76 Annex 9.1 of the US-
Colombia agreement lists the thresholds of procurement contacts as follows: 
 
Table 4.4.1. Government procurement thresholds of the US-Colombia PTA 
Procurement by 
Central government 
entities, in USD 
Procurement by sub-
central government 
entities, in USD 
Construction 
contracts by Central 
government entities, 
in USD 
Construction contracts 
by sub-central 
government entities, in 
USD 
64,786 526,000 7,407,000 7,407,000 
Source: Annex 9.1 of the US-Colombia PTA77 
 
Trade in Services 
The liberalization of trade in services was quite comprehensive in the US-Colombia PTA, which 
provided for market access in most services, with only a few exceptions, and went much beyond 
the WTO GATS agreement. Among other thing, US financial services suppliers and portfolio 
managers acquired equal rights with local firms for establishing branches and subsidiaries in 
Colombia, as well as got access to the privatized social security market in the country (USITC, 
2006a; Villarreal, 2014). Moreover, unlike the WTO GATS agreement, the US-Colombia PTA 
calls for a ‘negative list’ approach in the liberalization of services sectors, which extends the 
coverage of the agreement over services sectors, such as real estate services, construction 
services, environmental services, and pipeline transport services, not covered under the GATS 
agreement. The agreement was to provide favorable environment for US services providers that 
enjoyed a competitive edge in most services sectors (USITC, 2006a). 
																																								 																				
76 The text of the US-Colombia PTA, available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-
agreements/colombia-fta/final-text (accessed 3 December 2015). 
 
77 The text of the US-Colombia PTA, available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-
agreements/colombia-fta/final-text (accessed 3 December 2015). 
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The liberalization in services, too, were mostly in line with US preferences. The US was able 
to get from Colombia the measures it sought, notwithstanding Colombia’s preference for a less 
ambitious services chapter. However, Colombia had to compromise and accept US proposals, 
largely motivated by the urge to complete the deal as soon as possible (Interview 11). 
 
Investment Measures 
The investment chapter of the US-Colombia PTA goes much further than the TRIMS agreement 
to provide for the protection of all forms of investment and full compensation in cases of 
expropriation (Villarreal, 2014). More specifically, Articles 10.3 and 10.4 of the US-Colombia 
PTA establish provisions regulating investment-related measures, calling for ‘National 
Treatment’ and ‘Most-Favored Nation Treatment’ that establish the treatment of investors of a 
Party no less favorably than their own investors, as well as investors from a non-Party.78 
Article 10.7 prevents any direct nationalization or expropriation of investment or indirect 
measures ‘equivalent to expropriation or nationalization,’ except for a public purpose, in a non-
discriminatory manner, in accordance with due process of law, and on the payment of 
compensation, which is equivalent to the fair market value of the expropriated investment and 
should be paid without delay and be fully realizable and freely transferable. Unlike NAFTA and 
like many post-NAFTA US PTAs, Annex 10-B of the US-Colombia PTA asserts that a 
government’s nondiscriminatory regulatory actions directed towards the protection of public 
welfare, including public health, safety, and the environment, do not constitute indirect 
																																								 																				
78 The text of the US-Colombia PTA, available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-
agreements/colombia-fta/final-text (accessed 3 December 2015). 
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expropriation.79 This is an important factor, for, as noted earlier (Public Citizen, 2005), 
environmental measures have been regarded as ‘tantamount to expropriation’ by rulings in 
relation to PTAs, such as NAFTA, with significant policy and monetary implications for 
governments.  
In addition, Article 10.9 prohibits performance requirements, including export requirements, 
domestic content requirements, export-to-import ratio requirements, and technology transfer 
requirements.80 Most importantly, Section B of Chapter 10 of the US-Colombia PTA provides 
for investor-state dispute settlement clauses, whereby investors can submit direct claims for 
damages against nation-states at ICSID or UNCITRAL arbitration tribunals.81 This provision, 
according to the Advisory Committee for Trade Policy and Negotiations on the US-Colombia 
PTA, applies not only to investments made after the conclusion of the agreement, but also to 
many types of investment that were made before the agreement went into effect.82 
 
IPRs 
The US-Colombia PTA goes beyond the TRIPS agreement and provides a strong protection of 
all forms of IPRs. The agreement effectively limits the grounds on which a patent can be revoked 
and provides for a strong and state-of-the-art protection of test data (Villarreal, 2014). In general, 
																																								 																				
79 The text of the US-Colombia PTA, available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-
agreements/colombia-fta/final-text (accessed 3 December 2015). 
 
80 The text of the US-Colombia PTA, available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-
agreements/colombia-fta/final-text (accessed 3 December 2015). 
 
81 The text of the US-Colombia PTA, available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-
agreements/colombia-fta/final-text (accessed 3 December 2015). 
 
82 The Advisory Committee for Trade Policy and Negotiations report to the President, the Congress, and the USTR, 
of 20 September 2006, available at 
https://ustr.gov/archive/assets/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Colombia_FTA/Reports/asset_upload_file920_9821.pdf 
(accessed 3 December 2015). 
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‘[t]he intellectual property rights (IPR) provisions of the U.S.-Colombia TPA will likely benefit 
U.S.-based industries that rely on IPR protection and enforcement’ (USITC, 2006a:6-14). 
The strict IPRs rules of the US-Colombia PTA were a result of Colombia’s significantly 
reduced bargaining power vis-à-vis the US, as in wake of Peru’s conclusion of a bilateral deal 
with the US, Colombia had to follow suit and agree on a deal, albeit with restrictive IPRs clauses 
dictated by the US (von Braun, 2012). As recounted by a USTR official (Interview 11), IPRs 
were a contentious issue during the negotiations and one of the reasons for the collapse of the 
US-Andean talks. After the collapse of the US-Andean negotiations, however, Peru’s willingness 
to conclude a bilateral deal with the US made Colombia follow suit, as it could not afford to be 
left out. This was perceived by the US as willingness to compromise and was well exploited by 
the US to extract concessions in IPRs that were hitherto perceived by Colombian negotiators as 
non-negotiable.  
More specifically, Article 16.10 of the US-Colombia PTA provides undisclosed test data 
exclusivity period for at least ten years for new agricultural chemical products and five years for 
new pharmaceutical products. In addition, the article also prohibits the approval of new 
pharmaceutical or agricultural chemical products based on data submitted in another country 
without the consent of the patent holder.83 In fact, test data exclusivity was a contentious issue 
during the negotiations, whereby the US wanted to secure stricter WTO-plus provisions, while 
Colombia would have been better off with terms that resembled more those in TRIPS. Thus, the 
outcome that is strictly WTO-plus reflects the asymmetry of power between the parties, which 
was in part enabled by competitive pressures (von Braun, 2012). The US-Colombia PTA also 
prohibits the approval of generic drugs based on test data available in other countries. Moreover, 
																																								 																				
83 The text of the US-Colombia PTA, available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-
agreements/colombia-fta/final-text (accessed 3 December 2015). 
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‘if a patent expires before the end of these periods of exclusive data use, the government cannot 
approve competitive entry of generic versions.’ This clause could effectively extend the patent 
duration beyond the initially approved period (Maskus, 2006:150-151). 
Article 16.9.6(b) provides that ‘[e]ach Party shall provide the means to and shall, at the 
request of the patent owner, compensate for unreasonable delays in the issuance of a patent.’84 In 
addition, the US-Colombia agreement also provides that Colombia implement measures in its 
marketing approval process ‘to prevent generic drugs from being approved during the term of the 
patent covering the pharmaceutical product (i.e., “linkage”) and requires the mandatory 
disclosure of the identity of the generic applicant seeking marketing approval during the patent 
term’ (USITC, 2006a:6-17). 
After the negotiations were completed, however, a new majority in Congress prompted 
certain changes in the agreements with Colombia and Peru. In line with a document entitled ‘A 
New Trade Agenda for America,’ amendments to the texts of the agreements were made to 
mitigate some of the restrictive language initially incorporated in the IPRs sections of the 
agreements. The changes particularly referred to the abolition of the protection of ‘second-use’ 
patents and reference to the Doha Declaration (von Braun, 2012). 
 
4.5. The US-Peru PTA 
 
The importance of the US-Peru PTA for the Peruvian side was highlighted by the visits of 
Peruvian President Alan Garcia to the US during the early 2000s to meet with President Bush 
and Members of Congress on several occasions and stress the importance of the agreement for 
																																								 																				
84 The text of the US-Colombia PTA, available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-
agreements/colombia-fta/final-text (accessed 3 December 2015). 
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Peru (Villarreal, 2007). The agreement’s importance for Peru derived from, among other things, 
the possible negative consequences of the US-Colombia PTA on the Peruvian economy. The 
Peruvian government was originally hesitant to start PTA negotiations with the US, but after the 
US began PTA talks with Colombia, the Peruvian government understood that it could not afford 
to be left out (Shadlen, 2008). After the US and Colombia announced to begin their negotiations 
on 18 May 2004,85 Peru and Ecuador expressed their desire to join the trade talks for a US-
Andean agreement.86 However, the US-Andean negotiations came to a stalemate, and Colombia 
and Peru negotiated separately with the US (Villarreal, 2007).  
After the collapse of the US-Andean negotiations, Peru decided to negotiate further, although 
it realized that this was going to diminish it negotiating power vis-à-vis the US. As a result, Peru 
concluded its bilateral negotiations with the US in less than a month after the collapse of the US-
Andean talks. The final steps of the negotiations took place with the participation of high-rank 
politicians from Peru, who endorsed the final deal ‘with a presidential promise that it would 
bring six million jobs’ (von Braun, 2012:136). One of the reasons for such a speedy conclusion 
of talks between Peru and the US was that Peru urgently needed the agreement and could not risk 
jeopardizing the deal, fearing that a US deal with its peers in the Andean region would put Peru 
in an unfavorable situation. As a result, Peru’s bilateral negotiations with the US successfully 
concluded in December 2005, and an agreement was signed in April 2006. After ratification in 
both countries, the US-Peru PTA entered into force in February 2009.87  
																																								 																				
85 USTR press release, of 23 March 2004, available at https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-
releases/archives/2004/march/us-and-colombia-begin-fta-negotiations-may- (accessed 3 December 2015). 
 
86 USTR Press Release, of 3 May 2004, available at https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-
releases/archives/2004/may/peru-and-ecuador-join-colombia-may-18-19-laun (accessed 3 December 2015). 
 
87 USTR: http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/peru-tpa (accessed 3 December 2015). 
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Notwithstanding certain minor changes from the initial US position, as accounted by García 
(2008), the US-Peru PTA largely reflects the US position in the US-Andean negotiations that 
failed to be concluded due to irreconcilable differences between the negotiating parties. 
According to the Advisory Committee for Trade Policy and Negotiations, the US-Peru PTA ‘is 
strongly in the interest of the United States,’ which exceeds the achievements in other US North-
South PTAs, such as those with Chile and Central America. The achievements of the agreement 
have been significant enough for the Committee to recommend them as a model for future 
PTAs.88  
Figure 4.5.1. US trade with Peru, in thousand USD, 1981-2013 
 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) data, available at 
http://www.cepal.org/en (accessed 13 November 2014) 
 
Despite its ambitious tariff and non-tariff liberalization, however, due to the small amount of 
trade between the two countries relative to the size of the US economy, the economic effects of 
																																								 																				
88 The Report of the Advisory Committee for Trade Policy and Negotiations on the US-Peru PTA, of 1 February 
2006, p.1, available at 
https://ustr.gov/archive/assets/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Peru_TPA/Reports/asset_upload_file628_8962.pdf 
(accessed 3 December 2015).  
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the US-Peru PTA were estimated to be very small for the US (0.02 per cent of GDP), while for 
Peru it was estimated to be more significant (3.29 per cent of GDP) as the US was Peru’s leading 
trading partner, with 23 per cent of Peru’s exports going to and 16 per cent of Peru’s imports 
coming from the US in 2006 (Villarreal, 2007; USITC, 2006b). The dynamics of US-Peru trade 
is presented in Figure 4.5.1 above. 
The rest of the section looks at the negotiations and outcome of the US-Peru PTA with a 
particular focus on a number of key areas, including tariffs and related measures, agriculture, 
government procurement, trade in services, investment provisions, and IPRs, as outlined in 
Chapter 3.  
 
Tariffs and Related Measures 
Given that Peru already enjoyed preferential unilateral tariff concessions from the US under the 
Andean Trade Preference Act and GSP, tariff elimination as a result of the PTA was going to 
give greater benefits to US exporters compared to their Peruvian counterparts (USITC, 2006b). 
As a result of the US-Peru PTA, duties on 80 per cent of US exports to Peru were going to be 
eliminated immediately. Duties on additional 7 per cent of US exports were to be eliminated in a 
5-year period, while the remaining duties were to be eliminated in 10 years after the agreement 
entered into force. In addition, 99 per cent of US industrial and textile tariff lines were to be 
brought down to zero immediately (including the conversion of concessional zero tariffs to a 
permanent measure) (USITC, 2006b; Villarreal, 2007).  
Subject to the agreement’s rules of origin provisions, all textile and apparel products became 
duty free immediately. This was especially significant for Peru, for the textile and apparel 
industry, which experienced rapid export growth as a result of unilateral duty concession 
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programs granted by the US, was a major employer in the country. As of 2004, two years before 
the signing of the US-Peru PTA, the industry directly employed 150,000 people and indirectly 
350,000. The agreement also provides for a ‘special textile safeguard’ provision for the parties in 
case textile and apparel import surges threaten to damage domestic producers (Villarreal, 2007).  
 
Agriculture 
Agriculture was a contentious issue throughout the negotiations that prompted the US to appoint 
a special agricultural negotiator in the negotiations with Peru to resolve the final provisions 
related to agriculture.89 In addition to the average applied tariff level of 10 per cent, the Peruvian 
government applied a ‘temporary’ tariff surcharge of 5 per cent on agricultural products, in an 
attempt to protect the domestic industry. The Peruvian agricultural industry also benefited 
heavily from the unilateral duty-free schemes granted by the US. As a result, Peruvian 
agricultural exports rose during the first half of the 2000s, and Peru became the world’s leading 
exporter of certain agricultural products, such as asparagus and paprika (Villarreal, 2007).  
As a result of the agreement, the US unilateral concessions would become permanent, and 
the US farmers would gain preferential access to the growing Peruvian market.90 More 
specifically, two-thirds of US agricultural exports to Peru, including high quality beef, cotton, 
wheat, soybeans, and certain fruits and vegetables, were going to become duty-free immediately 
upon the implementation of the agreement, while virtually all of the remaining tariffs, including 
rice and poultry, were going to be eliminated in 15-18 years. At the same time, including the 
																																								 																				
89 Summaries of the rounds of US-Peru (US-Andean) PTA negotiations provided by the Organization of American 
States, available at http://www.sice.oas.org/TPD/AND_USA/per_usa_e.asp (accessed 3 December 2015).  
 
90 A statement by USTR Schwab on the singing of the US-Peru PTA, December 14, 2007, available at 
https://ustr.gov/archive/Document_Library/Press_Releases/2007/December/Statement_by_USTR_Schwab_on_toda
ys_signing_of_the_US_Peru_Trade_Promotion_Agreement.html (accessed 3 December 2015). 
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temporary unilateral tariff concessions that would become permanent as a result of the PTAs, 89 
per cent of US agricultural tariff lines for imports from Peru were going to become duty-free 
immediately upon the implementation of the agreements. Protection on most of the remaining 
product lines was to be phased out over 10 to 17 years. Certain agricultural products in the US, 
however, would have permanent protection, which were not to be affected by the US-Peru 
agreement. Sugar, for example, was going to be protected by tariff-rate quotas in the US even 
after the full implementation of the US-Peru PTA (USITC, 2006b; Villarreal, 2007).  
 
Government Procurement 
Unlike the US, Peru was not a member of the WTO Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) 
at the time of the PTA negotiations. Thus, the government procurement provisions of the US-
Peru PTA were going to produce new commitments, especially for the Andean country. More 
specifically, the PTA intended to expand government procurement opportunities for the parties 
by expanding the list of central and sub-central government entities covered in procurement 
provisions and by providing national treatment to each other’s firms (Article 9.2).91 The 
government procurement chapter also includes the purchases of state-owned enterprises in Peru, 
including the country’s oil company and public health insurance agency, a major buyer of 
pharmaceuticals (Villarreal, 2007).  
Government procurement clauses of the US-Peru PTA are covered under Chapter 9 and 
Annex 9.1, which provide access to the procurements of both central and sub-central government 
entities. The threshold for the procurement of goods and services for central governmental 
entities is about four times higher than in other US North-South PTAs, such as with Chile, 
																																								 																				
91 The text of the US-Peru PTA, available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/peru-
tpa/final-text (accessed 3 December 2015).  
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Singapore, and Central America, and about twice higher than in the agreement with Korea.92 
Annex 9.1 of the US-Peru PTA lists the thresholds of procurement contacts as follows: 
 
Table 4.5.1. Government procurement thresholds of the US-Peru PTA 
Procurement by 
Central government 
entities, in USD 
Procurement by sub-
central government 
entities, in USD 
Construction contracts 
by Central government 
entities, in USD 
Construction 
contracts by sub-
central government 
entities, in USD 
193,000 526,000 7,407,000 7,407,000 
Source: Annex 9.1 of the US-Peru PTA93 
 
Trade in Services 
The liberalization of trade in services in the US-Peru PTA was comprehensive, going much 
beyond the WTO GATS agreement. The agreements calls for a ‘negative list’ approach in 
services liberalization, which extended the coverage of the agreement over services sectors, such 
as real estate services, construction services, environmental services, and pipeline transport 
services, not covered under the GATS agreement (USITC, 2006b). 
Among other things, US financial services suppliers and portfolio managers acquired equal 
rights with local firms to establish branches and subsidiaries in Peru, as well as access to its 
privatized social security market. Other key industries affected by the agreements include 
telecommunications, financial services, energy services, transport services, construction and 
engineering services, professional services, and environmental services. In telecommunications, 
for example, the US-Peru PTA prevents local companies from having preferential access to 
																																								 																				
92 The text of the US-Peru PTA, available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/peru-
tpa/final-text (accessed 3 December 2015). 
 
93 The text of the US-Peru PTA, available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/peru-
tpa/final-text (accessed 3 December 2015). 
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telecommunications networks, and calls for guaranteed reasonable and non-discriminatory access 
for all network users94 (USITC, 2006b; Villarreal, 2007). 
The liberalization of services was quite comprehensive and an achievement for the US, as it 
was going to reap major benefits from free trade in services. Extracting concessions from Peru in 
trade in service turned out to be not as problematic, for driven by the urge of completing a deal 
with the US as soon as possible, Peru was willing to concede in areas where the US had special 
interests, including in trade in services (Interview 11). 
 
Investment Measures 
Peru’s investment laws had some limitations that concerned US investors. Among other things, 
Peruvian law required majority ownership of broadcast media to Peruvian citizens and a limit (to 
30 per cent) of foreign workers employed in local companies. The US-Peru PTA was to 
liberalize investment measures through TRIMS-plus provisions among the parties (Villarreal, 
2007). The US-Peru agreement successfully tore down all the barriers concerning US investors, 
providing comprehensive investment provisions. The US-Peru PTA goes further than earlier 
concluded US North-South PTAs by, among other things, providing for ‘third party arbitration 
for investor-state disputes not only for investments concluded after the agreement goes into 
effect, but also for many types of investments that pre-date the agreement.’95 
																																								 																				
94 USTR summary of the US-Peru PTA, available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/factsheets/2007/asset_upload_file672_13066.pdf (accessed 3 
December 2015). 
 
95 The Report of the Advisory Committee for Trade Policy and Negotiations on the US-Peru PTA, of 1February 
2006, p.5, available at 
https://ustr.gov/archive/assets/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Peru_TPA/Reports/asset_upload_file628_8962.pdf 
(accessed 3 December 2015).  
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More specifically, Articles 10.3 and 10.4 of the US-Peru PTA establish provisions regulating 
investment-related measures, calling for ‘National Treatment’ and ‘Most-Favored Nation 
Treatment’ that establish the treatment of investors of a Party no less favorably than their own 
investors, as well as investors from a non-Party.96 Article 10.7 prevents any direct nationalization 
or expropriation of investment or indirect measures ‘equivalent to expropriation or 
nationalization,’ except for a public purpose, in a non-discriminatory manner, in accordance with 
due process of law, and on the payment of compensation, which is equivalent to the fair market 
value of the expropriated investment and should be paid without delay and be fully realizable 
and freely transferable. Unlike NAFTA and like many post-NAFTA US PTAs, Annex 10-B of 
the US-Peru PTA asserts that a government’s nondiscriminatory regulatory actions directed 
towards the protection of public welfare, including public health, safety, and the environment, do 
not constitute indirect expropriation.97 In addition, Article 10.9 prohibits performance 
requirements, including export requirements, domestic content requirements, export-to-import 
ratio requirements, and technology transfer requirements.98 
Most importantly, Section B of the Chapter 10 of the US-Peru PTA provides for investor-
state dispute settlement clauses, whereby investors can submit direct claims for damages against 
nation-states at ICSID or UNCITRAL arbitration tribunals.99 This provision, according to the 
Advisory Committee for Trade Policy and Negotiations on the US-Peru PTA, applies not only to 
																																								 																				
96 The text of the US-Peru PTA, available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/peru-
tpa/final-text (accessed 3 December 2015). 
 
97 The text of the US-Peru PTA, available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/peru-
tpa/final-text (accessed 3 December 2015). 
 
98 The text of the US-Peru PTA, available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/peru-
tpa/final-text (accessed 3 December 2015). 
 
99 The text of the US-Peru PTA, available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/peru-
tpa/final-text (accessed 3 December 2015). 
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investments made after the conclusion of the agreement, but also to many types of investment 
that were made before the agreement went into effect.100 
Although Peru was initially reluctant to provide such heavy concessions in investment 
protection fearing that strong PTA provisions would undermine national laws regulating 
investment, it eventually agreed, especially after the negotiations went bilateral in the wake of 
the collapse of the US-Andean talks. The swiftly concluded bilateral talks entailed lots of 
concessions from the Peruvian side, including in investment measures, as Peru was determined 
to conclude the talks with the US as soon as possible, fearing of being frozen out of integration 
with the US, if its competitors got ahead of it and signed preferential deals with the US 
(Interview 11). 
 
IPRs 
The IPRs were among the most contentious issues in the US-Andean negotiations and the US-
Peru talks that derived from it.101 The IPRs chapter of the US-Peru PTA was designed to provide 
a state-of-the-art protection of all forms of intellectual property, including stronger protection of 
patents and tougher punishment for piracy and counterfeiting.102 The terms agreed on as a result 
of the US-Peru negotiations in the wake of the breakdown of the US-Andean talks turned out to 
be quite in line with US preferences and with possible negative consequences for the Peruvian 
																																								 																				
100 The Report of the Advisory Committee for Trade Policy and Negotiations on the US-Peru PTA, February 1, 
2006, p.5, available at 
https://ustr.gov/archive/assets/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Peru_TPA/Reports/asset_upload_file628_8962.pdf 
(accessed 3 December 2015). 
 
101 The summaries of the rounds of US-Peru PTA negotiations provided the Organization of American States, 
available at http://www.sice.oas.org/TPD/AND_USA/per_usa_e.asp (accessed 3 December 2015). 
 
102 USTR summary of the US-Peru PTA, page 6, available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/factsheets/2007/asset_upload_file672_13066.pdf (accessed 3 
December 2015). 
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public healthcare sector. According to a staff member of the Peruvian Ministry of Health, the 
Minister, realizing she could not prevent the ratification of an unfavorable agreement, ‘agreed to 
endorse the agreement under a condition of a side payment’ from the Presidency that was to 
compensate the public health sector for medicine price increases as a result of the PTA. The 
Presidency, motivated by inking a deal with the US as soon as possible, agreed to make painful 
concessions, including in IPRs, notwithstanding the anticipated negative consequences on public 
health (von Braun, 2012:136).  
Article 16.10 of the US-Peru PTA provides undisclosed test data exclusivity period for at 
least ten years for new agricultural chemical products and five years for new pharmaceutical 
products. In addition, the article also prohibits the approval of new pharmaceutical or agricultural 
chemical products based on data submitted in another country without the consent of the patent 
holder.103 The cost of the adoption of a full data exclusivity regime in Peru was estimated to be 
more than USD 34 million during the first year alone, USD 29 million of which was to be 
covered by the consumers. This number was estimated to reach as high as USD 170 million by 
year 13. These are considerable amounts compared to the size of the Peruvian pharmaceutical 
market, which was at around USD 650 million at the time of the impact estimation (Health 
Ministry of Peru, 2005; von Braun, 2012).  
The US-Peru PTA provides for a mechanism, according to which, ‘[i]f Peru relies on U.S. 
FDA approval of a given drug, and meets certain conditions for expeditious approval of that drug 
in Peru, the period of data protection will be concurrent with the term of protection provided in 
																																								 																				
103 The text of the US-Peru PTA, available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/peru-
tpa/final-text (accessed 3 December 2015). 
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the United States.’104 Notwithstanding the shift in US trade policy towards greater sensitivity to 
public health concerns in global IPR rules, especially in the PTAs with Peru, Panama, and 
Colombia, other TRIPS-plus elements in the US-Peru PTA were not improved substantially and 
mostly resemble the restrictive clauses found in other US North-South PTAs, such as CAFTA-
DR (Fink, 2011). 
Debates on the restrictive nature of the IPRs section of the US-Peru PTA highlighted the 
harsh data exclusivity clauses of the agreement that ‘would have delayed the availability of 
generic pharmaceuticals in the Peruvian market for at least five years, even if the patent had 
already expired’ (Villarreal, 2007:16). It was estimated that the US-Peru PTA would limit access 
to medicine in Peru by limiting the share of more affordable generic drugs in the country. 
Moreover, in thirteen years after the implementation of the agreement, the prices of some 
medical products would increase by as much as 132 per cent, and within the first five years of 
the implementation of the agreement, ‘between 700,000 and 900,000 people will be excluded 
each year from receiving medicines’ (Health Ministry of Peru, 2005:3). 
The negotiations over IPRs were arguably the most contentious during the negotiations. IPRs 
were the main point of disagreement that caused the stalemate and eventually the collapse of the 
US-Andean talks. The Peruvian side did not want to concede in this area, given the estimated 
negative consequences of the IPRs measures on public health in Peru. For the US, on the other 
hand, as the main producer of intellectual property, strong IPRs clauses were of huge 
importance. The stalemate was eventually resolved in the favor of the US, after the Peruvian 
government, feared of being left out in case the US signed preferential deals with its competitors, 
expressed strong commitment for a bilateral deal with the US in the wake of the collapse of the 
																																								 																				
104 USTR summary of the US-Peru PTA, page 6, available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/factsheets/2007/asset_upload_file672_13066.pdf (accessed 3 
December 2015). 
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US-Andean talks. The US took advantage of the situation and extracted the concessions it 
needed to incorporate IPRs measures in the agreement in line with its preferences, 
notwithstanding their estimated negative effects on Peru (Interview 11; von Braun, 2012). 
 
4.6. Concluding Remarks 
 
The US interest in regional and bilateral trade agreements emerged in the late 1980s, as a result 
of which NAFTA was signed in the early 1990s. The bulk of the US regional and bilateral trade 
agreements, however, were signed during the 2000s, when USTR Robert Zoellick took 
advantage of the TPA Act of 2002 and concluded a number of North-South PTAs, including with 
Chile, Korea, Colombia, and Peru. This was largely motivated by the stalemate in multilateral 
trade liberalization starting from the early 2000s. A new era of US active engagement in regional 
trade negotiations appears to have emerged in 2015, whereby bolstered by the passage of the 
TPA Act of 2015, the US concluded the TPP with 11 other Pacific Rim countries on October 5, 
2015 and has been actively negotiating the TTIP with the EU (Sahakyan, 2015).  
The US has largely been a path-breaker in promoting trade liberalization in other parts of the 
world, with a pro-active approach to sign North-South PTAs to get ahead of other developed 
economies and establish preferential trade rules in line with its preferences and priorities (Schott, 
2001). This has been the case in the first-order negotiations with Mexico, Korea, Colombia, and 
Peru, while in the second-order negotiations with Chile, the US was, among other things, 
motivated by redressing its declining positions in Chile that had resulted because of Chile’s 
active involvement in preferential trade relations with a range of third parties, most importantly 
the EU.  
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This chapter has provided a comprehensive assessment of the US first-order negotiations 
with Mexico (NAFTA), Korea, Colombia, and Peru, as well as the second-order negotiations 
with Chile. Based on the assessment conducted in this chapter, Table 4.6.1 provides a measure of 
restrictiveness of the five US North-South PTAs from the standpoint of US counterpart 
developing and emerging economies. Based on the assessment, a value from 1 to 10 (1 is least 
restrictive, 10 is most restrictive) is assigned to each area of North-South cooperation discussed 
in Chapter 3 and outlined in the table. 
 
Table 4.6.1. An overview of US North-South PTAs 
PTA 
Order 
of the 
PTA 
Tariffs 
(including 
agriculture) and 
Related 
Measures 
Government 
Procurement Services Investment IPRs 
NAFTA first 9 9 10 10 10 
US-Chile second 4 7 9 9 8 
US-Korea first 9 5 10 9 10 
US-Peru first 10 10 10 9 10 
US-Colombia first 10 10 10 9 10 
 
The overall picture of the outcomes of US North-South PTAs depicted in Table 4.6.1 
represents the agreements’ general restrictiveness for developing and emerging economies. Such 
outcomes do not appear surprising as the negotiations of most US North-South PTAs took place 
against the backdrop of vivid asymmetry between the negotiating partners. This asymmetry has 
been efficiently exploited by USTR Robert Zoellick (2002) to foster ‘competitive liberalization’ 
among US trading partners contrary to their prior policies.  
The politics of competitive liberalization have been characterized by pressures on Southern 
countries to sign deals with industrialized Northern countries under the threat of losing vital 
access to the markets of rich economies while their competitors enjoy preferential treatment. As 
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a result of this pressure, Southern countries have been forced to give up policy autonomy in a 
number of areas and end up with restricted policy space under North-South PTAs in return to 
vital access to the markets of Northern countries. Hence the restrictive nature of the US North-
South PTAs discussed in this chapter and outlined in Table 4.6.1.  
NAFTA is a vivid example of a PTA with strong asymmetry between the negotiating parties, 
negotiated under the pressure of ‘competitive liberalization.’ Mexico’s decision to join the 
NAFTA agreement was, among other things, largely determined by the power asymmetry 
between the US and Mexico, whereby the US managed to marginalize Mexico, making it choose 
between a restrictive NAFTA agreement (which would squeeze its development policy space) 
and being left out while its competitors enjoyed preferential access to the lucrative US market. 
Mexico could not afford the latter option and had to agree to a NAFTA agreement on terms 
largely dictated by the US (Gruber, 2000). The Mexican government initially did not view 
NAFTA positively, which as late as 1988, was a policy option it did not even consider. The 
change of attitude inspired by the fear of being left out of North American integration not only 
made Mexico embrace NAFTA, but also made it agree to hitherto unacceptable provisions 
largely dictated by the US. More specifically, Mexico conceded in a number of key provisions, 
including duty drawbacks and other tariff-related areas, government procurement, trade in 
services, investment measures, and IPRs. As a result, NAFTA turned out be strictly WTO-plus 
with outcomes that clearly favored US interests. Such an outcome was possible by the setting of 
the negotiations, whereby the US efficiently exploited Mexico’s fear of being left out of North 
American integration and pushed for deep liberalization in line with its priorities (Maxfield and 
Shapiro, 1998; Cameron and Tomlin, 2000; Hufbauer and Schott, 2005; Interview 10).  
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The second-order US-Chile PTA, on the other hand, was negotiated in a different setting. 
Having completed the negotiations with the EU, Chile approached the second-order talks with 
the US, having already secured preferential access to the EU market. In such conditions, feeling 
left out was not a major concern for Chile, although it was hugely interested in a PTA with the 
US. The US, on the other hand, approached the talks with Chile with a priority to level the 
playing field for US exporters and investors in Chile vis-à-vis, first of all, their European 
competitors.105 The declining US share in Chilean imports was a primary motivation for US 
negotiators to conclude a deal with Chile as soon as possible.106   
 The US-Chile agreement turned out to be restrictive for Chile in a number of areas, 
including government procurement, trade in services, investment protection, and IPRs. However, 
Chile managed to secure favorable conditions in tariff measures, including in agriculture. 
Moreover, notwithstanding the general restrictive nature of the agreement, Chile managed to 
counter US negotiators in a number of areas, including in investment and IPRs, whereby Chile 
managed to push the US to mitigate some of the strong wording seen in other US North-South 
PTAs. Most importantly, Chile insisted on and managed to secure some leeway in IPRs 
provisions that appear to be lighter in the US-Chile agreement compared to other US North-
South agreements negotiated simultaneously. Some of these ‘shortcomings’ of the US-Chile 
PTA were also acknowledged by USTR officials.107 Chile’s ability to counter some of the US 
																																								 																				
105 A statement by the US House of Representatives (Statement on How the United States-Chile Free Trade 
Agreement Serves the Interests of United States Commerce), available at 
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/media/pdf/chile/hr2738docbenefitschilefta.pdf (accessed 8 October, 2014).  
 
106 A statement by the US House of Representatives (Statement on How the United States-Chile Free Trade 
Agreement Serves the Interests of United States Commerce), available at 
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/media/pdf/chile/hr2738docbenefitschilefta.pdf (accessed 8 October, 2014).  
 
107 USTR Trade Advisory Committee Report, p.2-3, Feb 2003, available at 
https://ustr.gov/archive/assets/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Chile_FTA/Reports/asset_upload_file799_4936.pdf 
(accessed 3 December 2015). 
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initial positions and extract compromises was, among other things, attributed to its enhanced 
bargaining power that was enabled by its wide network of PTAs, including with the EU, and the 
determination of US negotiators to seal a deal with Chile as soon as possible, to redress the 
declining positions of the US in Chile (Roffe, 2004; Interview 10).  
The first-order US-Korea PTA was negotiated under conditions similar to that of NAFTA, 
whereby Korea felt the compelling need to sign a PTA with the US in order to counter 
competitors that had started to challenge it in the American market. An agreement between the 
US and Korea was long overdue, given the considerable trade volumes between the countries, 
but the talks were held back by the lobby from uncompetitive industries in Korea, such as 
agriculture and financial services (Koo, 2006). The US was not hurrying to start talks with Korea 
either, for Korea was not ready to compromise in important areas, such as agriculture (Schott et 
al, 2006). The mounting competitive pressures, however, eventually made Korea consider 
painful concessions, including in sensitive areas, as the absence of preferential access to the US 
market was becoming increasingly costly for competitive businesses in Korea. As a result, taking 
advantage of the favorable circumstances enabled by Korea’s urge to complete the trade talks as 
soon as possible, the US managed to achieve most of its negotiating targets, including in 
agriculture, trade in services, and IPRs, notwithstanding the fact that some of these concessions 
were estimated to have negative economic consequences in Korea (Interview 12). 
As reflected in Table 4.6.1, the outcomes of the US-Colombia and US-Peru PTAs have been 
almost identical with similar restrictive impact on the policy space in the two Andean countries. 
The negotiations of the first-order US-Colombia and US-Peru PTAs took place against the 
backdrop of competitive pressures brought about by stiff competition between the Andean 
countries. The US-Colombia talks triggered action from Peru and Ecuador, who could not afford 
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to be left out, while Colombian exports enjoyed preferential access to the US market. As a result, 
the three Andean countries started to negotiate an Andean agreement with the US (Shadlen, 
2008). After the US-Andean talks came to a stalemate and collapsed due to irreconcilable 
differences between the priorities of the parties, the US went bilateral first with Peru and then 
with Colombia. Peru’s willingness to complete its bilateral talks with the US, motivated by the 
need to establish preferential trade ties with the US as soon as possible, triggered actions from 
Colombia. Both countries were very wary that the resumption of the talks, albeit bilateral, with 
the US was going to diminish their bargaining powers and they would have to concede in a 
number of important areas, including in agriculture and IPRs, where they had been successful to 
confront the US during the US-Andean talks (von Braun, 2012). However, being left out for 
either of the Andean countries, given the other’s conclusion of talks with the US, was the least 
acceptable outcome, which neither Colombia nor Peru could afford. As a result, the US was swift 
to extract the concessions from both Colombia and Peru it failed to achieve during the US-
Andean talks. More specifically, both Colombia and Peru made painful compromises in 
important areas, such as agriculture, trade in services, investment, and IPRs, notwithstanding the 
Andean countries’ initial stance of more moderate liberalization in these areas (Interview 11).   
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5. An Assessment of EU North-South PTAs: A Comparative Overview 
 
The EU’s trade policy has change dramatically over the last quarter century. During the 1990s, a 
decade that saw the completion of the Uruguay Round of negotiations and the formation of the 
WTO, the EU was a strong supporter of multilateral trade liberalization. With some exceptions, 
such as the agreements with Mexico and Chile which were motivated by the relative decline of 
the EU’s positions in Latin America vis-à-vis the US and negotiated in the late 1990s and early 
2000s, the EU’s regional and bilateral options were put ‘on hold.’ Once multilateral talks stalled 
and the prospects of the Doha Round of negotiations became gloomy in the early 2000s, the EU 
started to look at bilateral and regional alternatives to multilateral trade liberalization (Interview 
1; Interview 4; Interview 7).  
Initially, the EU prioritized region-to-region negotiations with established regional blocs, 
such as ASEAN and Mercosur, over bilateral talks with individual countries. However, this 
approach, termed ‘interregionalism’ by Aggarwal and Fogarty (2004), did not prove very 
successful. With ASEAN, for example, the negotiations started in 2007 but failed to be 
concluded because of the different levels of development among the ASEAN countries, which 
led to diverging priorities and expectations from an agreement with the EU. The negotiations 
with the bloc eventually stalled in 2009. Starting in 2010, the EU pursued bilateral agreements 
with individual ASEAN countries. The negotiations with Singapore108 and Malaysia started in 
2010 and with Vietnam in 2012. The negotiations with Mercosur, another well-established 
regional bloc, did not prove to be successful either. Launched in 1999, the trade talks with 
Mercosur stalled in 2004. Although the EU did not go bilateral with the members of Mercosur, 
																																								 																				
108 The negotiations of the EU-Singapore PTA were concluded on 16 December 2012 (European Commission 
Memo of 16 December 2012, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-1380_en.htm (accessed 3 
December 2015)).  
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the negotiations with the bloc resumed only six years later in 2010 and are still under way 
(Interview 4; Interview 5; Interview 7; Interview 8).  
The EU approach, a synthesis of ‘market-driven globalism and politically-driven 
regionalism,’ has been shaped by factors such as the interests of domestic actors and competition 
with other major powers (Aggarwal and Fogarty, 2004: 2; Woolcock, 2007). As discussed in 
earlier chapters, the proliferation of North-South PTAs during the last quarter century has created 
competition between developed economies in third markets. The expansion of US PTAs starting 
from the 2000s has produced competitive pressures and has triggered a reaction from the EU, 
which, in order to protect the interests of its firms in third markets, has negotiated its own North-
South PTAs (Interview 1; Interview 4; Interview 6). Given the high volume of EU preferential 
trade starting from the mid-2000s, a vector of discriminative pressure has emerged, pointing 
towards the US. The EU trade policy shift towards regionalism coincided with the expiration of 
the TPA in the US in 2007, which hindered the process of concluding trade agreements for the 
US.109 The EU’s proactive stance has left the Obama Administration with the need for counter 
measures to avoid losing an export market share to the EU (Ahearn, 2011; Economist, 2014a).  
The EU trade policy is multi-layered. The motivations behind trade policy towards future EU 
members and close neighbors, as well as near-bordering countries  (e.g., the Balkan and 
Mediterranean countries), are both economic and political, such as helping countries prepare for 
possible EU accession and ensuring political stability at the EU’s doorstep. In addition, the EU 
extends unilateral one-way preferences to least developed countries in the Africa, Caribbean, and 
Pacific regions and provides concessions through the GSP. On the other hand, the agreements 
with distant countries and regions—the main focus of this thesis—aim at neutralizing adverse 
																																								 																				
109 The TPA legislation was renewed only eight years later, in June 2015, with the view to complete the TPP and 
TTIP negotiations (Press Statement of the US Department of State, available at 
http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2015/06/244361.htm, accessed 3 December 2015).  
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effects of other North-South PTAs and levelling the playing field for European multinationals in 
their overseas operations (Panagariya, 2002; Ahearn, 2011).  
The objectives of the EU’s new trade agenda, as outlined in the European Commission’s 
‘Global Europe’ Communication released on 4 October 2006, include opening up new markets 
through PTAs by moving beyond the reduction of tariffs and tackling non-tariff barriers in the 
‘new areas of growth,’ including IPRs, investment, and services. With stronger provisions in 
these areas, the new PTAs ‘need to be comprehensive and ambitious in coverage, aiming at the 
highest possible degree of trade liberalization’ (European Commission, 2006:11). This agenda, 
as noted above, has been pursued against the backdrop of discriminative pressures induced by 
the proliferation of North-South PTAs. Moreover, by reacting to such pressures and pursuing its 
own counter-agreements, the EU has itself put pressure on other developed countries, 
particularly the US and Japan, thus augmenting the discrimination-driven proliferation of PTAs 
(Interview 1; Interview 6).  
The remaining parts of this chapter attempt to account for the role of discriminative pressures 
in EU PTA negotiations with emerging and developing countries, particularly Mexico, Chile, 
Korea, Colombia, and Peru, and assess the outcomes of the EU’s first-order and second-order 
North-South PTAs from the viewpoint of EU trade partners. The assessments seek to establish 
whether second-order agreements are substantively different from first-order North-South PTAs 
and whether the differences in second-order agreements, if any, are due to the availability of 
first-order North-South PTAs. The evaluation of the contents of the EU’s first-order and second-
order North-South PTAs is carried out based on the criteria outlined in Chapter 3 and is 
summarized in Chapter 5.5.  
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5.1. The EU-Mexico PTA 
 
The PTA negotiations between the EU and Mexico started in the mid-1990s and an agreement 
was signed in 1997, entering into force in 2000. Among the EU’s primary motivations behind an 
agreement with Mexico was to level the playing field for European multinationals competing 
with American companies in the region, which, enabled by the NAFTA provisions, were 
enjoying a ‘significant competitive advantage’ over European firms (Dür, 2007:842; Ahearn 
2011). The EU was worried about potential ‘considerable trade diversion’ as a result of NAFTA 
that would especially affect the services, auto, and chemical industries in the EU. The lobbying 
from these industries was among major factors behind the EU’s willingness to sign its first PTA 
across the Atlantic (Manger 2009:15). Figure 5.1.1 below illustrated the dynamics of the EU-25–
Mexico trade. 
 
Figure 5.1.1. The EU-25 trade with Mexico, in thousand USD, 2000-2013 
 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) data, available at 
http://www.cepal.org/en (accessed 21 November 2014) 
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The EU’s share of Mexico’s total trade slipped from around 11 per cent in the beginning of 
the 1990s to about 6.5 per cent in 2001 (Reiter, 2003; Espach, 2006). Ironically, the trade 
between the EU and Mexico grew in absolute terms more in the second half of the 1990s, when 
NAFTA was already in force, than in the early 1990s, but in relative terms it was steadily 
declining throughout the 1990s (Reiter, 2003). According to Dür (2007:838), NAFTA was one of 
the ‘key causes’ of the EU’s declining share in Mexico’s imports during the 1990s.  
European firms exporting to or operating in Mexico felt the discriminative effects of 
NAFTA110 and mobilized to push the EU to sign a trade deal with Mexico. As a result, the EU 
declared that ‘the existence of NAFTA risks hampering or even eroding economic relations with 
Mexico in the medium term’ (cited in Dür, 2007:842), thus the need for a counter-agreement 
became more compelling (Dür, 2007). According to EU trade officials (Interview 1; Interview 
2), NAFTA had a significant impact on the EU’s intentions to start trade talks with Mexico and 
conclude the negotiations as soon as possible. One the one hand, NAFTA gave EU negotiators 
an idea of the type of liberalization they could demand from Mexico. On the other hand, 
however, the ‘NAFTA factor’ enhanced Mexico’s negotiating position, which it exploited very 
well. 
Mexico, on the other hand, was willing to lessen its dependence on the US economy, which 
had historically been very high even before NAFTA (see Figure 4.1.1 in Chapter 4.1). The 
diversification of Mexico’s trade away from the US and towards other regions, including 
Western Europe and East Asia, failed in the late 1980s, leading Mexico to reinforce its economic 
ties with the US by signing the NAFTA agreement in 1992 (Feinberg 2003). After NAFTA 
completed, however, other developed countries, particularly the EU, felt their positions in 
																																								 																				
110 According to Busse et al. (2000:8), the share of the EU-15’s trade with Mexico diminished from 15.5 per cent in 
1990 to 6.4 per cent in 1998, and this ‘dramatic decline’ was reflecting NAFTA’s coming into effect.   
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Mexico deteriorating and, lobbied by local export industries, put every effort to sign an 
agreement with Mexico to, among other things, level the playing field for their multinationals 
vis-à-vis American firms (Manger 2009; Interview 1; Interview 2).  
Thus, the negotiations of the second-order EU-Mexico PTA took place against the 
background of the EU losing its market share in Mexico because of NAFTA. Meanwhile, 
Mexico, unlike during the NAFTA negotiations, was not feeling any competitive pressures it 
could not ignore. The EU not only did not have the means to exert power over Mexico by 
threatening to preclude Mexico’s preferential access to its market, but was itself feeling under 
pressure because of its diminishing market share in Mexico. The rest of the section looks at the 
process and outcome of the EU-Mexico PTA negotiations in a number of key areas, including 
tariff and related measures, agriculture, government procurement, trade in services, investment 
measures, and IPRs, as outlined in Chapter 3.  
 
Tariffs and Related Measures 
The EU-Mexico agreement called for the immediate abolition of 82 per cent of EU tariff lines for 
Mexican manufacturing exports, while the remaining 18 per cent were to be phased out by 2003. 
In return, Mexico was to eliminate its customs duties in a slightly longer period of time. 47 per 
cent of the tariff lines were to be abolished immediately, another 5 per cent by 2003, while the 
remaining tariffs were to phase out by 2007. Although Mexico had a slightly longer phase-out 
period for tariff elimination, it agreed to cap its tariff levels for manufactured imports from the 
EU at 5 per cent by 2003. A slightly different schedule was agreed for auto tariffs. Mexico 
agreed to reduce them from 20 per cent to 3.3 per cent immediately, and abolish them altogether 
by 2003 (Schott and Oegg, 2001; Villarreal, 2012). 
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Agriculture 
The agricultural industry in Europe, which has been relying on the EU’s protection, lobbied 
against trade liberalization with countries and trade blocs, such as Mercosur, that had big and 
competitive agriculture and agro-processing industries. It rather preferred bilateral deals with 
smaller countries, such as Chile, and countries that had a less competitive agriculture sector, such 
as Mexico (Faust, 2004). Agricultural liberalization was partial in the EU-Mexico PTA, mostly 
due to the opposition from the strong agricultural lobby in the EU. Only about 60 per cent of 
agricultural product lines were to be eliminated in the EU within ten years, while the remaining 
product lines, including sugar, dairy, beef, and grains, were kept out of the agreement. Mexico, 
on the other hand, was to liberalize 68 per cent of its agricultural tariff lines within ten years, 
keeping the rest out of the agreement. However, limited liberalization of key export categories, 
such as wine and spirits for the EU and concentrated orange juice and avocados for Mexico, was 
also included in the agreement (Schott and Oegg, 2001; Cheong and Cho, 2007; Villarreal, 
2012). Notwithstanding the opposition in the EU, however, agricultural liberalization went 
beyond what the EU initially intended and it played an important role in the conclusion of the 
agreement. Given the importance of agricultural market access for Mexico and the push from 
pro-PTA industries in the EU, which were feeling their positions in Mexico deteriorating as a 
result of NAFTA, the EU had to agree on a number of important concessions in agriculture. 
Thus, although the EU initially opted for strictly modest concessions in agriculture, it had to go 
much further than that as the need to secure a deal with Mexico was becoming much compelling 
(Interview 2; Interview 9).  
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In sum, although agricultural liberalization was only partial due to strong opposition in the 
EU and the sensitivity of certain agricultural products in both parties, Mexico managed to win 
important agricultural concession from the EU, which was compelled to provide them under the 
pressure from EU export-oriented industries lobbying for an expedited conclusion of the EU-
Mexico PTA to level their playing field with competitors from the US (Interview 2; Interview 9). 
 
Government Procurement 
The government procurement chapter of the EU-Mexico PTA did not turn out to be very 
ambitious. It left out sub-federal government entities, which was an achievement for Mexico, as, 
unlike the EU, it was not a member of the WTO GPA, which covers both federal and sub-federal 
procurements (Reiter, 2003). The thresholds for Mexico turned out to be similar with those found 
in NAFTA. The only difference was that the threshold for the procurement of federal 
government entities was negotiated twice higher than in NAFTA, which was to provide 
additional protection for local bidders in Mexico. The government procurement thresholds of the 
EU-Mexico PTA are presented in Table 5.1.1 below. 
 
Table 5.1.1. Government procurement thresholds of the EU-Mexico PTA 
 Procurement by 
federal 
government 
entities 
Procurement by 
federal 
government 
enterprises 
Construction 
contracts by 
federal 
government 
entities 
Construction 
contracts by 
federal 
government 
enterprises 
For the EU SDR 130,000 SDR 400,000 SDR 5,000,000 SRD 5,000,000 
For Mexico USD 100,000 USD 250,000 USD 6,500,000 USD 8,000,000 
Source: Annex X of the EU-Mexico PTA111 
 
																																								 																				
111 Annex X of EU-Mexico PTA, available at 
http://www.sice.oas.org/Trade/MEX_EU/English/Decisions_Council/Dec2_Annexes_e/Annex_10_e.pdf (accessed 
3 December 2015). 
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Trade in Services 
The EU-Mexico agreement goes beyond the GATS agreement and has been argued to provide 
European service providers access to Mexico that is on par with NAFTA in a number of areas, 
including financial services, energy, telecommunications, and tourism (Reveles and Rocha, 
2007; Villarreal, 2012). In addition to including ‘MFN treatment’ and ‘national treatment’ 
clauses, as well as strong market access provisions, the EU-Mexico Joint Council decision 
includes strong wording on the definition of ‘service suppliers’ as a ‘person of a Party that seeks 
to provide or provides a service.’112 In a number of areas, however, the agreement falls short of 
matching NAFTA provisions. Pursuant to Article 6 of the EU-Mexico PTA, a decision of the 
EU-Mexico Joint Council provides for explicit exclusion of certain type of services (e.g., audio-
visual services), while the question of inclusion or exclusion of specific services was to be 
concluded at a later stage through additional negotiations of commitments113 (Mattoo and Sauvé, 
2011), thus leaving much of the regulation of trade in services to the GATS agreement.  
Trade in services was one of the sectors, which the EU was especially interested in. This was 
one of the sectors where the EU had to push for NAFTA-like clauses, acknowledging that it 
could concede in other areas, such as agriculture, where the stakes for Mexico were high. 
Nevertheless, EU negotiators could not go all the way and break Mexico’s resistance to stricter 
NAFTA-like causes in trade in services and had to agree on a final deal that does not entirely 
reflect its initial intentions. An important factor for the EU’s failure to secure the provisions it 
initially intended was the combination of the increasing pressure on EU companies and Mexico’s 
																																								 																				
112 Decision Nº 2/2001 of the EU-Mexico Joint Council of 27 February 2001, available at 
http://www.sice.oas.org/Trade/MEX_EU/English/Decisions_Council/2_2001_e.asp (accessed 3 December 2015). 
 
113 The EU-Mexico agreement, unlike most PTAs that adopt either positive or negative list approach in the 
liberalization of services, has produced a standstill over the negotiations of services. As a result, services were 
agreed to be negotiated at a later stage (Mattoo and Sauvé, 2011). 
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enhanced bargaining power, both of which were a direct result of NAFTA (Interview 2). As a 
result, the EU-Mexico PTA turned out to have strong services provisions favoring EU interests 
but it failed to match the NAFTA provisions.  
 
Investment Measures 
The investment component of the EU-Mexico PTA turned out to be quite weak. Article 15 calls 
for the creation of ‘an attractive and stable environment for reciprocal investment,’ through, 
among other things, the development of an appropriate legal environment that promotes and 
protects investment and prevents double taxation, harmonized administrative practices, and 
mechanisms for joint investments.114 Certain investment-related clauses are regulated by an EU-
Mexico Joint Council decision, which calls for investment promotion between the parties, 
establishes safety valves that may restrict capital movements in cases of balance of payment 
difficulties, in accordance with the parties’ multilateral commitments under the WTO and 
IMF.115 
As stated by Reiter (2003:77), ‘[t]he final result, however, was that the EU-Mexico FTA is 
left without any real substantive or procedural commitments on investment.’ Indeed, investment 
provisions in the EU-Mexico PTA are far from those in NAFTA. There is an opinion that the 
shortcomings of investment clauses under the EU-Mexico PTA are explained by the EU’s 
intentions to negotiate Investment Promotion and Protection Agreements with Mexico and other 
Latin American countries with, supposedly, more investor-friendly conditions (Reveles and 
Rocha, 2007). The fact, however, is that investment provisions of the EU-Mexico agreement 
																																								 																				
114 The text of the EU-Mexico PTA, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:f95ad1a3-795e-
4fb0-84e1-28351b99415c.0004.02/DOC_2&format=PDF (accessed 3 December 2015). 
 
115 Decision Nº 2/2001 of the EU-Mexico Joint Council of 27 February 2001, available at 
http://www.sice.oas.org/Trade/MEX_EU/English/Decisions_Council/2_2001_e.asp (accessed 3 December 2015). 
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hardly go beyond the WTO commitments. The failure to negotiate more ambitious investment 
provisions with Mexico was acknowledged by an EU trade official. The EU failed to incorporate 
strong investment protection clauses in the agreement, which were opposed by Mexico, and was 
hoping to incorporate stronger investment provisions at a later stage, either through the PTA or 
through other mechanisms. However, ‘as of now, investment remains one of the weakest points 
of the EU-Mexico trade agreement’ (Interview 2). In addition, the EU-Mexico PTA does not 
include any provision for investor-state arbitration. It instead makes recourse to government-to-
government dispute settlement, compatible with WTO provisions.116 According to an EU trade 
official (Interview 2), the reasons for such weak investment measures are multiple, ranging from 
the EU’s intention to incorporate strong investment provisions at a later stage to the pressing 
need to conclude a deal with Mexico and hence being soft on issues Mexico attached higher 
priority to. Given the pressing need to conclude an agreement with Mexico as soon as possible, 
the EU had to go soft on a number of measures prioritized by Mexico, including investment.  
In sum, in the EU-Mexico PTA, investment remains ‘the biggest disappointment’ for the EU 
(Reiter, 2003:87). The investment clauses of the PTA fail to be classified as WTO-plus and are 
not in par with other North-South PTAs, particularly those negotiated by the US. One of the 
main reasons for such an outcome was the pressure induced by NAFTA that made the EU 
conclude a deal with Mexico as soon as possible and compromise on a number of issues as a 
result.   
 
 
 
																																								 																				
116 The text of the EU-Mexico PTA, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:f95ad1a3-795e-
4fb0-84e1-28351b99415c.0004.02/DOC_2&format=PDF (accessed 3 December 2015). 
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IPRs 
The IPRs provisions in the EU-Mexico agreement are very short and mostly do not go beyond 
the WTO (Fink, 2011). Article 12 of the EU-Mexico PTA reaffirms the importance of IPRs and 
calls for their ‘adequate and effective protection in accordance with the highest international 
standards,’117 while an EU-Mexico Joint Council decision reaffirms the parties’ obligations 
under the TRIPS agreement and a number of earlier IP conventions, such as the Paris 
Convention, Berne Convention, and the Patent Cooperation Treaty.118 
Like it was the case with investment-related clauses, the EU failed to negotiate strong IPRs 
provisions with Mexico. Although such clauses were in the agenda of EU negotiators during the 
negotiations, they failed to push them through. This was, among other things, explained by the 
need for an expedited completion of the EU-Mexico PTA negotiations. Thus, the EU had to 
refrain from pushing its agenda to its fullest, including in IPRs, and give in to Mexico’s 
priorities, in order to compete a deal as soon as possible (Interview 2). 
 
5.2. The EU-Chile PTA 
 
Signed in 2002, the EU-Chile PTA was the EU’s second PTA with a Latin American country 
after the agreement signed with Mexico in 1997. While the agreement with Mexico was largely a 
counter-reaction to NAFTA, that with Chile was to allow the EU to fully enjoy the privileges of 
enhanced access to the Chilean market and the country’s liberalized investment regime, while 
competitors, such as the US, dealt with Chile on WTO terms (Interview 1; Interview 2). With an 
																																								 																				
117 The text of the EU-Mexico PTA, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:f95ad1a3-795e-
4fb0-84e1-28351b99415c.0004.02/DOC_2&format=PDF (accessed 3 December 2015). 
 
118 Decision Nº 2/2001 of the EU-Mexico Joint Council of 27 February 2001, available at 
http://www.sice.oas.org/Trade/MEX_EU/English/Decisions_Council/2_2001_e.asp (accessed 3 December 2015). 
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open economy with a flat average MFN tariff rate of 7 per cent, Chile had been dependent on 
external trade and investment. Multilateral liberalization would have been ideal for Chile, but 
due to the stalemate in multilateral talks and the proliferation of regional agreements, Chile had 
to consider bilateral agreements to keep its open and export-oriented economy developing and 
reduce its vulnerability to disruptions of trade and investment flows (Rosales, 2004). 
Chile’s exports to the EU during the 1990s, as percentage of total exports, were in the range 
of 25-28 per cent, while its imports from the EU comprised 19-26 per cent of the total 
(Kuwayama, 2003). The figure did not change in 2003, when 25 per cent of Chile’s total exports 
went to the EU, while 19 per cent of its imports came from the EU. As of 2003, mining 
(predominantly copper) had the largest share of Chilean goods exports to the EU (46 per cent), 
while agriculture, farming, forestry and fishery products came second at 13 per cent (Nowak-
Lehmann et al, 2007). The dynamics of the EU-25–Chile trade since 2000 is presented in Figure 
5.2.1 below. 
 
Figure 5.2.1. The EU-25 trade with Chile, in thousand USD, 2000-2013 
 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) data, available at 
http://www.cepal.org/en (accessed 21 November 2014) 
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At the time of the EU-Chile PTA negotiations Chile did not have PTAs with other Northern 
countries. Thus, because of the absence of discriminative pressures, the negotiations with Chile 
did not proceed under the type of duress seen during the EU-Mexico negotiations. An EU-Chile 
agreement would give the EU a first-mover advantage and boost the competitiveness of 
European firms in Chile, as well as improve their prospects in numerous countries and regions 
Chile had preferential trading arrangements with. Given the absence of discriminative pressures, 
the EU intended to conclude a comprehensive deal with Chile and achieve during the 
negotiations what it failed to achieve in the agreement with Mexico (Interview 1; Interview 2). 
The rest of the section looks at the process and outcome of the EU-Chile PTA negotiations in 
a number of key areas, including tariffs and related measures, agriculture, government 
procurement, trade in services, investment measures, and IPRs, as outlined in Chapter 3.  
 
Tariffs and Related Measures 
The EU-Chile PTA established tariff-free trade in goods in all sectors (Article 58.2) with 
relatively short transition periods. Article 65 of the EU-Chile PTA calls for the elimination of 
duties in the EU on industrial products originating in Chile immediately or within three years 
after the implementation of the agreement in three instalments, while Article 66 calls for the 
elimination of customs duties on industrial products originating in the EU in a longer phase-out 
period, lasting up to 7 years.119 By 2008, five years after the agreement entered into force, 82 per 
cent of Chilean exports to the EU would become duty-free, while the remaining 18 per cent 
would still face positive tariffs. As a result of the tariff cuts, the average tariff on EU exports to 
																																								 																				
119 The text of the EU-Chile PTA, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:f83a503c-fa20-
4b3a-9535-f1074175eaf0.0004.02/DOC_2&format=PDF (accessed 3 December 2015). 
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Chile fell from 6.7 per cent in 2002 to 0.6 per cent in 2008, which was a lower figure compared 
to the EU tariffs for Chilean exports (Jean et al, 2014). 
 
Agriculture 
Agriculture had been an important sector for both sides of the agreement. Although the 
agreement was estimated to boost Chile’s food-related exports to the EU, which faced strong 
protection in the EU (Nowak-Lehmann et al, 2007), agricultural liberalization (especially in the 
EU), as per Annex I and Annex II of the EU-Chile PTA,120 was scheduled to take place gradually 
over a ten-year period and through tariff rate quotas for certain products. Duties on fishery and 
agricultural products originating in Chile were to be eliminated in the EU during various phase-
out periods of up to 10 years.  
Chilean duties on EU fish and fishery products were to be eliminated immediately (Article 
69), although some products, such as certain types of salmons and other fish, were to have tariff 
rate quotas as defined in Annex II. Chilean duties on agricultural products were to be eliminated 
in phase-out periods of up to 10 years, while a limited number of products, such as certain types 
of cheese, would retain tariff rate quotas.121 In addition, apart from general safeguard clauses set 
out under Article 92, Article 73 provides for ‘emergency clauses’ in case of import surge of 
agricultural products that may harm domestic industries. In such cases, the parties can suspend 
further reduction of tariffs or increase the duties up to the MFN levels.122 The EU had its ‘red 
lines’ in agricultural liberalization, which were incorporated into the agreement with Chile, while 
																																								 																				
120 The text of the EU-Chile PTA, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:f83a503c-fa20-
4b3a-9535-f1074175eaf0.0004.02/DOC_2&format=PDF (accessed 3 December 2015). 
 
121 The text of the EU-Chile PTA, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:f83a503c-fa20-
4b3a-9535-f1074175eaf0.0004.02/DOC_2&format=PDF (accessed 3 December 2015). 
 
122 The text of the EU-Chile PTA, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:f83a503c-fa20-
4b3a-9535-f1074175eaf0.0004.02/DOC_2&format=PDF (accessed 3 December 2015). 
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special agricultural safeguard measures were there for further protection of sensitive agricultural 
tariff lines in case of import surges. Safeguards were an important tool for Chile as well, but it 
had a less protected agricultural sector with lower tariff and non-tariff barriers than in the EU, 
hence safeguard clauses were backed largely by the EU and were seen as beneficial first of all 
for the EU (Interview 2; Interview 9). 
 
Government Procurement 
As opposed to the EU, Chile was not a member of the WTO GPA at the time of the negotiations 
of the EU-Chile PTA, and the liberalization of the government procurement sector was going to 
have greater effect on Chile. Article 138(b) of the EU-Chile PTA includes ‘central, sub-central or 
local government entities, municipalities, [and] public undertakings’ as entities covered under 
government procurement measures. Moreover, Article 138(c) provides a broad definition of 
‘public undertakings’ as ‘any undertaking over which the public authorities may exercise directly 
or indirectly a dominant influence by virtue of their ownership of it, their financial participation 
therein, or the rules which govern it.’123 The procurement thresholds of the EU-Chile PTA are 
presented in Table 5.2.1 below. 
 
Table 5.2.1. Government procurement thresholds of the EU-Chile PTA 
Procurement by 
Central government 
entities, in SDR 
Procurement by sub-
central government 
entities, in SDR 
Construction 
contracts by Central 
government entities, 
in SDR 
Construction 
contracts by sub-
central government 
entities, in SDR 
130,000 200,000 5,000,000 5,000,000 
Source: Annex XI of the EU-Chile PTA124 
																																								 																				
123 The text of the EU-Chile PTA, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:f83a503c-fa20-
4b3a-9535-f1074175eaf0.0004.02/DOC_2&format=PDF (accessed 3 December 2015). 
 
124 The text of the EU-Chile PTA, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:f83a503c-fa20-
4b3a-9535-f1074175eaf0.0004.02/DOC_2&format=PDF (accessed 3 December 2015). 
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Trade in Services 
The EU-Chile PTA provides for ‘national treatment’ (Article 98) and strong market access 
provisions for the parties’ services providers (Article 97 and Article 118), through a GATS-stile 
‘positive list’ approach to the liberalization of services, albeit with a broad coverage of services 
sectors. Moreover, Article 96(c) defines a ‘services supplier’ as ‘any legal or natural person that 
seeks to supply or supplies a service.’125 The wording ‘seeks to supply’ broadens the scope of the 
agreement providing for a greater coverage of the services provisions. 
 
Investment Measures 
The EU-Chile PTA does not have a separate investment chapter, and investment provisions of 
the agreement are covered in Title III (Trade in Services and Establishment), under establishment 
provisions that refer either to the creation of a new firm in the host country or the acquisition of 
an existing firm. Establishment provisions, a critical market access component, define the 
conditions, under which foreign investment is made, and thus the scope and depth of these rules 
define the scope of the PTA. (Miroudot, 2011). The most notable achievement for the EU in the 
EU-Chile investment provisions is the strong commitments on pre-establishment of investments 
(Reiter, 2003). As opposed to post-establishment, which guarantees foreign investors national 
treatment and MFN treatment once there are admitted, pre-establishment allows the 
establishment of investments, which automatically start to enjoy national treatment and MFN 
treatment. In addition, pre-establishment prohibits the imposition of performance requirements, 
as a condition for the establishment of the investment. Given the strong market access provisions 
																																								 																				
125 The text of the EU-Chile PTA, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:f83a503c-fa20-
4b3a-9535-f1074175eaf0.0004.02/DOC_2&format=PDF (accessed 3 December 2015). 
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of the EU-Chile PTA and the shortcomings of the EU-Mexico PTA, especially in investment, 
one commentator (Reiter, 2003:90) described the EU-Chile PTA as an agreement that 
‘thoroughly filled the gaps in the EU-Mexico FTA,’ most notably in investment, trade in 
services, and government procurement.  
The strong wording on market access and establishment provisions notwithstanding, and 
unlike most US PTAs, the EU-Chile PTA is not explicit with strong provisions on direct and 
indirect expropriation, nor does it include investor-state arbitration mechanisms, thus leaving 
investment-related dispute settlement to the WTO DSU.126 
 
IPRs 
The IPRs provisions of the EU-Chile agreement are very short and do not go much beyond the 
WTO. Article 170 of the EU-Chile PTA calls for ‘an adequate and effective implementation of 
the obligations’ arising from a number of multilateral agreements, such as TRIPS, the 1967 Paris 
Convention, and the 1971 Berne Convention.127  
 
5.3. The EU-Korea PTA 
 
The negotiations of the EU-Korea PTA started in 2007. It was signed in 2010 and entered into 
force in 2011. In the words of Karel De Gucht, the EU Commissioner for Trade, ‘[t]he EU-Korea 
FTA is the most ambitious trade agreement ever negotiated by the EU’ and the EU’s first PTA 
with an Asian country that, after transitional periods, was to establish tariff-free trade in all 
																																								 																				
126 The text of the EU-Chile PTA, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:f83a503c-fa20-
4b3a-9535-f1074175eaf0.0004.02/DOC_2&format=PDF (accessed 3 December 2015). 
 
127 The text of the EU-Chile PTA, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:f83a503c-fa20-
4b3a-9535-f1074175eaf0.0004.02/DOC_2&format=PDF (accessed 3 December 2015). 
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industrial and almost all agricultural trade between the parties, as well as to significantly reduce 
non-tariff barriers to trade, including related to IPRs, services, and government procurement 
(European Commission, 2011:1, CRS, 2011).  
One of the main driving forces behind the EU’s motivation to sign a PTA with Korea was to 
level the playing field for European exporters to Korea before the discriminative effects of the 
US-Korea agreement128 became visible. Moreover, European companies had been among major 
investors in Korea, and it was important for the EU to make sure its multinationals had an equal 
footing vis-à-vis their competitors from the US. Thus, the agreement with Korea was, among 
other things, a defensive response by the EU to the strengthening positions of the US in the 
Korean market (Interview 6). As argued by Elsig and Dupont (2012), one of the main objectives 
of EU negotiators with Korea was to secure a level playing field with the US. In addition, Korea, 
a dynamic and fast-growing economy, fitted well with the ‘Global Europe’ criteria and emerged 
as a priority in EU trade negotiations. Korea also was an ideal point of entry for the EU’s future 
bilateral and regional trade relations in East Asia (European Commission, 2006; Pollet-Fort, 
2011).  
Korea, on the other hand, became enthusiastic about PTAs in general and one with the EU in 
particular as a result of the 1997 Asian financial crisis and the stalemate in WTO negotiations. 
The main factors behind Korea’s motivation to enter into a PTA with the EU included the EU 
market size and high volume of trade between the countries, as well as the diversification of 
trading partners, which seemed especially timely after the completion of the US-Korea PTA 
(Francois, 2007; Pollet-Fort, 2011).  
																																								 																				
128 The US-Korea PTA was signed in 2007 but was not ratified until 2011. 
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According to the European Commission,129 as of 2014, Korea was the EU’s eighth largest 
export destination, while the EU is Korea’s forth largest export destination, after China, Japan, 
and the US. The trade flow between the countries reached again the benchmark of USD 1 trillion 
in 2011 (after a slowdown as a result of the 2007 financial crisis). The dynamics of the EU-25–
Korea trade since 2000 is presented in Figure 5.3.1 below. 
 
Figure 5.3.1. The EU-25 trade with Korea, in thousand USD, 2000-2013 
 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) data, available at 
http://www.cepal.org/en (accessed 21 November 2014) 
 
Studies estimated that the EU-Korea PTA would increase the Korean GDP by 1-2 per cent,130 
while the EU GDP would increase less than 0.05 per cent. Because the Korean economy was 
considerably smaller than that of the EU and trade barriers in Korea were higher, too, the longer-
																																								 																				
129 European Commission: http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/south-korea/ (accessed 3 
December 2015). 
 
130 Other accounts put the GDP growth as a result of the PTA at 3 per cent (Lee, 2009). 
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term impact of the agreement was estimated to be higher for Korea (CRS, 2011). According to 
Francios (2007), two-thirds of the total gains from the EU-Korea PTA would go to Korea.   
As noted, the negotiations of the second-order EU-Korea PTA were largely determined by 
the US-Korea agreement. Worried about their worsening positions in Korea as a result of the US-
Korea PTA, European businesses pushed the EU to sign a counter-agreement and redress the 
possible negative consequences of America’s deepening trade relations with Korea. Thus, the 
negotiations of the EU-Korea PTA took place in settings similar to those during EU-Mexico 
negotiations, whereby the EU felt the pressure to complete the talks and sign a final deal as soon 
as possible (Interview 6). 
The rest of the section looks at the process and outcome of the EU-Korea PTA negotiations 
in a number of key areas, including tariffs and related measures, agriculture, government 
procurement, trade in services, investment measures, and IPRs, as outlined in Chapter 3.  
 
Tariffs and Related Measures 
The EU-Korea PTA was to eliminate close to 99 per cent of all tariff lines (in terms of trade 
value) and create Euro 19 billion worth of trade opportunities for the EU and close to Euro 13 
billion for Korea. Most tariff lines were to be eliminated within five years, while for a limited 
number of highly sensitive product lines in agriculture, such as frozen pork belly, the transitional 
period was set longer than seven years; other sensitive agricultural product lines, such as rice and 
rice products, were excluded from the agreement (European Commission, 2011). EU service 
providers, especially in transportation and finance, as well as exporters of pharmaceuticals, auto 
parts, industrial machinery, electronics parts, and some agricultural goods are expected to be 
among the main beneficiaries of the PTA. Meanwhile, the manufacturers of cars, wireless 
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telecommunications devices, chemical products, and imaging equipment in Korea were expected 
to expand their exports to the EU and gain as a result of the agreement (CRS, 2011).  
One specific feature of the EU-Korea PTA is that drawbacks—the subsidy-like provisions 
that provide import tax rebates on goods used as inputs for exports—although restricted in most 
North-South PTAs, are allowed under the EU-Korea PTA. Under this provision, a Korean car 
manufacturer, for example, could use low-cost inputs from countries, such as China, and claim 
duties back when end product vehicles are exported to the EU, provided the third-country inputs 
comply with the rules of origin131 provisions (CRS, 2011; Elsig and Dupont, 2012). The de facto 
duty-free deployment of low-cost components from third countries could potentially boost the 
competitiveness of Korean car producers, which, according to Pollet-Fort (2011), was one of the 
initial demands from Korean negotiators, who wanted the EU rules of origin provisions to 
become more flexible to consider Korea’s integration in East Asian production networks.  
As the course of the negotiations demonstrated, Korea preferred drawbacks, as it had an 
industrial structure that benefitted from tariff refunds that comprised more than 21 per cent of all 
tariff collection; meanwhile, the EU opposed them (Lee, 2009). Auto industry representatives in 
the EU argued that having duty drawbacks in the agreement with Korea would set a wrong 
precedent for future negotiations, and thus lobbied EU negotiators to take the clause off the 
negotiation agenda. Korean negotiators, however, were firm in their position and were quick to 
let their European counterparts know that duty drawbacks in the automobile industry were not 
negotiable (Elsig and Dupont, 2012). This provision proved controversial among European car 
																																								 																				
131 For automobiles, the use of foreign components is limited to 45 per cent, which was risen from lower then 40 per 
cent on Korea’s demand (Lee, 2009).  
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producers132 that were worried that Korean producers could relocate parts of their production to 
low-cost destinations, such as China, and flood the EU car market with vehicles with significant 
Chinese components. Notwithstanding the possibility of capping the amount of drawbacks to 5 
per cent in case of a ‘notable increase’ in foreign sourcing, the provision was of serious concern 
for the European auto industry (CRS, 2011).     
The main reason why EU negotiators did not manage to successfully push for the elimination 
of duty drawbacks, despite the urge from the auto industry in Europe, was that duty drawbacks 
were strongly favored by Korea, and the EU could not jeopardise the negotiations because of one 
particular—albeit important—provision. The EU was under pressure to sign a deal with Korea in 
the shortest possible period of time, in order to provide EU companies with an equal footing in 
the Korean market vis-à-vis their US competitors. Thus, in order to achieve this aim, the EU had 
to concede in a number of important areas, including in drawbacks. In fact, Korea exploited the 
‘US factor’ very well and played its hand efficiently, to extract maximum concessions from the 
EU (Interview 6).  
 
Agriculture 
Agricultural liberalization in the agreement was quite substantial. Average annual EU 
agricultural exports to Korea exceeded Euro 1 billion, of which only 2 per cent entered Korea 
duty-free before the agreement. The PTA eliminated tariffs on nearly all EU agricultural exports 
to Korea, albeit with transition periods up to 10 years for the most sensitive products, such as 
frozen pork. The weighted average duty on EU agricultural exports to Korea was 35 per cent, 
																																								 																				
132 The automobile industry in the EU was one of the industries reluctant about a potential PTA with Korea in the 
first place (Pollet-Fort, 2011). Opposition to the Korean duty drawbacks scheme was voiced by the German, Italian, 
Czech, Spanish, Portuguese, and Hungarian governments that were lobbied by low- and middle-price car producers. 
These voices, however, failed to change the course of the negotiations adopted by the European Commission’s 
Directorate-General for Trade (Elsig and Dupont, 2012). 
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which was expected to fall by Euro 380 million annually after the signing of the agreement. The 
need for EU access to the Korean agriculture market was among other things motivated by 
Korea’s PTA negotiations with competitive agricultural exporters, such as Chile, Canada, the 
US, and Australia (European Commission, 2011). The EU imported little in agricultural products 
from Korea. The agreement acknowledges Korea’s sensitivity over certain agricultural products, 
a few of which either retained high tariffs and quotas or were excluded from the PTA altogether. 
Rice and rice products, for example, were excluded from the PTA as they also were from the 
US-Korea agreement (Lee, 2009; CRS, 2011).  
Duty-free trade in agricultural products has been a higher priority for the EU, given its high 
volume of agricultural exports to Korea, comprising USD 1.4 billion in 2009. Despite the 
lengthy transitional periods for most sensitive products, 30 per cent (worth USD 430 million) of 
European agricultural exports were set to enter the Korean market duty-free immediately. This 
figure, however, was far less compared to the immediate reduction of tariffs for US agricultural 
exports to Korea at 62 per cent (worth USD 2.7 billion), as a result of Korea’s PTA with the US 
(CRS, 2011). Import quotas that Korea deployed to protect its sensitive agricultural sectors were 
set at much lower levels for the EU than they were for the US, for example. Effective in 5 years 
after the implementation of the US-Korea PTA, the natural honey quota for the US, for instance, 
was set at a level more than 5 times higher than that for the EU as per the EU-Korea PTA (225 
metric tons to 54 metric tons). Preferential quotas for other products, such as dairy, would 
eventually be capped for the EU, whereas in the case of the US, the quotas for the same products 
would rise 3 per cent annually. This difference, however, may have been a reflection of the fact 
that the EU had been a smaller supplier of such agricultural products than the US (CRS, 2011).  
	 190 
According to EU trade officials (Interview 6), in agriculture, the EU’s deal with Korea did 
not compare to that negotiated by the US, whereby the US secured far better access to the 
Korean agricultural market than the EU. Among reasons for such an outcome was the EU’s 
determination to secure a deal with Korea in the shortest possible time, which hindered its 
bargaining position in many areas, including in agriculture.  
 
Government Procurement 
Because both parties were signatories to the WTO GPA, which covers government procurement 
by central and (certain) sub-central entities, the EU-Korea PTA was going to build on existing 
multilateral commitment.  The EU-Korea PTA goes beyond the WTO GPA to provide additional 
coverage in EU public works concessions and Korean ‘build-operate-transfer’ (BOT) contracts. 
The provision guarantees access to BOT contacts beyond the threshold of SDR 15,000,000  
(Euro 17,000,000) from all central and sub-central public procuring entities (European 
Commission, 2011; Pollet-Fort, 2011). In contrast, Korea’s agreement with the US goes further 
beyond the GPA, lowers the thresholds, and expands the eligibility of contracts, thus, expanding 
government procurement opportunities in bilateral trade between the countries (CRS, 2011).  
 
Trade in Services 
The agreement provides substantial coverage of trade in services that encourages FDI in Korea 
and ensures that EU suppliers and investors are not discriminated vis-à-vis their Korean 
counterparts. The EU-Korea PTA ‘is by far the most ambitious’ in relation to services in terms of 
both sectoral coverage and depth of market access that the parties had ever concluded (European 
Commission, 2011:16). In addition, Article 7.5 of the EU-Korea PTA provides for strong market 
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access provisions for the parties’ cross-border service providers. In addition, the chapter on 
services calls for ‘national treatment’ (Article 7.6) and ‘MFN treatment’ (Article 7.8).133 
Given the priority of the EU in trade in services, it pushed for and ensured far-reaching 
liberalization of services that can be regarded as WTO-plus. Despite the broad coverage of 
services, however, the EU-Korea PTA uses a ‘positive list’ approach in services liberalization. 
This clause in the EU-Korea PTA differs from that in Korea’s agreement with the US, which 
employs a ‘negative list’ approach (CRS, 2011; Pollet-Fort, 2011). It is worth noting that the 
adoption of a ‘positive list’ approach happened contrary to the recommendation by the European 
Services Forum (2006), a network of high-level representatives from the European services 
sector lobbying for the liberalization of international trade in services that advised the 
Commission to opt for a ‘negative list’ approach in the liberalization of services in EU PTAs, 
including with Korea. Despite its broad coverage, some of the shortcomings of the services 
chapter for the EU can be attributed to the EU’s willingness to give in to Korean negotiators in 
order to secure an expedited completion of the negotiations (Interview 6).  
 
Investment Measures 
The EU-Korea PTA, unlike Korea’s agreement with the US, does not cover investment 
protection134 and does not have a general investment chapter (CRS, 2011; Pollet-Fort, 2011). 
Certain investment-related provisions are covered under Chapter 7 (Section C - Establishment). 
Establishment provisions, referring either to the creation of a new firm in the host country or the 
acquisition of an existing firm, define the conditions, under which foreign investment is made, 
																																								 																				
133 The text of the EU-Korea PTA, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L:2011:127:FULL&from=EN (accessed 3 December 2015). 
 
134 Korea, however, had BITs with twenty European countries (CRS, 2011). 
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and thus the scope and depth of these rules define the scope of the PTA (Miroudot, 2011). 
Section C (Establishment) of Chapter 7 includes some strong wording in the definition of 
investor as ‘any person that seeks to perform or performs an economic activity through setting up 
an establishment’ (Article 7.9(b)). In addition, the agreement provides strong market access 
provisions (Article 7.11) and calls for ‘national treatment’ (Article 7.12) and ‘MFN treatment’ 
(Article 7.14). However, in establishment, too, the agreement adopts a ‘positive list’ approach 
and extends the market access provisions to the list of sectors included in Annex 7-A, while all 
other sectors are excluded from the agreement.135 Most importantly, the EU-Korea PTA does not 
include any provision for investor-state arbitration, thus leaving investment-related dispute 
settlement to the WTO DSU.136 
 
IPRs 
In relation to IPRs, the EU-Korea PTA reaffirms and builds upon the TRIPS agreement and in a 
number of areas goes beyond the WTO. More specifically, the PTA (Article 10.35) provides for 
the extension of patent terms to compensate for delays of up to 5 years that may occur during the 
administrative process of patent registration.137 In addition, Article 10.36 calls for the protection 
of data submitted to obtain a marketing authorization for pharmaceutical products for at least five 
																																								 																				
135 The text of the EU-Korea PTA, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L:2011:127:FULL&from=EN (accesses 3 December 2015). 
 
136 The text of the EU-Korea PTA, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L:2011:127:FULL&from=EN (accesses 3 December 2015). 
 
137 The text of the EU-Korea PTA, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L:2011:127:FULL&from=EN (accesses 3 December 2015). 
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years. Article 10.36.2 makes a reference to TRIPS Article 39, which refers to ‘undisclosed test or 
other data,’138 thus limiting the scope of the article to the TRIPS definition.139 
Article 10.4 of the PTA states that the parties are ‘free to establish its own regime for the 
exhaustion of intellectual property rights.’140 The exhaustion of IPRs is important for 
determining the possibility of parallel importation. According to Maskus and Chen (2005), under 
international exhaustion, parallel importation is allowed because the right to control distribution 
is exhausted upon first sale. Whereas, under national exhaustion, IPRs holders can restrict 
parallel importation because sales within a specific nation exhausts only national distribution 
rights to control distribution. Thus, the freedom to establish one’s own regime of IPRs 
exhaustion provides for the possibility of parallel importation of patented products, like it is 
allowed under TRIPS but is restricted in many North-South PTAs. Moreover, the agreement 
(Article 10.34) makes recourse to the 2001 Doha Declaration reaffirming measures to protect 
public health, as well as adopts clauses on the criminal enforcement of IP rules (Sub-Section b of 
Chapter 10). Meanwhile, Article 10.18 calls for protection of the geographical indicators (GIs) 
included in Annex 10-A and Annex 10-B of the agreement.141 
The IPRs section of the EU-Korea PTA turned out to be much deeper than in the EU’s 
agreements with Mexico and Chile. The reason for such an outcome was that the EU was 
concerned about Korea’s higher capacity to replicate know-how and free ride on innovation. 
																																								 																				
138 WTO TRIPS Article 39, available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips_04d_e.htm (accessed 3 
December 2015). 
 
139 The text of the EU-Korea PTA, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L:2011:127:FULL&from=EN (accesses 3 December 2015). 
 
140 The text of the EU-Korea PTA, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L:2011:127:FULL&from=EN (accesses 3 December 2015). 
 
141 The text of the EU-Korea PTA, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L:2011:127:FULL&from=EN (accesses 3 December 2015). 
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Although the IPRs section of the EU-Korea PTAs went further than those with Chile and 
Mexico, it tuned out to be a far cry from the IPRs provisions of the US-Korea PTA. Again, the 
reason for failing to fully accomplish its initial targets can at least partially be attributed to the 
setting of the negotiations, whereby the EU could not afford to jeopardies the negotiations by 
pushing its agenda too far in the areas where Korea did not want to concede. Hence, in order to 
secure a deal as soon as possible, the EU had to concede in a number of areas, including IPRs 
(Interview 6). 
 
5.4. The EU-Columbia and Peru PTA 
 
The EU, in line with its preference for region-to-region agreements over individual PTAs, started 
to negotiate a trade deal with the Andean bloc, comprising of Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, and 
Ecuador. In the course of the negotiations, however, the governments of Bolivia and Ecuador 
backtracked, and the EU decided to go with Colombia and Peru and signed a trilateral PTA in 
2012, while leaving the door open for Bolivia and Ecuador. By doing so, the EU would level its 
positions with the US in Colombia and Peru and, by providing Colombian and Peruvian exports 
preferential access to the EU market, would put pressure on non-participating Bolivia and 
Ecuador not to fall behind their Andean neighbours and join the bandwagon142 (Interview 1; 
Interview 3).  
Levelling the playing field with the US was an important objective for the EU. Among other 
things, the PTA with Colombia and Peru was to redress the economic disadvantages of EU 
																																								 																				
142 In fact, after the agreement with Colombia and Peru was completed, Ecuador re-evaluated its position in relation 
to joining the EU agreement with Colombia and Peru and resumed the negotiations, with the first formal round of 
talks held in January 2014 (European Commission Press Release of 16 June 2014, available at 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1091, accessed 3 December 2015). 
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multinationals vis-à-vis their US counterparts in the two Andean countries that had arisen or 
could potential arise as a result of the US-Colombia and US-Peru PTAs, both singed in 2006 
(Interview 1; Interview 3). Given the tiny share (0.6 per cent) of Colombia and Peru in the total 
EU exports, as well as the close to zero projected effect of the agreement on the EU GDP 
(European Parliament, 2012), other factors behind the EU’s interest in the agreement, such as 
levelling the playing field with the US, become more plausible.  
Colombia and Peru, on the other hand, wanted to make the EU unilateral concessions under 
the GSP+143 scheme permanent. ‘Almost all Colombian and Peruvian exports’ were covered 
under the GSP+ scheme before the singing of the PTA, which allowed the duty-free entry of 
Colombian and Peruvian goods to the European market. Future reviews of the GSP+ schemes 
could potentially deprive both Colombia and Peru of this privilege, thus both countries were 
eager to establish a permanent mechanism of duty-free access to the EU market (European 
Parliament, 2012).  
Signed in 2012, the EU-Colombia and Peru PTA entered into force in 2013 and was expected 
to boost trade and investment between the EU and the two Andean countries. As of 2013, the EU 
was Colombia’s third largest source of imports, while the EU was Colombia’s second biggest 
export destination.144 Similarly, the EU was Peru’s third largest source of imports, too, but the 
																																								 																				
143 As opposed to the GSP scheme that provides for the ‘partial or entire removal of tariffs on two thirds of all 
product categories,’ the GSP+ scheme calls for a full removal of tariffs on essentially the same product categories as 
those covered under the GSP (European Commission website, available at http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-
and-regions/development/generalised-scheme-of-preferences/, accessed 3 December 2015).  
 
144 European Commission Press Release of 26 July 2013, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-
749_en.htm (accessed 3 December 2015). 
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EU was Peru’s main export market.145 The dynamics of the EU-25–Columbia and Peru trade 
since 2000 is presented in Figure 5.4.1 below. 
 
Figure 5.4.1. The EU-25 trade with Columbia and Peru, in thousand USD, 2000-2013 
 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) data, available at 
http://www.cepal.org/en (accessed 21 November 2014) 
 
As noted above, the negotiations of the second-order EU-Colombia and Peru PTA were 
largely a reaction to the US-Colombia and US-Peru agreements signed in 2006. Thus, the 
negotiations took place against the background of EU’s losing market share in Colombia and 
Peru and its determination to urgently sign a deal with the two Andean countries to level the 
playing for its multinationals vis-à-vis their American counterparts in the Andean region 
(Interview 1; Interview 3). 
																																								 																				
145 European Commission Press Release of 28 February 2013, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-
13-173_en.htm (accessed 3 December 2015). 
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The rest of the section looks at the process and outcome of the EU-Colombia and Peru PTA 
negotiations in a number of key areas, including tariffs and related measures, agriculture, 
government procurement, trade in services, investment measures, and IPRs, as outlined in 
Chapter 3.  
 
Tariffs and Related Measures 
As a result of the EU-Colombia and Peru PTA, 80 per cent of tariffs on EU industrial and fishery 
exports to Peru and 65 per cent of exports to Colombia were to be eliminated immediately. These 
tariffs were to be fully liberalized in 10 years after the agreement’s entry into force (European 
Commission, 2012). In addition, Article 43 reaffirms the rights and obligations under the 
multilateral safeguard provisions under Article XIX of the GATT 1994, as well as bilateral 
safeguard provisions (Article 48) which are in line with measures adopted by the EU in other 
PTAs (European Parliament, 2012). 
 
Agriculture 
As a result of the EU-Colombia and Peru PTA, 85 per cent of EU agricultural exports to 
Colombia and Peru would eventually become duty free, albeit during phase-out periods of up to 
17 years. Although this falls short of matching the agricultural concessions provided by 
Colombia and Peru to US exporters, the liberalization was estimated to result in modest gains for 
the EU (European Parliament, 2012). Despite the long phase-out periods, most agricultural 
products would become duty free in 10 years, while others, such as wine, which had been a key 
product for the EU, would have immediate duty-free access to the Colombian market; meanwhile 
Peru would allow duty-free entry of European wine into its market in 5 years after the 
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implementation of the agreement (European Commission, 2012). 
Notwithstanding the overall modest gains, however, in certain sectors the EU was estimated 
to experience negative sectoral change in output. In vegetables, fruits and nuts, for example, the 
output in the EU was estimated to decrease by 1.5 per cent, while Colombia and Peru were to 
experience 11 per cent and 0.7 per cent increase, respectively (European Parliament, 2012:29). 
Notwithstanding the strong agricultural lobby in the EU, the EU negotiators did not manage to 
shield the agricultural sector in the EU from possible negative consequences as a result of the 
PTA. In fact, the concessions in agriculture from the EU side were an important tool, in order to 
get concessions from the Andean counties in other sectors that were of high priority for the EU 
and had to be included the final text of the agreement. Forced by the pressure to sign a deal with 
Colombia and Peru as soon as possible, the EU had to prioritize and compromise more than it 
initially intended, to make sure an agreement with the Andean countries was inked in the shortest 
possible time (Interview 3).  
Moreover, in addition to general multilateral and bilateral safeguard provisions (Article 43 
and Article 48), Article 29 of the EU-Colombia and Peru PTA provides for ‘special agricultural 
safeguard measures’ for Colombia and Peru in the event of agricultural import surges from the 
EU exceeding the predefined (in Annex IV) levels. In addition, according to Article 30, both 
Colombia and Peru maintained their right to use ‘price band systems,’146 which had been aimed 
at reducing the volatility of agricultural prices and could constitute a trade barrier for the EU. 
 
Government Procurement 
In contrast to the EU, neither Columbia nor Peru was a member of the WTO GPA at the time of 
																																								 																				
146 The text of the EU-Colombia and Peru PTA, available at 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2011/march/tradoc_147704.pdf. Annexes available at 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=691 (accessed 3 December 2015). 
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PTA negotiations, thus the liberalization in government procurement was going to have a more 
significant impact on the two Andean countries (European Commission, 2012). Government 
procurement clauses of the EU-Colombia and Peru PTA are covered under Title VI and Annex 
XII, which provide access to the procurements of both central and sub-central government 
entities, including local municipalities in Colombia and Peru (European Parliament, 2012). The 
procurement thresholds of the EU-Columbia and Peru PTA are presented in Table 5.4.1 below. 
 
Table 5.4.1. Government procurement thresholds of the EU-Columbia and Peru PTA 
Procurement by 
Central government 
entities, in SDR 
Procurement by sub-
central government 
entities, in SDR 
Construction 
contracts by Central 
government entities, 
in SDR 
Construction 
contracts by sub-
central government 
entities, in SDR 
130,000 200,000 5,000,000 5,000,000 
Source: Annex XII of the EU-Columbia and Peru PTA147 
 
Trade in Services  
The EU-Colombia and Peru agreement provides for strong market access provisions in services 
and a broad sectoral coverage. It, however, adopts a ‘positive list’ approach in services 
liberalization in contrast to the ‘negative list’ approach adopted in the US agreements with 
Colombia and Peru, which broadens the scopes of the US agreements (European Commission, 
2012; European Parliament, 2012). The adoption of a ‘positive list’ approach, in fact, happened 
contrary to the recommendation by the European Services Forum (2006), which advised the 
Commission to opt for a ‘negative list’ approach in the liberalization of services in EU PTAs, 
including with Colombia and Peru. The EU-Colombia and Peru agreement adopts NAFTA-like 
language in the definition of service suppliers, defining them as a ‘natural or juridical person of a 
																																								 																				
147 Annex XII of the EU-Columbia and Peru PTA, available at 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2011/march/tradoc_147723.pdf and 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2011/march/tradoc_147724.pdf (accessed 3 December 2015). 
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Party that seeks to supply or supplies a service’ (Article 108).148 
Market access measures of the EU-Colombia and Peru agreement are provided under 
establishment provisions (Title IV, Chapter 2).149 Referring either to the creation of a new firm in 
the host country or the acquisition of an existing firm, establishment provisions define the 
conditions, under which foreign investment is made, and thus the scope and depth of these rules 
define the scope of the PTA (Miroudot, 2011). The EU-Colombia and Peru PTA grants 
establishment rights in ‘almost all’ services (and non-services) sectors. Key services sectors 
covered by the agreement include telecommunications, maritime transport, banking and 
insurance, distribution, environmental, and certain professional services (European Commission, 
2012:15). More specifically, Article 119 of the agreement provides for strong market access 
provisions, while Article 120 calls for ‘national treatment.’ In line with the ‘positive list’ 
approach, these market access measures are, however, applied to a fixed, albeit broad, ‘list of 
commitments’ under Annexes VII and VIII of the agreement.150  
The services chapter of the EU-Colombia and Peru agreement does not compare with US-
Colombia and US-Peru agreements, which call for more enhanced market access for American 
service providers. The differences US and EU achievements in pushing their agenda with 
Colombia and Peru are, among other things, due to the settings of the negotiations, whereby, 
unlike the US, the EU had to compromise more, in order to ensure a fast conclusion of the 
agreement with the Andean countries, given the urgency of levelling the playing field for 
European multinationals vis-à-vis their competitors (Interview 3). 
																																								 																				
148 The text of the EU-Colombia and Peru PTA, available at 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2011/march/tradoc_147704.pdf (accessed 3 December 2015).  
 
149 The text of the EU-Colombia and Peru PTA, available at 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2011/march/tradoc_147704.pdf (accessed 3 December 2015). 
 
150 The text of the EU-Colombia and Peru PTA, available at 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2011/march/tradoc_147704.pdf (accessed 3 December 2015). 
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Investment Measures 
The EU-Colombia and Peru agreement does not include a separate investment chapter. 
Investment measures are instead covered under establishment provisions of the agreement (Title 
IV, Chapter 2).151 The PTA adopts strong establishment provisions for a wide range of services 
and non-services. It calls for strong market access (Article 112) and national treatment (Article 
113) provisions in par with the US agreements with the two Andean countries (European 
Parliament, 2012; European Commission, 2012). However, unlike the US agreements with the 
two Andean countries, the EU-Colombia and Peru PTA does not cover investment protection. A 
footnote to Article 111 (Scope of the Application) under Chapter 2 (Establishment) explicitly 
states that ‘[f]or greater certainty, and without prejudice to the obligations set out therein, this 
Chapter does not cover provisions on investment protection, such as provisions specifically 
relating to expropriation and fair and equitable treatment, nor does it cover investor-State dispute 
settlement procedures.’152 Furthermore, investment provisions covered under establishment 
clauses of the EU-Colombia and Peru agreement employ a ‘positive list’ approach. In addition 
there are a number of general exceptions that allow Colombia and Peru to deploy investment 
policies in the interests of socially and economically disadvantaged minorities and ethnics groups 
(European Parliament, 2012).  
Like it was the case with the provisions on services, the investment-related provisions of the 
EU-Colombia and Peru PTA turned out to be much weaker compered to the deals secured by the 
US with the two Andean countries. These differences too are to a great extent attributed to the 
																																								 																				
151 The text of the EU-Colombia and Peru PTA, available at 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2011/march/tradoc_147704.pdf (accessed 3 December 2015). 
 
152 The text of the EU-Colombia and Peru PTA, available at 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2011/march/tradoc_147704.pdf (accessed 3 December 2015). 
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settings of the negotiations, whereby the EU had to compromise more in order to expedite the 
negotiations (Interview 3).  
 
IPRs 
The IPRs chapter of the EU-Colombia and Peru PTA builds upon the WTO TRIPS agreement. It 
has strong provisions on GIs and calls for test data protection of pharmaceutical and chemical 
agricultural products for at least 5 years and 10 years, respectively (European Commission, 
2012). More specifically, the IPRs section of the agreement calls for ‘national treatment’ (Article 
198) and ‘MFN treatment’ (Article 199), while Section 2 of Chapter 3 provides for strong 
protection of GIs.153 In addition, Article 231 calls for the protection of ‘undisclosed test or other 
data related to safety and efficacy of pharmaceutical products and agricultural chemical products, 
in accordance with Article 39 of the TRIPS Agreement,’ for 5 years for pharmaceutical products 
and 10 years for chemical agricultural products.154 It should be noted that the wording 
‘undisclosed test or other data’ and reference to the TRIPS agreement provide a more limited 
scope of the protection, as opposed to the wording ‘information’ or ‘data’ (whether undisclosed 
or not) seen in a number of US agreement, including with Korea and Singapore. 
Moreover, Article 200 provides that ‘Each Party shall be free to establish its own regime for 
exhaustion of intellectual property rights, subject to the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement.’155 
The exhaustion of IPRs is important for determining the possibility of parallel importation. 
According to Maskus and Chen (2005), under international exhaustion, parallel importation is 
																																								 																				
153 The text of the EU-Colombia and Peru PTA, available at 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2011/march/tradoc_147704.pdf (accessed 3 December 2015). 
 
154 The text of the EU-Colombia and Peru PTA, available at 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2011/march/tradoc_147704.pdf (accessed 3 December 2015). 
 
155 The text of the EU-Colombia and Peru PTA, available at 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2011/march/tradoc_147704.pdf (accessed 3 December 2015). 
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allowed because the right to control distribution is exhausted upon first sale. Whereas, under 
national exhaustion, IPRs holders can restrict parallel importation because sales within a specific 
nation exhausts only national distribution rights to control distribution. Thus, the freedom to 
establish one’s own regime of IPRs exhaustion, provides the possibility of parallel importation of 
patented products, like it is allowed under TRIPS but is restricted under many North-South 
PTAs. Overall, as accounted by Maskus (2014), the EU-Colombia and Peru PTA generally 
recognizes the importance of policy flexibility in IPRs, hence being more development-friendly 
than other North-South PTAs. 
 
5.5. Concluding Remarks 
 
The EU’s preferential trade relations with Mexico, Korea, Colombia, and Peru have been largely 
influenced by discriminative pressures induced by the proliferation of North-South PTAs in 
Latin America and East Asia. Having felt its economic interests threatened in Mexico, Colombia, 
Peru, and Korea mostly as a result of the US PTAs with these countries, the EU was compelled 
to seek counter-agreements and level the playing field for its multinationals vis-à-vis their 
competitions from the US. The relations with Chile, on the other hand, followed a different logic. 
The EU trade policy toward Chile was motivated by establishing enhanced access to the Chilean 
market and the country’s liberalized investment regime, while competitors, such as the US, dealt 
with Chile on WTO terms. This would give the EU a first-mover advantage and boost the 
competitiveness of European firms in Chile, as well as improve their prospects in numerous 
countries and regions Chile had preferential trading arrangements with (Interview 1; Interview 4; 
Interview 6). 
	 204 
The results of the assessment of the EU’s first-order North-South PTA with Chile and 
second-order North-South PTAs with Mexico, Korea, and Colombia and Peru are presented in 
Table 5.5.1 below. Based on the assessment conducted in this chapter, Table 5.5.1 provides a 
measure of restrictiveness of the four EU North-South PTAs from the standpoint of EU 
counterpart developing and emerging economies, by assigning a value from 1 to 10 (1 is least 
restrictive, 10 is most restrictive) to each area of North-South cooperation discussed in Chapter 
3. 
 
Table 5.5.1. An overview of the EU’s North-South PTAs 
PTA 
Order 
of the 
PTA 
Tariffs 
(including 
agriculture) and 
Related 
Measures 
Government 
Procurement Services Investment IPRs 
EU-Mexico second 5 4 6 1 1 
EU-Chile first 7 8 7 7 1 
EU-Korea second 3 4 5 1 7 
EU-Colombia 
and Peru second 5 8 8 4 5 
 
As seen from Table 5.5.1, the second-order EU North-South PTAs with Mexico, Korea, and 
Columbia and Peru did not turn out to be restrictive for the EU’s counterpart emerging and 
developing countries. This appears to be in line with the hypothesis of this thesis, whereby the 
negotiating power of Sothern countries are enhanced during second-order North-South PTA 
negotiations due to stable access to Northern markets, as well as discriminative pressures on 
Northern countries as a result of first-order North-South agreements. The first-order EU-Chile 
PTA, on the other hand, somewhat diverges from the main hypothesis of the paper. Although 
overall a more restrictive agreement than the second-order PTAs, it turned out to be not 
restrictive in IPRs-related measures.  
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The second-order EU-Mexico PTA is one example where the negotiations took place against 
the backdrop of the EU losing its market share in Mexico, and European companies pushing EU 
negotiators to sign a deal with Mexico in the shortest possible time, to counter the ‘significant 
competitive advantage’ enjoyed by US companies as a result of NAFTA (Dür, 2007:842). The 
EU-Mexico PTA, although considered a successful one for the EU with broad coverage of goods 
and services, short transition periods, and NAFTA-parity clauses in certain spheres (Reiter, 
2003; Reveles and Rocha, 2007), did not turn out to be WTO-plus in some key aspects of the 
agreement. This was, among other things, because Mexico managed to play its ‘NAFTA card’ 
well and resists restrictive measures proposed by the EU, while the EU, constrained by the urge 
of completing the negotiations as soon as possible, had to compromise more than it had initially 
intended (Interview 2). In the word of one commentator (Reiter, 2003:83), the EU-Mexico PTA 
reveals ‘some serious shortcomings from an EU point of view in terms of establishing WTO-plus 
commitments.’  This refers to a number of key provisions affecting the policy space in 
developing and emerging countries, including in tariff measures, government procurement, trade 
in services, investment, and IPRs, where the EU-Mexico PTA turned out to be a good deal for 
Mexico and considerably less restrictive than NAFTA. 
More specifically, notwithstanding the strong agricultural lobby in the EU, Mexico managed 
to win important agricultural concession from the EU, which was compelled to provide them 
under the pressure from EU export-oriented industries lobbying for an expedited conclusion of 
the EU-Mexico PTA. The EU was willing to compromise in agriculture, to provide better 
provisions for its competitive industries in Mexico. However, the deal did not turn out to be as 
favorable for competitive sectors, such as services, either. Despite the initial attempts to establish 
NAFTA-parity provisions in trade in services, the negotiations came to a stalemate, and the 
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liberalization in services was left to further negotiations, thus leaving certain provisions on 
services to the GATS agreement (Mattoo and Sauvé, 2011). Mexico opposed stricter services 
provisions and the EU could not afford to jeopardize the entire agreement because of one 
specific issue. In fact, this was exactly the case during the negotiations of government 
procurement clauses, investment, and IPRs. Given the opposition by Mexico for stricter 
NAFTA-like investment provisions, ‘the EU-Mexico FTA is left without any real substantive or 
procedural commitments on investment’ (Reiter, 2003:77). The EU was hoping to incorporate 
stronger investment provisions at a later stage, either through the PTA or through other 
mechanisms. However, ‘as of now, investment remains one of the weakest points of the EU-
Mexico trade agreement’ (Interview 2). Meanwhile, the IPRs section of the EU-Mexico PTA 
merely reaffirms the parties’ commitment to IPRs protection under multilateral agreements and 
fails to establish any substantial WTO-plus commitments. 
The negotiations of the second-order EU-Korea PTA were a result of the EU’s deteriorating 
positions in the Korean market. Although the size of the Korean economy and its level of 
development were by themselves a valid reason to establish deeper trade relations with the 
country, one of the main incentives behind the EU’s move to pursue a PTA with Korea was to 
level the playing field for European exporters to Korea before the discriminative effects of the 
US-Korea agreement made themselves visible. Hence, the negotiations, largely pushed for by 
competitive EU industries that were concerned about their deteriorating positions in the Korean 
market, happened in settings similar to those in the EU-Mexico negotiations, whereby the EU 
felt the pressure to complete the talks as soon as possible (Interview 6).  
As also seen from Table 5.5.1, the EU-Korea agreement turned out to be not as restrictive for 
Korea and not much in line with EU preferences in a number of policy areas outlined in Chapter 
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3. Despite the intentions of EU negotiators to conclude an agreement that is in par with the US-
Korea PTA, the EU-Korea agreement fell short of meeting that objective. More specifically, 
Korea insisted on duty drawbacks to be incorporated in the agreement, because it would 
handsomely benefit its auto industry by allowing it to use low-cost inputs from third countries, 
such as China, and claim duties back when end product vehicles are exported to the EU. 
Although the EU, backed by the European car producers, viciously opposed this particular 
clause, Korea managed to incorporate it in the final deal anyway. The EU had to agree on duty 
drawbacks because Korea attached a high priority to this particular provision, while the EU 
could not afford to delay or jeopardize the negotiations, as the provisions of the US-Korea PTA 
were starting to hurt EU businesses in the Korean market (CRS, 2011; Elsig and Dupont, 2012). 
The EU was under pressure to sign a deal with Korea in the shortest possible time, in order to 
provide EU companies with an equal footing in the Korean market vis-à-vis their US 
competitors. In fact, Korea exploited the ‘US factor’ very well and played its hand efficiently, to 
extract maximum concessions from the EU in other aspects of the agreement, too, including in 
trade in services, government procurement, and IPRs. The EU had to give in and substantially 
compromise in these areas, in order to achieve its higher priority, i.e., an expedited conclusion of 
the talks with Korea (Interview 6). 
Similarly, the negotiations of the second-order EU-Colombia and Peru PTA was motivated 
by the signing of the US-Colombia and US-Peru agreements. Thus, the negotiations took place 
against the background of the EU’s determination to urgently sign a deal with the two Andean 
countries to level the playing for its multinationals vis-à-vis their American counterparts in the 
Andean region. Forced by the pressure to sign a deal with Colombia and Peru as soon as 
possible, the EU had to compromise more than it initially intended (Interview 3; Interview 9). As 
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a result, the outcome of the agreement turned out to be in line with the preferences of the two 
Andean counties in a number of key areas, especially agriculture, investment measures, and 
IPRs.  
The negotiations of the first-order EU-Chile PTA, on the other hand, followed a different 
logic. The EU approached the negotiations with Chile with the intention to establish preferential 
trade relations with the Latin American country in order to get a first-mover advantage and enjoy 
preferential access to the Chilean market, while its competitors dealt with Chile on WTO terms. 
Given the favorable conditions in the form of the absence of discriminative pressure during the 
negotiations, the EU intended to achieve in the negotiations with Chile what it failed to achieve 
with Mexico (Interview 1; Interview 2). In fact, the EU-Chile PTA turned out to be more in line 
with EU preferences than the EU-Mexico agreement. More specifically, the EU managed to 
achieve better provisions in agriculture and government procurement, as well as in the regulation 
of services and investment (Reiter, 2003).  
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6. An Assessment of Japan’s North-South PTAs: A Comparative Overview 
 
Japan had long avoided preferential trade liberalization and had instead favored multilateral 
liberalization through the GATT/WTO. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, however, Japan 
adopted a more inclusive ‘multi-layered’ trade policy that was to adapt to the new challenges 
posed by the Chinese economic rise and the proactive bilateral trade policies of the US and EU 
(METI, 2000; MOFA, 2002; Hatakeyama, 2002a; 2002b; Economist, 2007; Vio, 2010). Japan’s 
PTA strategy that was adopted in the early 2000s emphasized the need for PTAs that were to 
‘strengthen the free trade system’ and contribute to ‘the attainment of its economic interests as a 
mechanism to complement the multilateral free trade system centering on the WTO’ (Ono, 
2015:218). 
In fact, as admitted by a MITI Vice-Minister right before Japan started negotiating its first 
PTA with Singapore, ‘if Japan were to rely only on the WTO, we will not be able to liberalise for 
the next few years until the next global round of trade talks. Japan will be left behind in terms of 
competitiveness’ (cited in Terada, 2006:13). Redressing the trade diverting effects of the 
proliferating trade agreements elsewhere was indeed an urgent task for Japan (Solís, 2003). 
According to Wall (2002:34), more than 60 per cent of Japanese trade in 1997 was with 
countries that were members of major regional trade blocs. As a result of the formation of these 
trade blocs, Japan’s external trade had suffered significantly. If not for the third-party regional 
trade blocs, Japanese total trade would have been 11 per cent higher than it actually was in 1997; 
exports and imports would have respectively been higher by 13 and 8 per cent.  
To counter the trade diverting effects of third-party PTAs, Japan had to initiate PTAs of its 
own. It started by negotiating deals with smaller countries with relatively open economies. 
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Although the already low tariffs of such countries would have limited the gains from PTAs, the 
agreements would allow the Japanese government to earn preferential access to other countries’ 
markets, while protecting its sensitive sectors, such as agriculture (Solís, 2003; Pekkanen et al, 
2007; Corning, 2009). Japan’s first PTA was signed with Singapore, which came into force in 
November 2002. Ever since, the Japanese government has been active in pursuing preferential 
trade deals in the Asia-Pacific, as well as cross-regionally with Mexico, Chile, and Peru (Pempel 
and Urata, 2006; Gonzalez-Vigil and Shimuzu, 2012). The recent completion of the TPP talks 
between 12 Pacific Rim countries, including Japan and the US, is yet another major step by 
Shinzo Abe’s government towards preferential trade liberalization. 
There were a number of factors behind Japan’s move toward regionalism. Firstly, Japanese 
industries needed new markets. If Japanese exporting industries were to remain competitive in 
the world market, Japan had to pursue regional and bilateral PTAs, of which it did not have any 
until the beginning of the 2000s. Secondly, Japan could use the countries it signed PTAs with to 
expand to other networks of trade. This was the case with Singapore, which was used by Japan to 
expand to other ASEAN countries. Lastly, PTAs would incentivize important domestic structural 
reforms in a quicker and less painful manner (Hatakeyama, 2002a; 2002b; MOFA, 2002; Pempel 
and Urata, 2006; Solís, 2008; Vio, 2010).  
Another important factor was the considerable amount of Japanese FDI, which was 
particularly concentrated in Mexico and Southeast Asia. As a result of the appreciation of the 
Japanese Yen in the 1980s, Japan expanded its investment in Mexican maquiladoras, as well as 
in Southeast Asia. The dearer Yen reinforced the need for Japanese multinationals to cut costs 
domestically and establish production networks in low-cost-labor countries, as the appreciated 
Yen had made investment abroad less costly (Koido, 1991:64, Szekely, 1991). Thus, to protect 
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its increasing investments in countries and regions, such as Mexico and ASEAN, and secure 
preferential treatment in par with those granted to US and EU multinationals, Japan started to 
seek preferential deals first of all with its major FDI recipients (Prasirtsuk, 2006).  
Japanese negotiators emphasized a number of WTO-plus commitments in Japan’s future 
PTAs, including in services, IPRs, government procurement, and investment protection. Other 
key issue of the Japanese approach were economic cooperation and the asymmetry in tariff 
elimination, whereby Japan had been trying to shield its sensitive sectors, most importantly in 
agriculture, from outside competition (Solís, 2008). 
The move toward regionalism did not occur without domestic opposition, however. The 
Japanese economy was characterized by the so-called ‘duality,’ in which extremely competitive 
exporting industries (e.g., automobiles, machineries, and electronics) had been cohabiting with 
inefficient industries surviving at the expense of government subsidies and protectionist policies 
(e.g., agriculture, construction, retail). Of the latter industries, agriculture had historically been 
one of the most politically powerful sectors in Japan and had been exerting pressure on 
government policies since World War II, despite its ever declining share in Japan’s GDP.156 As a 
result, despite being one of the uncompetitive and low-productivity sectors in the Japanese 
economy and despite lacking promising prospects, agriculture had been provided government 
support and had been sheltered from external competition for decades (Mulgan, 2000; Pempel 
and Urata, 2006).  
The reasons why the Japanese agricultural sector exerted significant influence on Japanese 
politics can be traced back to the country’s organizational, electoral, and party-political 
traditions. Farmers have historically been well-mobilized and well-represented in the Diet, the 
																																								 																				
156 The share of agriculture, forestry, and fishery sector reached as low as 1.5 per cent of Japan’s GDP by 2005 
(Terada, 2006; Ando and Kimura, 2008).  
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Japanese parliament. As a highly politicized industry in Japan, agriculture ‘has been too 
electorally powerful, too highly organized, too visible publically and too well represented in the 
Diet and in the ruling party for the government to ignore the political ramifications of any major 
decision on agricultural policy’ (Mulgan, 2000:645). If the benefits of policy change are widely 
spread, individual beneficiaries do not have incentives to spend resources lobbying for it. By 
contrast, if benefits are concentrated, spending heavily on lobbying pays off as the promoted 
policies (agricultural protection, in this case) enable transfers from the many to the few. Hence, 
producer groups have been dominating the lobbying scene, as each of the vast number of 
consumers that would have felt only a tiny portion of the benefits of lower prices as a result of 
trade liberalization lacks the motivation to lobby for it (Hillman, 1989).  
Ando and Kimura (2008:2) mention three tiers of agricultural protection in Japan. The 
products under the first tier ‘structural protection,’ including rice, beef, pork, and chicken, enjoy 
comprehensive and resilient protection. The second tier products, including, sugar, molasses, 
barley, and pineapples, fall under ‘local protectionism.’ The third tier includes ‘sectors being 
liberalized’ as a result of trade negotiation, namely the Uruguay Round. The products under this 
category include vegetables, fruits and seafood, such as pepper, melon, asparagus, coffee, tuna, 
salmon, and shrimp.  
Given the strong agricultural protection, it is not surprising that Japan chose the sequence of 
its PTA partners in a way that would not inflict much cost on anti-liberalization domestic sectors, 
including agriculture. For this reason, Singapore was an ideal country for Japan to sign its first 
PTA with, since the exports from Singapore did not conflict much with protectionist forces in 
Japan. Once Japan started rolling in the path of preferential trade liberalization, new countries 
were included and new concessions were demanded from anti-liberalization sectors (Solís, 2003; 
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Pempel and Urata, 2006). The biggest test for Keidanren, Japan’s main business lobby, and other 
pro-liberalization forces in the country had been to ensure concessions from the farmers during 
the TPP negotiations (Economist, 2013c). 
As a result of the push from outside, however, there are signs that agricultural policy in Japan 
is changing ‘as many of the features of the old model are eroding.’ Most importantly, the share 
of the agricultural electorate in the national electorate decreased six-fold from almost 48 per cent 
in 1950 to close to 8 per cent in 2003 (Mulgan, 2005:262, 265). PTAs push for agricultural 
liberalization in two ways. Firstly, pro-liberalization forces, usually in export-oriented 
competitive industries, push for an end in agricultural protection. Secondly, political leaders start 
shifting their positions toward valuing the broader benefits of PTAs and not just the narrow 
interests of the agricultural sector (Mulgan, 2008). It seems increasingly likely that the 
determination of Shinzo Abe’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) to commit to TPP-induced 
liberalization may become a shifting point in the close ties between the LDP and the agricultural 
lobby that, according to (Mulgan, 2000; 2005), had been among the main impediments of 
agricultural liberalization in Japan (Economist, 2013a).  
Keidanren has been one of the most prominent pro-liberalization forces promoting the 
interests of the export-oriented efficient industries in Japan. Given the key interests of Japanese 
businesses in Singapore and Mexico, the first two countries Japan signed PTAs with, Keidanren 
was heavily lobbying for these and other agreements, opening prospects for expanding market 
access for Japanese businesses. The lobbying also included talks with anti-PTA forces, such as 
the Japanese Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery (MAFF), to work out optimal and 
mutually acceptable solutions regarding Japan’s PTA policy (Yoshimatsu, 2005; Mulgan, 2005; 
2008). 
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Thus, Japan’s move towards regionalism was largely a result of the trade-diverting effects of 
the proliferating PTAs in the region and across the Atlantic, while PTA negotiations were largely 
characterized by domestic cleavages between pro-free trade efficient industries and backward 
sectors with political power, which opposed trade liberalization. The Japan-Mexico PTA, for 
example, emerged as a reaction to NAFTA and was made possible by the push from domestic 
pro-free trade industries and Japanese firms with strong presence overseas as ‘Japanese firms 
with vertically integrated operations in the host country emerge as key supporters of FTAs, in 
particular when their profits are under threat from FTAs signed by other countries.’ Export-
oriented firms with significant FDI abroad had to fight the powerful agricultural lobby in Japan, 
thus emphasizing the importance of pro-PTA forces in the shaping of the Japanese foreign trade 
policy (Manger, 2005:805).  
The rest of this chapter attempts to account for the impact of trade-diverting third-country 
PTAs on the negotiations of Japan’s North-South PTAs with emerging and developing countries, 
particularly Mexico, Chile, and Peru. The following sections attempt to assess the outcomes of 
Japan’s selected North-South PTAs, all of which happened to be second-order agreements, from 
the viewpoint of Japan’s counterpart Southern countries. The assessment aims to determine 
whether the outcomes of these agreements are explained by the sequential order of the PTAs. 
The evaluation of the contents of Japan’s North-South PTAs is carried out based on the criteria 
outlined in Chapter 3 and is summarized in Chapter 6.4.  
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6.1. The Japan-Mexico PTA 
 
Prime Minister Koizumi and President Fox formally announced the start of the Japan-Mexico 
negotiations for a bilateral trade agreement in October 2002,157 which was concluded in March 
2004.158 The economic ties between Japan and Mexico have been developing since the second 
half of the twentieth century. With the establishment of Mexico’s maquiladora industry with the 
Border Industrialization Program in 1965, Japan had been a significant non-American investor in 
maquiladoras. Nissan, a Japanese carmaker, opened its first plant in Mexico back in 1966 in a 
hope to gain increased market share in a highly protected economy. By 1991, the year NAFTA 
negotiations officially initiated between Mexico and the US, Japanese corporations owned 
around seventy maquiladoras, compared to only eight in 1979. In 1991, Japanese maquiladoras 
employed around 25,000 Mexican workers or 6 per cent of the total maquiladora workforce. The 
70-odd Japanese maquiladoras comprised only a modest number among the total of 1,924, but 
they did compare well against non-US maquiladoras and were of high significance because of 
their concentration in important industries, such as electronics and automobile (Koido, 1991, 
Szekely, 1991).  
The spectacular rise of the Japanese maquiladoras during the 1980s was due to a number of 
reasons. Firstly, Mexico, and specifically its maquiladora system, had become an attractive 
cheap-labor destination for multinationals facing intense price competition. Mexico became 
especially attractive for its low labor costs after the 1980s debt crisis and the collapse of the Peso 
																																								 																				
157 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (MOFA): http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/apec/2002/joint_me.html 
(accessed 3 December 2015). 
 
158 The Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) Joint Press Statement, available at 
http://www.meti.go.jp/policy/trade_policy/l_america/mexico/j_mexico/data/press_e.pdf (accessed 3 December 
2015). 
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that followed it. Secondly, Mexico’s proximity to the US and the integration of its production 
processes into the global production chain added onto Mexico’s attractiveness as a global 
production site. Thirdly, a more strategic factor behind the expansion of Japanese maquiladoras 
in the 1980s was the drastic appreciation of the Japanese Yen against the dollar in the mid-1980s, 
which reinforced the need for Japanese multinationals to cut costs domestically and establish in 
low-cost-labor countries. As a result of the appreciation of the Japanese Yen, ‘by the summer of 
1987 more than half of Japanese color television manufacturers had established maquiladora 
operations along the U.S.-Mexican border’ (Koido, 1991:64). Thus, Mexico became a major 
exporter of color television sets by 1989. It became the leading exporter of color television sets 
to the US in the same year, accounting for more than 65 per cent of US sales, including complete 
sets and subassemblies (Koido, 1991; Szekely, 1991).  
As a result of the surge of Japanese investment in Mexico during the 1980s, Japanese total 
trade with the US, Canada, and Mexico doubled from USD 75 billion in 1981 to USD 150 billion 
in 1989 (Szekely, 1991). However, as a result of NAFTA (in force since 1994) and the EU-
Mexico PTA (in force since July 2000), Japanese exporters were feeling left out of the Mexican 
market, to which American and European firms were enjoying preferential access. While 
Mexican tariffs were waning out for American and European firms as a result of NAFTA and the 
EU-Mexico PTA, Japanese exporters faced an average Mexican import tariff of 16.2 per cent in 
2000, which was a significant obstacle for Japanese exporters to Mexico. Tariffs were only part 
of the disadvantage, however. Preferential treatment of American and European investments, as 
well as the effects of other trade-related aspects of the respective PTAs, put Japanese firms into a 
disadvantaged position vis-à-vis their European and American counterparts (Keidanren, 1999; 
2001; 2003; JETRO, 2000; 2005; Hatakeyama, 2002a; 2002b; MOFA, 2002; Solís, 2003; 
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Yoshimatsu, 2005; Manger, 2005; Pempel and Urata, 2006; Solís and Urata, 2007; Villareal, 
2012). The dynamics of the Japan-Mexico trade is presented in Figure 6.1.1 below. 
 
Figure 6.1.1. Japan’s trade with Mexico, in thousand USD, 1990-2013 
 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) data, available at 
http://www.cepal.org/en (accessed 21 November 2014) 
 
According to the estimates of the Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) 
and Keidanren, the absence of a PTA with Mexico, given the latter’s agreements with the US 
and EU, dropped the share of Mexico’s imports from Japan from 6.1 per cent in 1994 to 3.7 per 
cent in 2000. This cost Japan close to USD 3.5 billion (which transformed into a USD 5.5 billion 
decline in the Japanese GDP) and added some 30,000 workers on its soaring unemployment 
figure (Yoshimatstu, 2005; Solís and Katada, 2007b; Vio, 2010). Japanese steel product 
exporters to Mexico were predicted to incur losses of USD 300 million annually as a result of the 
removal of tariffs on EU steel product exports to Mexico (Keidanren, 1999; Yoshimatsu, 2005). 
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Industrial giants like Toyota and Nissan saw the prospects of their future FDIs in Mexico tied to 
a PTA, while Canon had to close a plant in Mexico in 2002 due to lack of progress in the Japan-
Mexico PTA negotiations (Manger, 2005).   
Japanese automakers were especially concerned about the high rules of origin in NAFTA. 
They were facing a dilemma between holding back investment, which was in a disadvantaged 
position vis-à-vis the US firms operating in Mexico, and using more local content to comply with 
the rules of origin requirements. Due to the lack subcontracting networks in the region, however, 
Japanese automakers found it hard to comply with NAFTA’s rules of origin requirements 
(Szekely, 1991, Solís and Katada, 2007b). Other factors too, such as the abolition of the special 
treatment within the maquiladora system in the end of 2000 and the unfavorable condition of 
Japanese firms competing for government procurement in Mexico, accelerated Japan’s move 
towards starting PTA negotiations with Mexico (Hosono and Nishijima, 2001;Keidanren, 2003; 
Yoshimatsu, 2005). 
Hence, a PTA with Mexico had become an urgent matter for Japanese export-oriented 
companies, which pushed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to launch PTA negotiations with 
Mexico ‘as soon as possible’ (MOFA, 2002). The urgency around Japan’s negotiations with 
Mexico, according to Solís and Katada (2007b) and Katada and Solís (2010), made the domestic 
pro-PTA forces in Japan more mobilized, which eventually pressed the Japanese government to 
sign a PTA with Mexico. Mexico’s emergence as a priority for the Japanese government to strike 
an agreement with as soon as possible was not accidental. In theory, an agreement with Korea, 
for example, should have been easier to conclude, given Mexico’s higher share of agricultural 
trade with Japan (21.8 per cent) compared to that of Korea (8.5 per cent) on the background of 
Japan’s sensitivity to agricultural liberalization. In practice, however, the agreement with Mexico 
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was inked in a relatively short period of time, while the agreement with Korea is yet to be 
concluded. This, according to Katada and Solís (2010), was due to the fact that the loss-making 
pro-liberalization industries in Japan were more likely to mobilize and push for the desired 
outcome with Mexico. Meanwhile, an agreement with Korea was for future potential gains and 
not of vital urgency. 
Thus, unlike during the NAFTA negotiations, whereby Mexico was threatened to be 
marginalized, while its competitions enjoyed preferential access to the lucrative US market, the 
Japan-Mexico PTA was negotiated in a completely different light. Japan was the party of the 
negotiations that felt the negative consequences of Mexico’s North-South PTAs with the US 
(i.e., NAFTA) and EU, while Mexico did not feel a vital need to have preferential access to the 
Japanese economy, for it was already enjoying preferential trade relations with the US and EU. 
In such a setting, as hypothesized in this thesis, the negotiations were to produce outcomes that 
would be more favorable for Mexico compared to the bargain it got during its first-order 
negotiations with the US in the framework of NAFTA.  
The remaining of this section looks at the process and outcome of the second-order Japan-
Mexico PTA negotiations in key areas, including tariffs and related measures, government 
procurement, trade in services, investment, and IPRs, as outlined in Chapter 3.   
 
Tariffs and Related Measures 
As a result of the Japan-Mexico PTA, Mexico agreed to liberalize all its imports from Japan, 
while Japan agreed to open up its market for 84 per cent of product lines imported from Mexico 
(Urata, 2005). Despite the incomplete liberalization from the Japanese side, however, Mexico 
managed to secure lower tariffs and greater tariff quotas for sensitive agricultural products such 
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as pork, beef, oranges, and orange juice that comprised a huge part of Mexico’s agricultural 
exports to Japan (Yoshimatsu, 2005; 2006; Ando and Kimura, 2008). 
 
Agriculture 
Agricultural liberalization in the Japan-Mexico negotiations was high on the agenda of Mexican 
negotiators, who wanted to ensure preferential treatment for Mexican key agricultural products, 
including meat and orange juice (Espach, 2006). Japan sought the liberalization of trade in 
manufactured goods but wanted to leave agricultural tariff reductions for sensitive products, such 
as beef, pork, chicken, fruits, and sugar, for later discussion. In fact, MAFF had initially intended 
to keep agriculture immune from liberalization in PTAs and leave it for further WTO 
negotiations. This was an especially significant issue during the negotiations with Mexico 
because the latter was a relatively big agricultural exporter, with 20.6 per cent of its exports to 
Japan consisting of agriculture-related products in 2001. Japanese proposals to keep agricultural 
liberalization off the agreement, however, were ‘flatly rejected’ by Mexico, and notwithstanding 
the lack of desire from MAFF to include agricultural liberalization in the PTA with Mexico, the 
liberalization of agriculture proved to be unavoidable. As a result of the negotiations, Mexico 
was able to achieve ‘a policy change away from the absolute exclusion of agricultural products 
to their inclusion in the FTA’ (Yoshimatsu, 2005:271; Pempel and Urata, 2006:89-90).  
The policy change was enabled, among other things, by the settings of the negotiations, 
whereby Japanese export-oriented industries were discriminated in the Mexican market because 
of NAFTA and the EU-Mexico PTA and were committed to push the Japanese government to 
sign a redressing agreement with Mexico as soon as possible. As a result of the push from the 
pro-PTA forces, represented by the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry 
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(MITI), ‘the Japanese agricultural lobby did make a substantial concession from its original 
position of negotiating exclusively at the multilateral level,’ albeit certain sensitive sectors were 
shielded from complete liberalization (Solís and Katada, 2007b:297). The parties broke the 
deadlock during the negotiations in October 2003 when MAFF agreed to make considerable 
concessions regarding agricultural liberalization, including on pork and orange juice, which were 
among Mexico’s key interests and Japan’s list of politically sensitive products (Yoshimatsu, 
2006).  
Indeed, the agreement with Mexico ‘became the first FTA to affect Japan’s agriculture 
sector.’ The agreement reduced tariffs on Mexico’s imports of sensitive agricultural product, 
such as pork, chicken, and oranges, and within 10 years was going to make 90 per cent of trade 
between the countries tariff-free (JETRO, 2005). Japan was to liberalize 52 per cent of its 
agricultural tariff lines within 10 years, some of them becoming in effect immediately. Some 8 
per cent of product lines would take a longer phase-out period, while the remaining 40 per cent 
were to be excluded from the agreement (Cheong and Cho, 2007). Despite the sensitivity of the 
sector and Japan’s limited concessions in agriculture to its other PTA partners, such as 
Singapore, Malaysia, and the Philippines, Mexico managed to extract significant compromises 
from Japan in agriculture. In pork, beef, and avocado, which together comprised more than a half 
of Mexico’s agricultural exports to Japan in 2005, Mexico managed to secure considerable tariff 
cuts (up to a half of the MFN tariff) or gradually eliminate them altogether (Ando and Kimura, 
2008:8).  
The PTA called for an immediate lowering of tariffs on Mexican pork through low-tariff 
import quotas. Similar low-tariff quotas were introduced for other sensitive agricultural products, 
such as chicken, beef, oranges, and orange juice (JETRO, 2005). As a result of formal 
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negotiations in October 2003, tariffs on pork were slashed by more than a half (from 4.3 to 2 per 
cent) for some 80,000 tons of Mexican pork, twice as much as Mexico was at the time exporting 
to Japan. Mexico added new demands regarding provisions for low-tariff exports of Mexican 
orange juice to Japan. Japan was not ready to provide more concessions in 2003 but in 2004 had 
to eventually agree on a low-tariff quota of 6,500 tons of orange juice annually. Additionally, the 
10-ton quota for chicken was to grow to 8,500 tons, the 10-ton quota for beef to 6,000 tons, and 
the 10-ton quota for oranges to 4,000 tons in five years, representing a 400-650-fold increase in 
low-tariff quotas for key Mexican exports. The 4,000-ton quota for orange juice was to grow to 
6,500 tons in five years. Nevertheless, over a thousand tariff lines, including rice, sugar, apple, 
pineapple, wheat, nectarines, potatoes, and sausages, were excluded from the agreement 
(Yoshimatsu, 2005; 2006; Solís and Katada, 2007b:298).  
According to Solís and Katada (2007b), Japan made substantial concessions on agricultural 
tariffs covering 43 per cent of tariff lines and more than 99 per cent of agricultural trade volume, 
most of the reductions taking effect immediately. The reduction of tariffs and quotas for the so-
called ‘five fingers’—five key agricultural export items for Mexico: pork, chicken, beef, oranges, 
and orange juice—was particularly significant. 
 
Government Procurement 
Government procurement clauses of the Japan-Mexico agreement were of greater importance for 
Mexico as, unlike Japan, Mexico was not a signatory of the WTO GPA during the time of the 
negotiations. The de facto exclusion of Japanese companies from bidding from government 
procurement in Mexico had been a major concern for Japanese firms, especially given the 
Mexican economic revitalization program of May 2003 that was to further limit the participation 
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of foreign firms from countries that did not have a PTA with Mexico in lucrative government 
procurement programs in Mexico, including a PEMEX-related modernization project valued at 
USD 1.6 billion (Keidanren, 2003). 
Government procurement provisions of the Japan-Mexico PTA cover only central/federal 
government entities (Annex 11), while no local/sub-federal entity is subject to the government 
procurement chapter of the agreement. This fact provided Mexico the opportunity to give priority 
to local firms on the sub-federal level. This achievement is spectacular given that firms interested 
in government procurement, together with electronics and automobile industry, were among the 
main lobbyers in Japan for a PTA with Mexico (Keidanren, 2003; Yoshimatsu, 2005; Solís and 
Katada, 2007b). The government procurement thresholds of the Japan-Mexico PTA almost 
identically mirror those in the EU-Mexico agreement and do not cover sub-federal government 
entities. 
 
Table 6.1.1. Government procurement thresholds of the Japan-Mexico PTA 
 Procurement by 
federal 
government 
entities 
Procurement by 
federal 
government 
enterprises 
Construction 
contracts by 
federal 
government 
entities 
Construction 
contracts by 
federal 
government 
enterprises 
For Japan SDR 130,000 SDR 130,000 SDR 4,500,000 SDR 4,500,000 
For Mexico USD 100,000 USD 250,000 USD 6,500,000 USD 8,000,000 
Source: Annex 15 of the Japan-Mexico PTA159 
 
Trade in Services 
The Japan-Mexico negotiations over the provisions in trade in services were contentious, 
whereby Mexico was concerned about keeping the services provisions in line with its GATS 
commitment, while Japan sought GATS-plus measures to secure strong market access provisions 
																																								 																				
159 Annex 15 of Japan-Mexico PTA, available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/latin/mexico/agreement/annex15.pdf 
(accessed 3 December 2015). 
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for its developed services sectors, in par with those provided to American and European 
companies (Solís and Katada, 2007b). 
The services chapter of the Japan-Mexico PTA calls for ‘national treatment’ (Article 98) and 
‘MFN treatment’ (Article 99) and prohibits the parties to require local presence in the forms of 
representation or any other type of enterprise to be eligible to provide cross-border services. 
Although the agreement adopts a ‘negative list’ approach in the liberalization of trade in 
services, the parties restrict the automatic application of the provisions to future activity types by 
reserving ‘[. . . ] the right to adopt or maintain any measure relating to new services other than 
those services recognized [. . . ] at the time of entry into force of this Agreement [. . . ],’ as per 
the provisions under Annex 7 of the Japan-Mexico PTA (Fink and Molinuevo, 2008:278).  
 
Investment Measures 
The investment chapter of the Japan-Mexico PTA (Chapter 7) turned out to be quite broad and 
comprehensive. It calls for ‘national treatment’ (Article 58) and ‘MFN treatment’ (Article 59), 
and has strong wording on expropriation (Article 61) that prohibits direct or indirect 
expropriation through measures ‘tantamount to expropriation or nationalization,’ except for a 
public purpose, on a non-discriminatory basis, in accordance with due process of law and on 
payment of compensation, which is equivalent to the fair market value of the expropriated 
investment and should be paid without delay. Article 65 prohibits performance requirements, 
while Section 2 of Chapter 7 provides for investor-state arbitration that allows firms to bring 
lawsuit directly against governments before arbitration tribunals operating under the arbitration 
rules of either ICSID or UNCITRAL.160  
																																								 																				
160 The text of the Japan-Mexico PTA, available at 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/latin/mexico/agreement/agreement.pdf (accessed 3 December 2015).  
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IPRs 
The IPRs provisions of the Japan-Mexico PTA turned out to be quite weak. In fact, the Japan-
Mexico PTA does not include a separate chapter on IPRs, referring to IPRs in a single article 
(Article 73) under the chapter on investment. Given the MFN clause under the TRIPS agreement 
(Article 4161), which states that ‘with regard to the protection of intellectual property, any 
advantage, favor, privilege or immunity granted by a Member to the nationals of any other 
country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the nationals of all other 
Members,’ it could be argued that, by virtue of being a WTO member, Japan could simply claim 
a not less favorable treatment from Mexico than one provided to the US under NAFTA (Correa, 
2004). Similarly, Fink and Reichenmiller (2005) and Fink (2011) state that, unlike some other 
agreements of the WTO, TRIPS does not provide for an exception to the MFN principle for 
PTAs. Thus, given the fact that both Japan and Mexico are members of the WTO, Japan can be 
entitled to all IPRs-related privileges that Mexico grants to US and Canadian nationals under 
NAFTA.  
The Japan-Mexico PTA, however, is not just silent on many IPRs provisions, but it also 
incorporates clauses that prevent the agreement from being interpreted as WTO-plus by virtue of 
the TRIPS agreement’s MFN clause. Article 73.2 of the Japan-Mexico agreement, with 
somewhat controversial wording, states: 
Nothing in this Chapter shall be construed so as to oblige either Party to extend to investors 
of the other Party and their investments treatment accorded to investors of a non-Party and 
their investments by virtue of multilateral agreements in respect of protection of intellectual 
property rights, to which the former Party is a party.162 
																																								 																				
161 The text of the WTO Agreement, available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips_03_e.htm 
(accessed 3 December 2015). 
 
162 The text of the Japan-Mexico PTA, available at 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/latin/mexico/agreement/agreement.pdf (accessed 3 December 2015). 
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Leaving the interpretation of the (in)consistency of this clause with TRIPS Article 4 to legal 
scholars, it can be concluded that this clause provides Mexico a justification to exclude Japanese 
firms from privileges granted to American and Canadian nationals under NAFTA. Article 73.2 
of the Japan-Mexico PTA might have, among other things, been drafted to keep IPRs-related 
disputes out of the ICSID jurisdiction and resolve such disputes under the WTO dispute 
settlement body in a government-to-government format. In general, Article 73.2 seems to be 
incorporated to prevent the Japan-Mexico PTA from becoming TRIPS-plus.  
Annex 9 of the Japan-Mexico PTA is particularly noteworthy. It provides exceptions to the 
MFN provision for treatments accorded under all international agreements in force prior to 
January 1, 1994.163 This provision effectively excludes any treatment under pre-TRIPS 
agreements (including most of the big conventions under the World Intellectual Property 
Organization) that Mexico may provide to any non-party from being automatically extended to 
Japanese nationals. The pre-TRIPS agreements are quite ambitious in their nature but they lack 
efficient enforcement mechanisms, like the Dispute Settlement Understanding in the WTO 
(Shadlen, 2004), thus keeping them off the Japan-Mexico PTA can be regarded as an important 
step towards preventing restrictive IPRs clauses from being applied.  
 
6.2. The Japan-Chile PTA 
 
The negotiations of the second-order Japan-Chile PTA started in 2005 and, after five rounds of 
negotiations, an agreement was signed in 2007, which entered into force the same year (Wehner, 
																																								 																				
163 The text of the Japan-Mexico PTA, available at 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/latin/mexico/agreement/agreement.pdf (accessed 3 December 2015). 
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2007). Levelling the playing field for Japanese firms operating in Chile was among the main 
reasons behind Japan’s move to start PTA talks with Chile. The disadvantages and forgone 
opportunities that Japanese businesses had experienced due to Chile’s increased participation in 
PTAs in the Americas and the potential negative effects of Chile’s North-South PTAs with the 
EU and US that were under negotiations in the early 2000s made JETRO conclude that a 
comprehensive agreement with Chile ‘should be concluded as soon as possible’ (JETRO, 2001). 
As also argued by Hosono and Nishijima (2001), the potential discrimination of Japanese 
companies vis-à-vis their American and European counterparts was among the main drivers 
behind Japan’s shift towards considering PTAs with both Chile and Mexico.  
Although the overall impact of the agreement was going to be significantly greater for Chile 
than for Japan, which might imply that Chile should have been keener to conclude the talks with 
Japan, the Japanese side was under pressure to complete an agreement as soon as possible 
because of the trade diverting effects of the US-Chile and EU-Chile PTAs on the Japanese auto 
industry. According to the Japan Times (2006), ‘Japanese firms [mostly in the auto industry] 
have complained about disadvantages they face in competing with Chile’s FTA partners in the 
Chilean market and urged the government to speedily sign the pact.’ As a result, while the Japan-
Chile PTA ‘was motivated by the loss-aversion behaviour of important Japanese domestic 
groups, which saw how their main competitors from other countries were getting preferential 
positions in the Chilean market,’ the liberalization of the auto industry was a number one priority 
for Japan (Wehner, 2007:80-81). Hence, domestic pro-liberalization lobbies led by the auto 
industry eventually pushed the Japanese government to sign an agreement with Chile in the 
shortest possible time (Wehner, 2007). As a result, the negotiations of the second-order Japan-
Chile PTA took place against the backdrop of Japanese firms, especially in the auto industry, 
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being discriminated in the Chilean market by their peers from the US and EU. Thus, one of the 
main motivations behind Japan’s move to start trade talks with Chile was to level the playing 
field for its auto and other competitive industries in the Chilean market.  
In 2004, a year before the negotiations started, Japan’s share of Chile’s total imports was 3.2 
per cent, while some 11.6 per cent of Chile’s total exports went to Japan. On the other hand, 
Chile’s share of Japan’s total imports was 0.9 per cent, while some 0.1 per cent of Japanese 
exports went to Chile in 2004.164 The dynamics of the Japan-Chile trade are presented in Figure 
6.2.1 below.  
 
Figure 6.2.1. Japan’s trade with Chile, in thousand USD, 1991-2013 
 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) data, available at 
http://www.cepal.org/en (accessed 6 December 2014) 
 
																																								 																				
164 Report of the Joint Study Group on Japan-Chile Economic Partnership Agreement/ Free Trade Agreement, 
November 2005, available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/latin/chile/report0511.pdf (accessed 3 December 2015). 
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As also seen in Figure 6.2.1, Chile has had a big trade surplus with Japan, which was largely 
a result of Chile’s export of natural resources to Japan, comprising predominantly of copper ores 
and concentrates, lithium carbonates, and molybdenum ores and concentrates. Agriculture and, 
especially, fish and fishery products have comprised another large share of Chilean exports to 
Japan.165 
The effects of the Japan-Chile PTA were estimated at almost 0.5 per cent of GDP for Chile 
and a negligible 0.002 per cent for Japan. These estimates would make the Japan-Chile PTA one 
of the most economically desirable agreements for Chile, while it would not be economically as 
significant for Japan compared to Japan’s other North-South PTAs.166 Other studies, too, 
identified Chile as the primary beneficiary of the Japan-Chile PTA. Brown et al (2010), for 
example, using the Michigan Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) Model of World 
Production and Trade, estimated the welfare effects of the agreement on Japan to be USD 2.8 
billion (0.1% of GNP), while on Chile it was estimated to be USD 0.9 billion (1.0% of GNP).  
The remaining of this section looks at the process and outcome of the second-order Japan-
Chile PTA negotiations in key areas, including tariffs and related measures, government 
procurement, trade in services, investment, and IPRs, as outlined in Chapter 3.  
 
Tariffs and Related Measures 
As a result of the Japan-Chile PTA, some 70 per cent of Chilean exports to Japan, and some 90 
per cent of Japanese exports to Chile, were to become duty-free immediately. Given the 
relatively low level of pre-agreement tariff rates in most sectors, however, the bargain during the 
																																								 																				
165 Report of the Joint Study Group on Japan-Chile Economic Partnership Agreement/ Free Trade Agreement, 
November 2005, available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/latin/chile/report0511.pdf (accessed 3 December 2015). 
 
166 Report of the Joint Study Group on Japan-Chile Economic Partnership Agreement/ Free Trade Agreement, 
November 2005, available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/latin/chile/report0511.pdf (accessed 3 December 2015). 
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Japan-Chile PTA negotiations was around the attempts to exclude sensitive product lines from 
liberalization. In return to the exclusion of certain sensitive agricultural product lines by Japan, 
Chile excluded certain iron and non-alloy steel products and sensitive footwear products from 
the agreement, as well as got longer transition periods for other steel products (Wehner, 2007). 
 
Agriculture 
Japanese imports from Chile have had a high share of agricultural products, particularly fishery. 
In 2005, about 35 per cent of all imports from Chile were of agricultural nature (Ando and 
Kimura, 2008:13). Thus, given Chile’s competitive advantages in agriculture and its sensitivity 
in Japan, agriculture was probably the most important aspect of the Japan-Chile PTA 
negotiations. Japan intended to exclude a broad range of agricultural products from the 
agreement, while Chile intended to secure a better deal for its agricultural exporters. The final 
deal did exclude certain sensitive product lines, including rice, wheat, oranges, mandarins, dairy 
products, and plywood, but it included a number of other important product lines, such as pork, 
chicken, beef, apples, grapes, and grapefruits. Most importantly, the agreement included the 
liberalization of salmon, albeit through progressive tariff removals over ten years, which was a 
key export category for Chile  (Wehner, 2007).  
In fact, unlike a number of other countries of the global South that had negotiated PTAs with 
Japan, such as Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines, Chile managed to secure 
significant tariff cuts for its agricultural exports to Japan. About a third of Chile’s agricultural 
exports to Japan comprised of trout and salmon with a pre-PTA tariff range of 3.5-10 per cent. 
Chile’s exports were dominated by fresh fishery that fell under the 3.5-per cent category. As a 
result of the PTA, these tariff lines were to be gradually eliminated in 10 years. Moreover, tariffs 
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on wine, with pre-PTA levels of 15 per cent were to be gradually abolished in 12 years, and tariff 
quotas were to be introduced on pork, one of the most sensitive agriculture product lines (Ando 
and Kimura, 2008:13).  
 
Government Procurement 
Unlike Japan, Chile was not a member of the WTO Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) 
at the time of the PTA negotiations, thus the government procurement provisions of the PTA 
were going to be more significant especially for Chile. Chapter 12 of the Japan-Chile PTA 
covers government procurement-related measures between the countries. It provides for ‘national 
treatment and non-discrimination’ that obliges the Parties to provide treatment to the goods, 
services, as well as the suppliers of the other Party ‘no less favorable than that it accords to its 
own goods, services and suppliers.’167 The PTA excludes sub-central government entities and 
relies heavily on the WTO GPA agreement. More specifically, Annex 14 of the Japan-Chile PTA 
lists the thresholds of procurement contacts as follows: 
 
Table 6.2.1. Government procurement thresholds of the Japan-Chile PTA 
Procurement by 
Central government 
entities, in SDR 
Procurement by sub-
central government 
entities, in SDR 
Construction contracts 
by Central government 
entities, in SDR 
Construction contracts 
by sub-central 
government entities, 
in SDR 
100,000 Non-applicable 5,000,000 (Chile) 4,500,000 (Japan168) Non-applicable 
Source: Annex 14 of the Japan-Chile PTA169 
 
																																								 																				
167 The text of the Japan-Chile PTA, available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/latin/chile/joint0703/agreement.pdf 
(accessed 12 December 2014). 
 
168 The PTA refers to the threshold under WTO GPA.  
 
169 Annexes of Japan-Chile PTA, available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/latin/chile/joint0703/annex.pdf 
(accessed 3 December 2015). 
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Trade in Services 
The Japan-Chile PTA regulates trade in services through a ‘negative list’ approach, although the 
liberalization of financial services adopted a ‘positive list’ approach (Mattoo and Sauvé, 2011). It 
provides for ‘national treatment’ (Article 107) and ‘MFN treatment’ (Article 108), while Article 
114 provides for safeguard measures in case of serious balance-of-payments and external 
financial difficulties.170 In addition, Article 116 of the Japan-Chile agreement defines a service 
supplier as ‘a person that seeks to supply or supplies a service.’171 As it was the case with the 
EU-Chile and US-Chile PTAs, the wording ‘seeks to supply’ broadens the scope of the 
agreement providing for a greater coverage of the services provisions. 
 
Investment 
The Japan-Chile PTA provides for ‘national treatment’ (Article 73) and ‘MFN treatment’ 
(Article 74) of cross-border investment, as well as investment protection from strife (Article 76). 
Moreover, Article 77 prohibits performance requirements, including export requirements, local 
content requirements, export-to-import ratio requirements, and technology transfer 
requirements.172 In addition, Article 82 of the Japan-Chile PTA prevents any direct 
nationalization or expropriation of investment or indirect measures ‘equivalent to expropriation 
or nationalization,’ except for a public purpose, in a non-discriminatory manner, in accordance 
with due process of law, and on the payment of compensation, which is equivalent to the fair 
market value of the expropriated investment and should be paid without delay and be fully 
																																								 																				
170 The text of the Japan-Chile PTA, available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/latin/chile/joint0703/agreement.pdf 
(accessed 3 December 2015). 
 
171 The text of the Japan-Chile PTA, available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/latin/chile/joint0703/agreement.pdf 
(accessed 3 December 2015). 
 
172 The text of the Japan-Chile PTA, available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/latin/chile/joint0703/agreement.pdf 
(accessed 3 December 2015). 
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realizable and freely transferable.173 And finally, Section 2 of Chapter 8 of the Japan-Chile PTA 
provides for investor-state dispute settlement clauses. Under Chapter 8, investors can submit 
direct claims for damages against nation-states at ICSID or UNCITRAL arbitration tribunals.174 
 
IPRs 
The IPRs provisions of the Japan-Chile PTA draw heavily on the TRIPS agreement, with no 
separate article on patents, an area of IPRs where the policy space in developing and emerging 
economies is circumscribed the most.175 
 
6.3. The Japan-Peru PTA 
 
After seven formal rounds of negotiations during 2009-2010, the second-order Japan-Peru North-
South PTA was signed in 2011 and entered into force in 2012.176 Like it was the case with 
Mexico and Chile, the negotiations with Peru were motivated by Japan’s diminishing positions in 
its counterpart Southern country. A Japan-Peru PTA was to, inter alia, level the playing field for 
Japanese multinationals with their American and European rivals in the Peruvian market 
(Gonzalez-Vigil and Shimuzu, 2012).  
Together with the diminishing Japanese share in the exports and imports of Latin America, 
Japan’s trade with Peru was decreasing, too. While Japan’s share in Latin American imports 
																																								 																				
173 The text of the Japan-Chile PTA, available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/latin/chile/joint0703/agreement.pdf 
(accessed 3 December 2015). 
 
174 The text of the Japan-Chile PTA, available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/latin/chile/joint0703/agreement.pdf 
(accessed 3 December 2015). 
 
175 The text of the Japan-Chile PTA, available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/latin/chile/joint0703/agreement.pdf 
(accessed 3 December 2015). 
 
176 MITI: http://www.meti.go.jp/policy/trade_policy/epa/epa_en/pe/ (accessed 3 December 2015). 
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decreased from 60 per cent in 1990 to less than 21 per cent in 2006 (Gonzalez-Vigil and 
Shimuzu, 2012, Table 1, p.4), Japan’s share in Peru’s total imports, fluctuating around 6-8 per 
cent during the 1990s, fell from more than 6.5 per cent in 2000 to 3.3 per cent in 2013.177 This, 
together with diminishing FDI flows between the nations, was among the reasons why Japan and 
Peru sought and completed a PTA (Gonzalez-Vigil and Shimuzu, 2012). The dynamics of 
Japan’s trade with Peru is presented in Figure 6.3.1 below. 
 
Figure 6.3.1. Japan’s trade with Peru, in thousand USD, 1991-2013 
 
 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) data, available at 
http://www.cepal.org/en (accessed 6 December 2014) 
 
The remaining of this section looks at the process and outcome of the second-order Japan-
Peru PTA negotiations in key areas including tariffs and related measures, agriculture, 
																																								 																				
177 Author’s calculations based on data from the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 
(ECLAC), http://www.cepal.org/en (accessed 6 December 2014). 
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government procurement, trade in services, investment measures, and IPRs, as outlined in 
Chapter 3.  
 
Tariffs and Related Measures 
The Japan-Peru PTA calls for the elimination of 99 per cent of existing tariffs, within a 10-year 
phase-out period (Gonzalez-Vigil and Shimuzu, 2012).  
 
Agriculture  
The Japan-Peru PTA calls for the immediate elimination of Japanese import tariffs on fresh 
asparagus178 and wood, while tariff rates on other products, such as pork, chicken, and corn, were 
going to be reduced in a 10-year period. However, some 749 sensitive tariff lines were excluded 
by Japan from the agreement. The number of excluded tariff lines, however, is much smaller 
compared to those under Japan’s agreements with Mexico (1,300 items) and Chile (1,200 items), 
and thus Japanese concessions to Peru appear to be greater than those provided to Mexico and 
Chile (Gonzalez-Vigil and Shimuzu, 2012). In addition, as per Article 28, Peru reserved the right 
to maintain its Price Band System with respect to certain agricultural goods, aimed at reducing 
the volatility of agricultural prices,179 which can potentially constitute a trade barrier for Japan.180 
 
 
 
																																								 																				
178 Asparagus was an important agricultural export product for Peru, as it had become the world’s leading exporter 
of asparagus by the mid-2000s (Villarreal, 2007). 
 
179 The text of the Japan-Peru PTA, available at 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/latin/peru/epa201105/pdfs/jpepa_ba_e.pdf (accessed 3 December 2015). 
 
180 An agricultural price band (or price range) system is employed to stabilize local prices via the use of import 
duties that vary with international prices (Saggi and Wu, 2015). 
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Government Procurement 
Unlike Japan, Peru was not a member of the WTO Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) 
at the time of the PTA negotiations, thus the government procurement provision of the PTA were 
going be to especially significant for Peru. The government procurement clauses of the Japan-
Peru PTA are covered under Chapter 10 and Annex 9, which provide access to the procurements 
of both central and sub-central government entities.181 The procurement thresholds of the Japan-
Peru PTA are presented in Table 6.3.1 below. 
 
Table 6.3.1. Government procurement thresholds of the Japan-Peru PTA 
Procurement by 
Central government 
entities, in SDR 
Procurement by 
sub-central 
government 
entities, in SDR 
Construction contracts 
by Central government 
entities, in SDR 
Construction 
contracts by sub-
central government 
entities, in SDR 
130,000 200,000 4,500,000 (Japan) 5,000,000 (Peru) 15,000,000 
                                                                           Source: Annex 9 of the Japan-Peru PTA182 
 
Trade in Services 
The Japan-Peru PTA provides for strong market access provisions in services (Article 106), 
calling for ‘national treatment’ (Article 104) and ‘MFN treatment’ (Article 105) via a ‘negative 
list’ approach. Meanwhile, Article 102.1(j) adopts a NAFTA-like definition of a service supplier 
as ‘a person that supplies or seeks to supply a service.’183 
 
																																								 																				
181 The text of the Japan-Peru PTA, available at 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/latin/peru/epa201105/pdfs/jpepa_ba_e.pdf; Annex 9 of the Japan-Peru PTA, available 
at http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/latin/peru/epa201105/pdfs/jpepa_x09_e.pdf (accessed 3 December 2015). 
 
182 Annex 9 of the Japan-Peru PTA, available at 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/latin/peru/epa201105/pdfs/jpepa_x09_e.pdf  (accessed 3 December 2015). 
 
183 The text of the Japan-Peru PTA, available at 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/latin/peru/epa201105/pdfs/jpepa_ba_e.pdf (accessed 3 December 2015). 
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Investment Measures 
The Japan-Peru PTA does not include a chapter on investment, which may have been a result of 
signing a BIT between the parties in 2008 (Gonzalez-Vigil and Shimuzu, 2012). The agreement 
does not specifically address investment-related measures in other chapters either.184 
 
IPRs 
The IPRs chapter of the Japan-Peru PTA is quite limited in scope and mostly draws on the 
TRIPS agreement. More specifically, the patent protection clauses consist of just one article 
(Article 174) that relates mostly to computer programs, while Article 179 calls for the protection 
of test data with no time period specified, ‘in accordance with Article 39 of the TRIPS 
Agreement.’185  
 
6.4. Concluding Remarks 
 
Japan’s trade policy shift towards considering regional and bilateral trade liberalization as a 
complement to multilateral liberalization through the GATT/WTO, took place in the late 1990s 
and early 2000s and was largely determined by the trade diverting effects of North-South PTAs 
signed by the US and EU. Pushed by the need for opening up new markets and providing level 
playing field for its exporters and investors in third markets vis-à-vis their competitors, Japan, 
supported by Keidanren and other pro-free trade lobbies, had to embrace the option of pursuing 
																																								 																				
184 The text of the Japan-Peru PTA, available at 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/latin/peru/epa201105/pdfs/jpepa_ba_e.pdf (accessed 3 December 2015). 
 
185 The text of the Japan-Peru PTA, available at 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/latin/peru/epa201105/pdfs/jpepa_ba_e.pdf (accessed 3 December 2015). 
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North-South PTAs both in the region and, most importantly, in Latin America (Wall, 2002; 
Solís, 2003; Prasirtsuk, 2006; Vio, 2010).  
This chapter has provided a comprehensive assessment of Japan’s second-order North-South 
PTAs with Mexico, Chile, and Peru. The results of the assessment are presented in Table 6.4.1 
below, which provides a measure of restrictiveness of Japan’s three North-South PTAs from the 
standpoint of Japan’s PTA partners, by assigning a value from 1 to 10 (1 is least restrictive, 10 is 
most restrictive) to each area of North-South cooperation discussed in Chapter 3. 
 
Table 6.4.1. An overview of Japan’s North-South PTAs 
PTA 
Order 
of the 
PTA 
Tariffs 
(including 
agriculture) 
and Related 
Measures 
Government 
Procurement Services Investment IPRs 
Japan-Mexico second 5 4 7 8 1 
Japan-Chile second 5 5 7 8 1 
Japan-Peru second 5 8 9 1 1 
 
As seen from Table 6.4.1, Japan’s second-order North-South PTAs with Mexico, Chile, and 
Peru turned out to be not as restrictive for the three Latin American countries, especially when 
compared to their first-order North-South PTAs. The lack of primary data on the negotiations of 
Japan’s agreements, which is one of the shortcomings of this thesis, does not allow the 
establishment of a direct link between the sequential order of the agreements and their outcomes, 
through the mechanism outlined in Chapter 2. However, as was the case with the US and EU 
agreements, the setting of the negotiations enabled by the sequential order of the agreements 
hints on the link between the order of an agreement and its outcome. In the case of Japan, the 
second-order negotiations with Mexico, Chile, and Peru took place against the backdrop of 
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Japan’s diminishing positions in the three Latin American countries and the push from Japan’s 
competitive pro-free trade industries to complete the negotiations as soon as possible.  
The negotiations of the Japan-Mexico PTA took place against the background of Japanese 
firms losing market share in Mexico, which was resulting in billions of dollars of lost profits for 
Japanese companies and deteriorating employment in Japan (Yoshimatstu, 2005; Solís and 
Katada, 2007b; Vio, 2010). With NAFTA and the EU-Mexico PTA coming into effect, Japanese 
exporters and investors in Mexico saw the absence of a Japan-Mexico PTA as a significant 
obstacle for Japanese firms that were being heavily discriminated against by the falling tariffs 
and other trade and trade-related barriers between Mexico and the US and Mexico and the EU, 
while Japanese exports faced an average import tariff of 16.2 per cent in Mexico in 2000. As a 
result, a PTA with Mexico had become an urgent matter for Japanese export-oriented companies, 
which pushed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to launch PTA negotiations with Mexico ‘as soon 
as possible’ (Keidanren 2001; JETRO, 2000; 2005; MOFA, 2002; Solís, 2003; Yoshimatsu, 
2005; Manger, 2005; Pempel and Urata, 2006; Solís and Urata, 2007).  
Given the setting of the negotiations, Mexico demonstrated increased bargaining power 
during the talks. It managed to counter Japanese negotiating priorities, causing policy shifts in 
Japan’s approach to PTAs and securing outcomes in line with its negotiating priorities, including 
in agriculture, which in 2001 comprised 20.6 per cent of its exports to Japan. More specifically, 
Mexico managed to ‘flatly reject’ Japanese proposals to keep agricultural liberalization off the 
agreement and achieve ‘a policy change away from the absolute exclusion of agricultural 
products to their inclusion in the FTA’ (Yoshimatsu, 2005:271; Pempel and Urata, 2006:89-90). 
In other areas, too, including government procurement, trade in services, and especially IPRs, the 
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agreement turned out to be not as restrictive for Mexico. The only exception was perhaps 
investment measures that provide state-of-the-art protection of all forms of investment.186  
The second-order Japan-Chile agreement, too, was negotiated in a setting whereby levelling 
the playing field with competitors was a major factor behind Japan’s intentions to start and 
conclude the PTA talks. The potential discrimination of Japanese companies vis-à-vis their 
American and European counterparts in Chile was among the main drivers behind Japan’s shift 
towards considering a PTA with the Latin American country (Hosono and Nishijima, 2001). As a 
result of the push from the pro-liberalization lobby in Japan, JETRO (2001) concluded that a 
PTA with Chile ‘should be concluded as soon as possible.’  
Thus, in line with the hypothesis of this thesis, the second-order Japan-Chile PTA produced 
outcomes in major policy areas, including agriculture, government procurement, trade in 
services, and especially IPRs, that favor Chilean priorities and are not as restrictive as Chile’s 
other North-South PTAs. Like it was the case in Japan-Mexico PTA, the only exception was 
investment protection, which turned out to be quite restrictive with strict investment protection 
and investor-state arbitration clauses.187  
The second-order Japan-Peru agreement, too, was negotiated against the backdrop of the 
diminishing positions of Japanese businesses in Peru vis-à-vis their American and European 
rivals. Thus, the negotiations with Peru had the mandate to level the playing field for Japanese 
multinationals in the shortest possible time (Gonzalez-Vigil and Shimuzu, 2012). As it can be 
seen from Table 6.4.1, Peru managed to take advantage of the settings of the negotiations, which 
																																								 																				
186 The text of the Japan-Mexico PTA, available at 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/latin/mexico/agreement/agreement.pdf (accessed 3 December 2015). 
 
187 The text of the Japan-Chile PTA, available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/latin/chile/joint0703/agreement.pdf 
(accessed 3 December 2015). 
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increased its bargaining position, and secure a deal with Japan that is far less restrictive than its 
first-order North-South PTA with the US.  
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7. Conclusion 
 
This thesis has contributed to the debate of what are the policy preferences of Northern and 
Southern countries in North-South trade relations and how these preferences are advanced or 
constrained during North-South preferential trade negotiations. More specifically, it has 
addressed the zero-sum problem of who gets what share of the increased welfare pie brought 
about by non-zero-sum preferential trade liberalization through North-South PTAs. It has argued 
that, contrary to the conventional argument, North-South preferential trade relations are not 
ubiquitously decided by North-South power asymmetries that produce asymmetric outcomes in 
favor of Northern countries. The thesis has advanced a novel approach that takes a differentiated 
and longer-term view on North-South preferential trade relations by distinguishing between first-
order, i.e., Southern countries’ first, and second-order, i.e., Southern countries’ subsequent, 
North-South PTAs. The thesis claims that there is sufficient evidence to suggest that the ‘order’ 
of an agreement affects the outcome of North-South PTA negotiations, whereby first-order 
agreements improve the bargaining positions of Southern countries in subsequent, i.e., second-
order, negotiations.  
North-South power asymmetries are better utilized in first-order North-South PTA 
negotiations. In this case, the ‘no agreement’ outcome of North-South preferential trade 
negotiations is costlier for the Southern country, as it cannot afford to be left out while its peers 
gain preferential access to a Northern market. As a result, the Southern country becomes 
vulnerable to discriminative pressures and is ‘forced’ to agree to a first-order North-South PTA 
on terms largely dictated by the North. Notwithstanding the restrictive nature of first-order 
agreements for developing and emerging economies, these agreements make Southern countries 
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immune to marginalization and help them exert pressure on Northern countries during second-
order North-South PTA negotiations. In second-order PTA negotiations, the ‘no agreement’ 
outcome becomes costlier for the Northern country, for its firms lose out in the competition with 
multinationals from other developed countries in third markets, while the Southern country is not 
easily marginalized because it has stable preferential access to a Northern market through a first-
order North-South agreement.   
As it can be seen from Table 7.1 below, Mexico, Chile, Korea, Colombia, and Peru, five 
countries of the Global South that have been active in North-South preferential trade 
negotiations, improved their bargaining positions during second-order North-South PTA 
negotiations, albeit to varying extents, and secured much better deals in second-order PTAs 
compared to their first-order agreements.  
 
Table 7.1. An overview of first-order and second-order North-South PTAs 
PTA 
Order 
of the 
PTA 
Tariffs and 
Related 
Measures 
Government 
Procurement Services Investment IPRs 
NAFTA first 9 9 10 10 10 
EU-Mexico second 5 4 6 1 1 
Japan-Mexico second 5 4 7 8 1 
EU-Chile first 7 8 7 7 1 
US-Chile second 4 7 9 9 8 
Japan-Chile second 5 5 7 8 1 
US-Korea first 9 5 10 9 10 
EU-Korea second 3 4 5 1 7 
US-Colombia first 10 10 10 9 10 
US-Peru first 10 10 10 9 10 
EU-Colombia 
and Peru second 5 8 8 4 5 
Japan-Peru second 5 8 9 1 1 
 
Table 7.1 is the combination of Tables 4.6.1, 5.5.1, and 6.4.1 that illustrate the restrictiveness 
of the US, EU, and Japanese North-South PTAs from the standpoint of Southern countries by 
assigning a value from 1 to 10 (1 is least restrictive, 10 is most restrictive) to key policy areas 
in North-South PTAs.  
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The effect of the ‘order’ of an agreement is especially significant when a Southern country’s 
first-order agreement is with the US. Having signed first-order North-South agreements with the 
US, albeit on terms largely dictated by American negotiators, Mexico, Korea, Colombia, and 
Peru considerably improved their bargaining positions during second-order North-South PTA 
negotiations with the EU and Japan. This helped them resist restrictive terms and push for their 
negotiating priorities during second-order negotiations.  
The findings for Chile, which signed its first-order North-South PTA with the EU, depicted a 
picture that is somewhat divergent from the central argument of this thesis. The provisions of the 
second-order US-Chile PTA in trade in services, investment, and IPRs turned out to be much 
more stringent and went much further beyond the WTO than those under the first-order EU-
Chile agreement (see Table 7.1). A few generalizations, however, stand out. Firstly, although the 
second-order US-Chile PTA turned out to be more restrictive than the first-order EU-Chile PTA, 
it should be noted that the first-order EU-Chile PTA happens to be more in line with EU 
preferences than, for example, the second-order EU-Mexico PTA, which in a number important 
aspects did not go as far as the EU would have preferred. The discriminative pressure felt by the 
EU during the negotiations with Mexico, which was absent during the talks with Chile, can 
explain the difference in the outcomes of the first-order EU-Chile and second-order EU-Mexico 
PTAs. The prevailing logic behind the EU’s negotiations with Mexico was to counter the 
negative consequences of NAFTA by signing an EU-Mexico deal as soon as possible, which 
gave Mexican negotiators additional bargaining power as they exploited the ‘NAFTA factor’ 
very well. The talks with Chile, on the other hand, took place under different circumstances, 
whereby no pressure was present on the EU as it sought to secure a first-mover advantage in 
Chile and fully enjoy the privileges of enhanced access to the Chilean market and the country’s 
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liberalized investment regime, while competitors, such as the US, dealt with Chile on WTO 
terms. As a result, as observed by one commentator (Reiter 2003:90), the EU-Chile PTA 
thoroughly ‘filled the gaps’ in the EU-Mexico PTA (Interview1; Interview 2). 
Secondly, although clearly a much more restrictive agreement than the EU-Chile PTA, the 
second-order US-Chile North-South PTA seems to be a better deal for the Southern party of the 
agreement compared to other US North-South PTAs, such as the first-order US-Columbia and 
US-Peru PTAs.  This difference too, among other things, can be explained by the fact that, unlike 
in the first-order US-Columbia and US-Peru negotiations, in the second-order US-Chile North-
South negotiations the Southern country, i.e., Chile, empowered by its preferential trade ties with 
the EU, resisted more stringent clauses, most specifically in IPRs, initially proposed by the US. 
Meanwhile, during the negotiations of the first-order US-Colombia and US-Peru North-South 
agreements, the fear of being left out played an important role in forcing the Southern parties, 
i.e., Colombia and Peru, to agree on restrictive provisions in every singe policy area outlined in 
this thesis (Interview 2; Interview 11).  
Chile’s deviation from the overall picture may be explained by the fact that, although the EU-
Chile agreement is technically a first-order North-South PTA, it was negotiated almost 
simultaneously with the second-order US-Chile North-South PTA. In fact, the negotiations of the 
US-Chile agreement were completed (December 2002) only a month after the signing of the EU-
Chile PTA (November 2002), which may have diminished the effect of the first-order agreement 
on the second-order PTA. In fact, as recounted by Dür (2007), the EU-Chile negotiations were 
affected by the potential consequences of US engagement with Chile either through a bilateral 
PTA or Chile’s possible accession to NAFTA.  
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The divergence of Chile from the main hypothesis points both to some of the limitations of 
this research and to how it can contribute to broader research agendas on the question of North-
South PTAs. The parsimonious approach adopted by this thesis may have neglected other 
variables that could have affected the outcomes of North-South PTAs. First, there may have been 
differences between Northern countries. Unlike the EU and Japan, the US may have been much 
more efficient in projecting power and utilizing North-South asymmetries due to its economic 
and political prominence and the specifics of its trade policy. The boost in Southern countries’ 
bargaining positions during second-order negotiations may have been sufficient to bend the 
negotiating priorities of Japan and the EU but not those of the US, given the greater economic 
and political weight the latter possesses. Second, the EU’s ‘underachievement’ in investment 
protection in most of its North-South PTAs may have been alternatively explained by the lack of 
mandate, for before the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, investment was dealt with 
through BITs that were negotiated by individual member-states and not through EU trade 
agreements. Although this factor may not explain EU agreements negotiated after 2009, it may 
explain some of the outcomes of the agreements negotiated before 2009. Another limitation of 
the thesis is the lack of primary data on Japan’s PTA negotiations. Unlike in the cases of the US 
and EU, no interviews were conducted with Japanese trade officials, which leaves the analysis 
short of sufficient causal links between the sequential order of Japanese agreements and their 
outcomes. In sum, this thesis argues for the importance of the ‘order’ of a North-South PTA, 
which affects the outcomes of North-South negotiations. However, a more complete picture 
involves a range of arguments that go from the sequential order of North-South PTAs to other 
possible factors that open a prospect for further research on the question of North-South trade 
relations.  
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This research has important theoretical and practical implications. From the theoretical point 
of view, the findings of this thesis imply that the ‘influence effect of foreign trade,’ which 
according to Hirschman (1969:17) raises the bargaining power of economically stronger 
countries, is mitigated when the sequential order of North-South PTA negotiations is taken into 
consideration.  Hence, the new dimension in North-South relations, namely the ‘order’ of a 
North-South PTA, can potentially redefine these relations by downplaying the somewhat 
exaggerated role of power asymmetries in North-South preferential trade relations.  
From the viewpoint of practical policy considerations, on the other hand, this thesis has 
serious implications for both developed and developing countries. Given the strategic importance 
of first-order North-South PTAs, the bulk of the developing and least developed countries, which 
are yet to complete their first full-fledged North-South PTAs, besides the more obvious benefits 
of these agreements, will have to also consider the agreements’ potential implication on their 
bargaining powers in subsequent PTA negotiations. This will be something to be factored in 
Northern countries’ calculations, too, when they decide to pursue new North-South PTAs. 
Because, as this study suggests, first-order agreements are more favourable for Northern 
countries, these agreements will not only provide developed countries with a first-mover 
advantage in Southern countries but will also serve as an attractive venue for furthering their 
policy preferences in international trade. This may provide an additional impetus to initiate new 
agreements and thus augment the discrimination-induced proliferation of PTAs.  
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Appendix I. List of Interviewees 
 
Interview 1. Trade official at the European Commission Directorate-General for Trade, Rue de 
la Loi 170, 1049 Brussels, Belgium, December 2012 
 
Interview 2. Trade official at the European Commission Directorate-General for Trade, Rue de 
la Loi 170, 1049 Brussels, Belgium, December 2012 
 
Interview 3. Trade official at the European Commission Directorate-General for Trade, Rue de 
la Loi 170, 1049 Brussels, Belgium, December 2012 
 
Interview 4. Trade official at the European Commission Directorate-General for Trade, Rue de 
la Loi 170, 1049 Brussels, Belgium, December 2012 
 
Interview 5. Trade official at the European Commission Directorate-General for Trade, Rue de 
la Loi 170, 1049 Brussels, Belgium, December 2012 
 
Interview 6. Trade official at the European Commission Directorate-General for Trade, Rue de 
la Loi 170, 1049 Brussels, Belgium, December 2012 
 
Interview 7. Trade official at the European Commission Directorate-General for Trade, Rue de 
la Loi 170, 1049 Brussels, Belgium, December 2012 
 
Interview 8. Trade official at the European Commission Directorate-General for Trade, Rue de 
la Loi 170, 1049 Brussels, Belgium, December 2012 
 
Interview 9. Trade official at the European Commission Directorate-General for Trade, Rue de 
la Loi 170, 1049 Brussels, Belgium, December 2012 
 
Interview 10. Official at the Office of the US Trade Representative, 600 17th Street NW, 
Washington, DC 20508, United States, April 2012 
 
Interview 11. Official at the Office of the US Trade Representative, 600 17th Street NW, 
Washington, DC 20508, United States, April 2012 
 
Interview 12. Official at the Office of the US Trade Representative, 600 17th Street NW, 
Washington, DC 20508, United States, April 2012 
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